CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Toni S. (mother) appeals from a juvenile court order issuing a restraining order against her and terminating her parental rights to Anthony S. (Anthony, born Apr. 1992), F.R. (F.R., born Apr. 1998), and Francisco D. (Francisco, born July 2005) (collectively the minors). Mother argues that the juvenile courts order terminating her parental rights must be reversed because respondent Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to provide proper notice as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.). Regarding the restraining order, mother contends that the juvenile courts order is not supported by substantial evidence. The juvenile courts issuance of a permanent restraining order against mother is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, Court affirm that order.

D.T., a minor, appeals from an order declaring him a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602[1]by reason of his having committed grand theft auto (Pen. Code, 487, subd. (d)(1)) and theft or unauthorized driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851, subd.(a)). The grand theft auto count was dismissed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. The juvenile court ordered appellant placed in the Camp Community Placement Program and set a maximum term of confinement of three years eight months. Appellant contends that the juvenile court failed to exercise its discretion, as required by section 702, to determine whether the adjudicated allegation was a felony or misdemeanor, requiring remand for the juvenile court to make that determination.

Defendant Anna Maria Gonzalez appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted her of one count of possession of methamphetamine in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a). She was placed on three years probation under the terms and conditions of Proposition 36 and ordered to pay a $200 restitution fine, a $100 drug rehabilitation fine and a $50 lab fee.

six-month review hearing ( 366.21, subd. (e)) after expiration of the 18-month statutory limit for reunification ( 361.5, subd. (a)(3), 366.22), terminating family reunification services and setting a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 to consider selection and implementation of a permanent plan for his two year old daughter Jessica M. Court deny the petition, finding no merit to Ramon R.s contentions there was not substantial evidence to support a finding Jessicas return to his care would create a substantial risk of detriment to her well being, and the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying his request for a continuance of the hearing.

Plaintiff Jim K. Elliott sold a portion of his property to defendant Gilbert Retail Holdings. When plaintiff subsequently encountered difficulties in developing his remaining parcel, he sued defendant for breach of contract and declaratory relief, asserting defendant failed to perform as their agreement required. The trial court sustained defendants demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment in defendants favor. Plaintiff appeals, asserting his complaint states valid causes of action. Court affirm the judgment.

Deanna R. and Andrew B., parents of the minors, appeal from orders terminating their parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code,[1] 366.26, 395.) Appellants challenge the juvenile courts findings that the minors were likely to be adopted and the orders terminating parental rights on several grounds and argue the court erred in failing to place the minors with the paternal grandmother. Court affirm.

A.J. (petitioner), the mother of the minor, seeks an extraordinary writ to vacate orders of the juvenile court entered at the dispositional hearing denying reunification services and setting a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) Petitioner contends the juvenile court erred by refusing to conduct a contested dispositional hearing to address the relative placement request of the paternal grandmother. Court deny the petition and the request for a stay.

A jury convicted defendant Tye (aka Tina) Mathews of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1)) and possession of narcotics paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, 11364). Mathews admitted that she had six prior felony convictions, including a conviction for robbery, in violation of section 211. The court sentenced Mathews to prison for seven years.
On appeal, Mathews contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction for possession of the firearm, and (2) the trial court erred when it denied her mistrial motion because prospective jurors may have seen her in restraints before trial. Court conclude that the record contains substantial evidence to support Mathews's conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mathews's motion for mistrial. Court therefore affirm the judgment.

Mark Anthony Morgan entered negotiated guilty pleas to two counts of committing a lewd act on a child (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a); all statutory references are to the Penal Code) and admitted he had substantial sexual conduct with a child under 14 years of age ( 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)) with respect to each count. Under the plea bargain, the prosecution agreed to dismiss four other counts of committing a lewd act on a child and two counts of committing a forcible lewd act on a child ( 288, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court sentenced Morgan to a 10 year prison term; the eight year upper term for the first count plus two years (one third the middle term) for the second count. As circumstances in aggravation, the court noted the crime involved a high degree of callousness, the victim was vulnerable and Morgan had taken advantage of a position of trust to commit the offense.

Defendant Sherman Alan Brown, Jr., appeals from his conviction of two counts of second degree murder (Pen. Code,[1] 187, subd. (a) counts 1 and 2), along with true findings on the allegations of personal firearm use with injury ( 12022.53, subd. (d)) as to those counts, and one count of endangering a child ( 273a, subd. (a) count 4). Defendant contends (1) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence statements obtained in violation of defendants privilege against self-incrimination; (2) the evidence of malice was insufficient to support his convictions for second degree murder; (3) the trial court erred in limiting the testimony of an expert witness for the defense; (4) defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to request a jury instruction that evidence of mental disorder and/or voluntary intoxication can negate express and implied malice; (5) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter; (6) defendant was deprived of due process and equal protection of law by the irrational denial of a defense of voluntary intoxication to a charge of second degree murder based upon implied malice; (7) a prosecution expert witnesss testimony was improper and usurped the jurys fact finding role; (8) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on general principles of law presented by the evidence concerning causation; and (9) the cumulative error doctrine requires reversal.

A jury found appellant and defendant Gill McPeters guilty of burglary (Pen. Code,[1] 459, count 1), and petty theft with a prior ( 666, count 2). The trial court found true the allegations that defendant had served three prior prison terms ( 667.5, subd. (b)). The court initially sentenced him to a total term of six years in state prison, which consisted of the upper term of three years on count 1, three years on count 2, stayed under section 654, plus one year on each of the prison priors. However, defense counsel requested defendant be sent to the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC), since he was addicted to narcotics. Both sides stipulated that defendant was an addict, so the court suspended execution of the sentence and committed him to the CRC. On appeal, defendant contends that 1) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for an updated supplemental probation report, and 2) the imposition of the upper term violated his right to a jury trial under Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [127 S.Ct. 856; 166 L.Ed.2d 856] (Cunningham). Court affirm.

The minor appeals from a wardship determination and a grant of probation following his admission that he committed grand theft in one subsequent petition, and that he resisted arrest as alleged in a separate subsequent petition. The judgment is affirmed.

In a criminal complaint filed October 30, 2007, appellant Susan Lee James was charged with possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)), a felony, and possession of an instrument used for smoking a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11364), a misdemeanor. On November 28, 2007, pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant pled guilty to the felony; she waived her right to the preparation of a presentence report; and the court, in accordance with the plea agreement, imposed the 16-month lower term and ordered that term be served concurrently with a term imposed for violation of parole. On January 29, 2008, the court denied appellants request for a certificate of probable cause (Pen. Code, 1237.5). The judgment is affirmed.

Appellant, T. E., appeals from orders of the juvenile court rejecting her petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1]to modify earlier orders of the court denying her reunification services and her motion to continue the hearing, as well as the order terminating her parental rights as to four of her children pursuant to section 366.26. After consideration of appellants argument, Court affirm the juvenile courts judgment.