CA Unpub Decisions

A juvenile wardship petition was filed alleging that defendant and appellant B.R. (minor) committed a battery against two different victims. (Pen. Code, 242, counts 1 and 2.) A juvenile court found the allegation in count 1 to be true but found the allegation in count 2 to be not true. Minor was placed on probation for a period of six months and released to the custody of his parents. On appeal, minor contends the court violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when it prevented his counsel from asking the victim what the victim has generally lied about in the past. Court affirm.

Appellant D.G. (mother) is the mother of F.D., A.D., and I.D. (the children). Mothers parental rights as to the children were terminated. On appeal, she claims that the relative guardianship exception applied. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A) (relative guardianship exception).) Court affirm.

Daron Hammond appeals from a judgment of nonsuit in this negligence action against the Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA). He asserts the trial was unfair, the trial judge used racist language and was biased, and he has been left saddled with unpaid medical bills. Court disagree and affirm.

The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended Trent Joseph Lindgren's license to drive for violating the "Zero Tolerance Law" by driving a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol content (BAC) of 0.01 percent when under the age of 21. (Veh. Code, 23136.) He appeals the denial of his petition for writ of mandate. Court affirm.

Jackie H. (Mother), the mother of J.H. (born in Aug. 1998), challenges the juvenile courts January 16, 2008 rulings at the six-month review hearing that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) had provided her with reasonable family reunification services, including drug testing referrals, and that Mother failed to comply with the case plan. We agree with Mothers contentions that the juvenile courts rulings were not supported by substantial evidence and that Mother suffered prejudice as a result because the rulings were the basis for the courts modification of the case plan to require Mother to attend a drug rehabilitation program when there was no evidence she currently or recently used drugs. Accordingly, we reverse the order requiring that Mother attend a drug rehabilitation program and vacate the findings that Mother was provided with reasonable reunification services and that she was not in compliance with the case plan.

While fleeing from a pursuing peace officer, defendant Brandon Williams crashed the stolen car he was driving, killing a passenger in the car. Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and causing the death of another while fleeing in a vehicle from a pursuing peace officer. He appealed. For reasons stated in People v. Williams (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1440, this court reversed the second degree murder conviction.

A jury convicted defendant Philip Louis Leveton of annoying or molesting a child (Pen. Code, 647.6, subd. (a)). In a bifurcated trial, the jury found defendant was convicted in 1996 of annoying or molesting a child. He was sentenced to state prison for the middle term of two years.
On appeal, defendant contends, and the People concede, that in the bifurcated trial on the prior conviction allegation, the court erred by failing to reinstruct the jury on the prosecutors burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as it had in the initial phase of trial on the new offense. Contrary to defendants claim, this failure was not structural error requiring reversal of the jurys finding that defendant had a prior conviction in 1996 for annoying or molesting a child. Because, at most, it was harmless error, Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant appeals from the judgment after a jury found him guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1); Ct. 2)[1]and possession of ammunition by a felon. ( 12316, subd. (b)(1); Ct. 3.) He admitted having served seven prior prison terms ( 667.5, subd. (b)) and was sentenced to a prison term of six years. On appeal, he contends the evidence is insufficient to support the verdicts on both counts and the trial court committed instructional error by declining to instruct on the defense of momentary possession and by giving an instruction on consciousness of guilt. Court find no error and shall affirm the judgment.

Defendant Heidi Lynn Dore drove a motor vehicle while she did not have a drivers license. During a traffic stop, useable amounts of methamphetamine were found in the car. In March 2006, in case No. 62-055505, defendant pled guilty of transporting methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a)) and driving without a license (Veh. Code, 12500, subd. (a)), and she admitted having a prior drug conviction (Health & Saf. Code, 11370.2, subd. (c)). In exchange, three related counts and enhancements were dismissed, as were charges in another case, No. 62-48565. She was sentenced to state prison for a stipulated term of seven years. Execution of sentence was suspended, and she was placed on probation for five years on conditions that included 365 days of incarceration or placement in the Track Three program or a residential drug treatment program. It was later alleged that she violated numerous terms of probation on multiple occasions, and the court terminated her participation in the Track Three program because of her multiple failures to appear. The judgment is affirmed.

A modification decision.

A jury convicted Henry Davis of selling cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)). In separate proceedings, the court found Davis had a prior prison conviction (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b))[1]and a prior conviction for selling cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code 11370.2, subd. (a)). In addition, the court found Davis had a 1981 conviction in New York for second degree assault (1981 conviction) that qualified as a prior strike conviction under California law. ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 668, 1170.12.) Davis appeals, arguing the court erred in denying his request for an entrapment instruction. He also argues the court erred in finding the 1981 conviction qualified as a prior strike conviction under California law. Court affirm the judgment.

In March 2005 defendant City of Poway (Poway) approved a resolution adopting a Reimbursement Agreement (RA) between Poway and Northpoint Development, Inc. The RA provided a mechanism to reimburse Northpoint for some of the costs of sewer improvements installed in connection with two subdivisions. The resolution found it was just and fair that the costs of the sewer system be borne by all who benefitted from the new sewer, including adjoining developers who in the future will use the sewer system in connection with development of their lands, and the RA therefore provided that Poway would assess adjoining developers for a share of the costs of the sewer improvements as a condition for development of their lands and would reimburse Northpoint as those assessments were collected.
On appeal, the Malones assert they met the standards for relief as specified in Maxwell, and there are numerous other grounds for relief requiring reversal of the judgment.

The juvenile court made a true finding that Irwin V. possessed an instrument and weapon of the kind commonly known as a billy in violation of Penal Code section 12020, subdivision (a)(1), a felony. The juvenile court ruled pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (c) that the maximum period of physical confinement was three years. Irwin appeals the juvenile court's ruling as to the maximum period of physical confinement. As Court explain, Court conclude that Irwin's argument is without merit, and accordingly Court affirm.

Christopher C. Clack entered a negotiated guilty plea to two counts of robbery (Pen. Code, 211) and two counts of grand theft (Pen. Code, 487, subd. (c)). The court sentenced him to three years in prison: the three year middle term for one robbery and concurrent terms on the remaining counts. Clack appeals. Court affirm.