CA Unpub Decisions

L.C. appeals from a post-permanency review order continuing legal guardianship as the permanent plan for her teenage son H.B. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.3, subd. (e)).[1] Appellants appointed appellate counsel submitted a letter in June 2008, advising that no brief would be forthcoming (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952). Court thereafter extended time for appellant to personally file a letter brief.

A modification decision.

Dilip Vithlani filed a collection action against a former client, Arnold McMahon, who refused to pay his legal bills. McMahon filed a cross-complaint against Vithlani. After ruling on several pretrial motions, the trial court entered judgment in Vithlanis favor in both actions. On appeal, McMahon asserts the trial court erroneously: (1) sustained Vithlanis demurrer to four claims in McMahons cross-complaint without leave to amend; (2) refused to allow McMahon to amend his cross-complaint by adding a new legal malpractice claim; (3) denied McMahons ex parte request to continue the summary judgment motion to conduct further discovery; (4) granted Vithlanis summary judgment motion as to his collection action because there was a triable issue as to Vithlanis legal incompetence; (5) allowed Vithlani to submit confidential attorney/client communications as evidence to support his summary judgment motion; (6) deemed Vithlanis motion for change of venue moot; and (7) failed to consider an argument raised in McMahons untimely corrected declaration in opposition to the summary judgment motion. Court conclude each of his contentions lack merit. The judgment is affirmed.

Plaintiff Vincent F. Simmon appeals from an order granting a new trial and simultaneously staying the entire action after he had prevailed at trial on his breach of contract action against defendant Kimberly Kirby. The court concluded it had committed legal error in exercising jurisdiction over the case, ruling that plaintiff was required to proceed against defendant in a marital dissolution action then pending between plaintiff and defendants mother. We disagree with the courts reasons for making the order. The other grounds urged as a basis for a new trial are without merit. Accordingly, we reverse the order granting a new trial and staying the proceeding and remand with directions to vacate said order and to enter a new order denying the motions for new trial and for a stay of the proceeding.

Patty D., mother of the children at issue here, appeals from juvenile court dispositional orders that awarded legal and physical custody of one child, K., to K.s father, who was previously a noncustodial parent; dismissed the dependency proceedings as to K.; and continued a second child, J., in out-of-custody care with family reunification services. Mother contends that (1) the courts finding that placing K. with her father would not be detrimental to her is not supported by substantial evidence, (2) the courts order terminating jurisdiction over K. is not supported by substantial evidence, and (3) the court should have appointed separate counsel for the children as an actual conflict of interest existed between them. As we find no error requiring reversal, Court affirm the dispositional orders as to both children.

Appellant is the biological father of the child who is the subject of this dependency proceeding. He appeals from an October 26, 2007 juvenile court order after remand finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) is not applicable in the proceeding, and reinstating a prior order terminating parental rights. He contends that the juvenile court order must be reversed because respondent Department of Social & Employment Services (the Department) and the court failed to comply with this courts remand directions. He also contends that the court committed Marsden[1] error, that he had a due process right to be transported for the October 26, 2007 hearing, and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. As we find that the record does not support the juvenile courts finding that the ICWA notice sent by the Department after remand was adequate, Court reverse the order and again remand the matter for the limited purpose of complying with the notice requirements of the ICWA.

Dale I. challenges, by writ petition, the juvenile courts decision to set a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1]hearing regarding his son B. He contends: (1) the juvenile court erred when it determined that there would be a substantial risk of detriment to B. if he were returned to petitioners custody; (2) the juvenile court erred when it determined that petitioner was offered reasonable reunification services; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion when it reduced petitioners visitation. For the reasons stated below, the petition is denied.

Mari-Lynne Earls (Earls) appeals an order, filed August 3, 2006, granting her neighbor Elizabeth Lees (Lee) petition for an injunction against Earls pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6.[1] The court also denied Earls petition for similar relief against Lee, ruled that Lee was not in contempt of any court order, and provided that a prior temporary restraining order against Lee, if it was still in effect, should be dissolved. The court further provided that Lee was the prevailing party for the purpose of an attorney fee award. Court shall hold that the first two procedural claims of error are without merit because they are based upon the incorrect premise that a prior order continuing in effect temporary mutual restraining orders constituted a final determination of the merits of Lees section 527.6 petition. Court also find that substantial evidence supports the injunctive relief granted, and shall affirm the order.

Appellant Jarell Maurice Johnson was found guilty, following a jury trial, of the murder of Maria King. On appeal, appellant contends (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress incriminating statements obtained in violation of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda); and (2) the redaction of his videotaped confession was error under constitutional and statutory law and was prejudicial to his defense. Court affirm the judgment.

After a ten-day jury trial, appellant was convicted of arson and sentenced to state prison for a term of five years. He appeals claiming abuse of discretion by the trial court in not sufficiently inquiring into a complaint of possible jury misconduct. Court find no abuse of discretion and hence affirm.

Appellant Howard Lawrence Webber, Jr., was prosecuted for two instances of making criminal threats. The two incidents occurred just over six months apart, and had different victims. The second incident, but not the first one, also involved domestic violence. The two cases were consolidated and tried together, and appellant was convicted in both. Court find no abuse of discretion in the consolidation of the two sets of charges, and reject appellants due process arguments. Court therefore affirm the judgment.

Appellant Roddy Allen McNevin appeals from a sentence and judgment following a plea of no contest to 11 counts of committing lewd or lascivious acts upon a child less than 14 years of age (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a)).[1] Appellants 28-year sentence resulted from the imposition of the upper term of eight years for Count One and two years for each of the remaining eight counts, to be served consecutively. Appellant challenges the sentence, claiming: (1) the aggravated sentence imposed for Count One violated his constitutional right to a jury trial; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel for his counsels failure to object to this alleged sentencing error; and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel for counsels failure to request a continuance of the sentencing hearing to allow the court time to review written sentencing mitigation materials submitted by the defense. For the reasons set forth below, Court conclude these claims lack merit and affirm the sentence.

Appellant Lynwood Darian Neubert having failed to secure a certificate of probable cause as required by Penal Code section 1237.5, his appeal is hereby dismissed. Our record contains neither a statement of certificate grounds nor a certificate of probable cause. In its brief, respondent raised this deficiency as grounds for dismissal. Appellant filed neither a reply brief nor any documentation in response. The appeal is dismissed.

Appellant Khalid Gheith was charged with four felony counts: auto burglary, receiving stolen property, possession of oxycodone, and possession of hydrocodone. All of the charges arose from the same incident on November 22, 2005. Appellant was also alleged to have been on bail in another matter at the time of the new offenses. Appellant pled guilty to felony receiving stolen property with the understanding that he would be placed on probation. At the time of the plea, the court informed him: Youre to pay any out of pocket restitution owing in this case. The balance of the complaint was dismissed.