CA Unpub Decisions

This is an appeal from a judgment for attorney fees entered after remand on a previous appeal. We will conclude that in all respects but one the record shows that the trial court applied the correct legal standards in determining the amount to be awarded as attorney fees; as to those areas, appellants have not demonstrated that the court abused its discretion. In one important respect, however, the record does not permit us to determine whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard, and the resolution of that ambiguity has, potentially, a significant impact on the trial courts exercise of discretion. Accordingly, Court conditionally reverse the judgment.

The district attorney charged Steven Anthony Molina with the commission of felonies on May 16, 2003. At an in camera hearing, he sought disclosure of information relevant to the issue of dishonesty from the personnel documents of Bakersfield Police Officers Gary Carruesco and William Hughes. (See Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).) At the hearing, the trial court granted disclosure of information from some documents and denied disclosure of information from other documents.
The judgment is reversed and a new trial is ordered. (Pen. Code, 1262.)

Appellant Santos Chapa Quintero was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (a); count 1), driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or higher (Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (b); count 2), and driving with a suspended or revoked license (Veh. Code, 14601.5, subd. (a); count 3). Counts 1 and 2 also included special allegations of three prior convictions for driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or higher (Veh. Code, 23550 & 23550.5), and of driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.15 percent or higher (Veh. Code, 23578). In a plea deal, he entered a plea of guilty to the count 2 charge of driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or higher (Veh. Code,
23152,(b)).[1] The court sentenced him to a term of two years in state prison, ordered his drivers license suspended, imposed various fines and penalty assessments, and further pronounced under Section 13386 subdivision (a) of the Vehicle Code that the defendant be ordered to install an interlock device in his vehicle under his custody and control when he resumes his -- when he -- if he obtains a restoration of his license status. When appellants counsel informed the court he believed that the interlock device requirement could be ordered for a period of time of up to three years, the court stated: Because of his long history I think the three year term would be appropriate if he -- when he gets his drivers license back. The abstract of judgment states in pertinent part: Pursuant to 13386(a) VC, defendant ordered to install the interlock device on any vehicle under his custody and control for a period of 3 years. It is this last portion of the sentence that is the subject of this appeal. Appellant contends that the court had authority to order the installation and utilization of an interlock device only for a period of time not to exceed three years from the date sentence was pronounced, regardless of when appellant might once again become licensed to drive. Respondent concedes the error. As Court explain, respondents concession is well taken, and Court direct the superior court to modify its judgment accordingly.

Appellant, Eugene Kyle, pled guilty to transportation of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)) and admitted a prior prison term enhancement (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)) On appeal, Kyle contends the court erred in imposing a $740 fine because: 1) it was unauthorized; and 2) imposition of the fine violated his plea bargain. Court affirm.

The Kern County Superior Court sentenced appellant Maurice M. Roark to a 3-year upper prison term after a jury found he committed a single count of arson of a truck in which he had been living. (Pen. Code, 451, subd. (d).) On appeal, Roark contends the prosecution failed to prove he lit or caused the fire. Finding sufficient evidence to support the finding, Court will affirm the conviction.

On November 20, 2007, the prosecutor filed a criminal complaint charging appellant, Bernard Kevin Chatman, with failing to register as a sex offender when he changed his residence to Stanislaus County (Pen. Code, 290).[1] The complaint alleged one prior serious felony conviction ( 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and three prior prison term enhancements ( 667.5, subd. (b)).
The judgment is affirmed.

Del Ray Builders, Inc., appeals from an order denying its petition to vacate an arbitration award. Del Ray contends the court erred because the evidence demonstrated the arbitrator was biased; he improperly excluded evidence favorable to Del Ray; and he exceeded his powers by awarding punitive damages against Del Ray. In a consolidated appeal, Del Ray, Eugene Levert and Richere Levert challenge the order amending the judgment to add Eugene Levert and Richere Levert as alter egos of Del Ray on the judgment. That second appeal raises no distinct issues, but instead asserts that if the judgment against Del Ray is reversed the order amending the judgment must be reversed as well. Court affirm.

