CA Unpub Decisions

Californias Unclaimed Property Law, or UPL (Code Civ. Proc., 1500 et seq.),[1] sets forth a comprehensive procedure under which certain types of unclaimed property escheat conditionally to the state, which then holds that property as a custodian until it is reclaimed by the rightful owner. (Fong v. Westly (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 841, 844 (Fong).) Historically, the payment of a property owners claim has included interest for the period the property was held by the state. ( 1540, former subd. (c).) In 2003, the Legislature amended the UPL to provide that when an owner files a claim to recover unclaimed property or the proceeds from its sale, [n]o interest shall be payable on any claim paid under this chapter. ( 1540, subd. (c); Stats. 2003, ch. 228, 8 (AB 1756), effective August 11, 2003.) We conclude that this provision, which allows the state to retain interest generated on unclaimed property, is not an unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation. (U.S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. 1, 19.) Court affirm the trial courts order granting summary judgment in favor of respondent the State of California (the State).

Kay Campbell (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered in favor of Costco Wholesale Corporation (respondent) after the trial court granted respondents motion for nonsuit. She contends that nonsuit was improper because (1) there was sufficient evidence to permit a jury to find in her favor; (2) the trial court erred in ruling that expert testimony was necessary to establish respondents negligence; and (3) the trial court erred in excluding relevant evidence. Court reject the contentions and affirm the judgment.

Defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of failing to update his annual sex offender registration. He contends that the charge was barred by the statute of limitations and that he was improperly denied custody credits. Court affirm.

Appellants in this action are objectors to a class action settlement who contend the trial court erred when it approved the settlement and awarded attorney fees. Court conclude the court did not abuse its discretion and affirm.

Appellant Larry S. Finks possesses an identification card authorizing him to engage in the use of medical marijuana pursuant to the state Medical Marijuana Program (Health & Saf. Code, 11362.7, subd. (g).) The sole issue he presents by this appeal is the propriety of a condition of probation requiring him to surrender that card and not obtain a new one during the term of probation. The parties assume, as Court do, that the purpose of this condition is to prohibit appellant from using medical marijuana while on probation. Court strike the condition and otherwise affirm the judgment.

On appeal, appellant claims that because she was not properly advised of her constitutional rights of confrontation and against self-incrimination, her concession of prior convictions is invalid. We conclude, under the authority of People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 362-365 (Mosby), and the totality of the circumstances, that appellant freely and intelligently waived her constitutional rights because (1) the trial court partially advised her of such rights; (2) she had just confronted witnesses at trial; and (3) appellant had extensive experience with the criminal justice system. The judgment is affirmed.

On August 14, 2005, plaintiff Carl L. LaRue, while riding a bicycle, was struck by a car driven by defendant Joseph A. DeMarco.[1] On October 7, 2005, LaRue filed an unverified complaint prepared on a Judicial Council form, alleging a cause of action for negligence against DeMarco. In addition to actual damages, an award of punitive damages was sought on the ground that DeMarco was guilty of malice as defined in Civil Code section 3294. As mandated by Code of Civil Procedure section 425.10, subdivision (b), the complaint did not specify the amount of actual or punitive damages. Instead, pursuant to sections 425.11 and 425.115, LaRue set forth the nature and amount of damages being sought in a separate statement of damages prepared on a Judicial Council form. LaRue sought damages in the total sum of $3,500,650, consisting of general and special damages of $2,000,650, and punitive damages of $1.5 million.
Defendant Joseph A. DeMarco appeals from an order denying his motion to vacate a default and default judgment entered in favor of plaintiff Carl L. LaRue. Court affirm.

Nelson G. Castrejon appeals from a judgment entered after he pleaded guilty to possessing cocaine base for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5.) He contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Court disagree and affirm.

Evelyn Floyd appeals from an order placing her on probation. She challenges two of the probation conditions that were imposed. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed the conditions and affirm the probation order.

Defendant James Garfield Ratcliff appeals his conviction by a jury in a trial at which he was not present. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in deeming his absence voluntary because he did not waive his right to be present and the court failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that his absence was voluntary. Court conclude that the trial court was justified in proceeding in defendants absence and, further, that defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object when the court advised the jury that his absence was voluntary. Thus, Court affirm.

William Carlo Elam (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered after he pled guilty to assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury. Appellants counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and requests that we conduct an independent review of the record. Appellant was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief and has not filed such a brief. Having independently reviewed the record, Court conclude there are no issues that require further briefing, and affirm the judgment.

Angela L. (appellant) appeals from the juvenile courts order, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26,[1] terminating her parental rights with respect to her daughter, Brianna L. (now two years old). Appellant contends (1) the juvenile courts adoptability finding was not supported by substantial evidence, and (2) the courts finding that the parent-child relationship exception to adoption did not apply was not supported by substantial evidence. Court affirm the juvenile courts order.

Defendant John William Marsic (Appellant) appeals from a final judgment and sentence following his plea of no-contest to a violation of Penal Code section 288.5, subdivision (a). Appellants counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, requesting that we conduct an independent review of the entire record on appeal. Having done so, Court affirm the judgment and sentence of the trial court.

Appellant law firm Glassberg, Pollak & Associates (Glassberg) successfully defended a professional malpractice suit brought by respondent Richard J. Wolf (Wolf). On appeal, Glassberg argues that Wolfs action constituted both a breach of contract claim and a negligence claim, entitling it to attorney fees pursuant to an underlying contract. (See Civ. Code, 1717 (section 1717).) Court affirm the order denying fees.