CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Syrus Parvizian appeals from the dismissal of his lawsuit against his former employer, the State of California, acting by and through the Department of Transportation, respondent herein. Court affirm.

Defendant, Moises Aranda Manzano, appeals from his convictions for marijuana transportation (Health & Saf. Code, 11360, subd. (a)) and possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11359) and the trial courts finding that he was previously convicted of a serious felony. (Pen. Code, 667, subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12.) Defendant argues the trial court improperly admitted hearsay testimony and denied his request to dismiss a prior conviction. Defendant further argues that his prior conviction must be stricken and his abstract of judgment must be corrected to more accurately reflect the sentence imposed. The Attorney General argues that additional fees and penalties and a court security fee must be imposed. Court affirm with modifications.

Appellant Syrus Parvizian was once married to respondent Malak Parvizian. (Hereinafter, we refer to the parties by first name, to avoid confusion.) Malak filed for dissolution in April of 1997 and after protracted litigation, the marriage was dissolved in October 2001. Syrus appealed from the judgment, which was affirmed on appeal in B158111, filed in May of 2003. Malak then filed an action against Syrus (and others) for enforcement of a money judgment arising from the judgment of dissolution and to set aside as fraudulent Syrus's transfer of certain real property. The trial court granted the relief Malak sought. The judgment is affirmed.

A jury convicted Patrick Shanard Norman of robbery. The jury also found that Norman personally used a firearm (Pen. Code, 12022.53, subd.(b))[1]and a principal was armed (12022.5, subd. (a)) in the commission of the robbery. The jury acquitted appellant of a charge of grand theft of a firearm. The trial court sentenced appellant to 13 years in prison, consisting of the middle term of 3 years, plus 10 years for the section 12022.53, subdivision (b) enhancement.
The judgment is affirmed.

A felony complaint charged Maria Amarillas with transportation of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)) and with possession for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5). The felony complaint also alleged Amarillas had three prior felony convictions and was thus ineligible for probation (Pen. Code, 1203, subd. (e)(4)).
The appeal is dismissed.

In her petition for writ of mandate, plaintiff Andrea Bianca Bragg (Ms. Bragg), challenges the trial courts order denying her motion to file an amended complaint adding, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13,[1]a claim for punitive damages against real party in interest Kee Seng Koh, M.D (Dr. Koh). We hold that Ms. Bragg has met her burden of providing a sufficient showing necessary to sustain a claim for punitive damages. Accordingly, we issue a writ of mandate and direct respondent court to vacate its order denying Ms. Braggs motion to allege a prayer for punitive damages as to the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against real party in interest and enter a new and different order granting her motion.

A jury found defendant Gregory Allen Chandler guilty of making criminal threats to D. H. and pimping involving M. S. The jury acquitted him of numerous other counts involving both victims, including a charge of making criminal threats to M. S. In bifurcated proceedings, the court found three strike priors to be true.
Sentenced to state prison for an aggregate term of 50 years to life, defendant appeals, contending he was denied a fair and impartial jury trial because the trial court instructed the jury during voir dire that there might be evidence of his affiliation with a prison gang but such evidence was later excluded. Defendant contends the trial court erroneously denied defense counsels request for a new jury panel or, in the alternative, that counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Court affirm the judgment.

Convicted of numerous crimes and sentenced to an aggregate term of 87 years in prison, defendant Jermaine Robert Blair raises only one contention on appeal: He contends the trial court erred in denying as untimely his peremptory challenge to the trial judge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. Because this contention is not cognizable on appeal from the judgment of conviction, Court affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Hamisi Marshall of theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)) and being under the influence of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11550, subd. (a)). Defendant filed a motion for new trial claiming insufficiency of the evidence as to the Vehicle Code violation, and the court granted the motion. The People appeal, contending the court abused its discretion in granting the motion. Court disagree and shall affirm the courts order.

On March 10, 2006, defendant Dale Richard Hale was seen taking three bicycle tire repair kits from a store in the City of Shasta Lake and concealing them in his jacket. He was detained by store security and, when confronted by a Shasta County Sheriffs deputy, said, I dont know why I did it. The judgment is affirmed.

Drug enforcement authorities executed a search warrant at the home of defendant David C. Griffin and found numerous pseudoephedrine tablets as well as other drugs, drug paraphernalia, and items used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Defendant pled guilty to unlawful possession of pseudoephedrine with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11383, subd. (c)(1)) in exchange for dismissal of all remaining charges and special allegations against him. The court sentenced defendant to six years in state prison, awarding him one day of presentence custody credit, and imposed fees and fines as recommended, except that the Court orders $1200 in restitution fines rather than [$]800. The probation report recommended an $800 restitution fine (Pen. Code, 1202.4, subd. (b)); an $800 restitution fine, stayed pending successful completion of parole (Pen. Code, 1202.45); a $20 court security fee (Pen. Code, 1465.8); $170 in criminal laboratory fees, comprised of a $50 criminal laboratory analysis fee (Health & Saf. Code, 11372.5, subd. (a)), a $10 state surcharge (Pen. Code, 1465.7), $25 for the state court facilities construction fund (Gov. Code, 70372, subd. (a)), a $50 state penalty assessment (Pen. Code, 1464), and a $35 county penalty assessment (Gov. Code, 76000); and a drug program fee of $340, comprised of a $100 drug program fee (Health & Saf. Code, 11372.7, subd. (a)), a $20 state surcharge (Pen. Code, 1465.7), $50 for the state court facilities construction fund (Gov. Code, 70372, subd. (a)), a $100 state penalty assessment (Pen. Code, 1464), and a $70 county penalty assessment (Gov. Code, 76000). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. The judgment is affirmed.

Sandra Sinai (Sandra) appeals from an order terminating spousal support from her former husband James Ooi (James). She asserts (1) the trial court abused its discretion in ruling she should no longer receive support; and (2) the trial court's termination of jurisdiction over support violated the parties' marital settlement agreement. Court reject her arguments and affirm the order.

Paul Cocio Ramos entered a plea of nolo contendere to transporting marijuana. He was granted three years' probation. Ramos appeals, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence made pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5.

Annette S. appeals a judgment declaring her minor son, Dylan E., a dependent of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (c),[1]and the dispositional order removing Dylan from her custody. Annette challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's jurisdictional and dispositional findings. Court conclude substantial evidence supports the court's jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (c). We further conclude, however, the evidence does not support findings, by clear and convincing evidence, there was or would be a substantial danger to Dylan were he returned home and there were no reasonable means by which he can be protected without removal. Accordingly, Court reverse the dispositional order.