Californians Aware and Richard P. McKee, the president of its board of directors (collectively CalAware), along with Steve Rocco, a member of the Board of Education (the Board) of the Orange Unified School District (the District), appeal from the order striking their Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate, an Injunction, and Declaratory Relief against the District and Thomas Godley, its superintendent. The trial court struck the petition in its entirety, following a motion brought by the District and Godley pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (hereinafter section 425.16, or the anti-SLAPP law.) Court affirm.

After settling his action against Shawn Hoekstra and associated individuals and entities, plaintiff Salvador Reyes moved for attorney fees pursuant to a term of the settlement agreement. The trial court granted all of the fees requested, finding them reasonable. Defendants appeal, contending that the trial court showed excessive deference to plaintiff and failed to deduct fees for the time plaintiff's counsel had spent in "wasteful" pursuit of unreasonable positions. They further contest the prejudgment interest ordered in the course of granting defendants a continuance of the hearing. Court find no error and will therefore affirm the judgment in plaintiff's favor.

Harry J. Williby appeals the dismissal of his action, resulting from his failure to furnish security after being ordered to do so pursuant to the vexatious litigant law (Code Civ. Proc., 391 et seq.). He challenges the trial courts decision to reconsider a previous order, which had denied defendants requests for an order requiring security, as well as the decision issued after reconsideration, which granted those requests. As discussed below, Court find no merit in Willibys contentions and affirm.

Scott Rainey is engaged in the business of outdoor advertising. He brought this action for inverse condemnation, declaratory relief, and related claims against the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) after Caltrans notified him that his long-existing advertising display was illegal, but then never held an administrative hearing to adjudicate the claimed illegality of the display space. The court granted Raineys summary adjudication motion and declared that Rainey was entitled to maintain the advertising display because an uncontested use of the property had existed for more than five years before Caltrans provided notice of a violation. (Bus. & Prof. Code, 5216.1.) The court further found that [Caltrans] is estopped from challenging Plaintiffs advertising, having waited 8 years to issue a citation and then failing to prove the violation [at an administrative hearing] despite orders from this Court to do so. The court held a bench trial on the issue of damages, and awarded Rainey $260,743 in lost profits. Court affirm the judgment.

This is an action for fraud brought by appellants Sitara Management Corporation (Sitara) and HJF, Inc. (HJF), a group of independent Shell gasoline service station dealers, against respondents Equilon Enterprises LLC (the Shell franchisor; hereinafter, Equilon) and several of its employees. In a prior appeal we affirmed the trial courts order granting respondents motion for a new trial (Value Gas, Inc. v. Equilon Enterprises LLC (Apr. 26, 2005, B169365 [nonpub. opn.]), and a second trial ensued that is the subject of the present appeal.
The sole issue in the present appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting five motions in limine precluding appellants from introducing certain evidence. Appellants contend that the rulings precluded the jury from considering evidence of respondents wrongdoing, including some evidence concerning their fraudulent acts, and that but for those rulings a more favorable result would have ensued, particularly as to punitive damages. Court find the trial courts rulings were not an abuse of discretion and affirm the judgment.

On April 17, 2006, appellant Cyrus Haroonian (Husband) filed a petition to dissolve his marriage to respondent Nahideh Harooni (Wife). The parties were married in 1999, separated in 2004, and have two children born in 2001 and 2002. Husband listed minimal assetsincluding furniture, cars, jewelry and cashthat he valued at $14,925, and a $4,000 debt. He claimed a monthly income of $2,000 from his job as an electrical contractor, and monthly expenses of $1,086. The appeal from the order of August 7, 2006, is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it was untimely filed. The trial courts order of November 6, 2006, is affirmed. Appellant Cyrus Haroonian to bear all costs on appeal.

Union Ventures, LLC appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court granted a motion for summary adjudication in favor of ADIR International Export Ltd., doing business as La Curacao (La Curacao) on Union Venturess cause of action for enforcement of an easement and Union Ventures dismissed its remaining claims with prejudice. Union Ventures contends the trial court erred in ruling that Civil Code section 811,[1] which provides [a] servitude is extinguished . . . [] 1. [b]y the vesting of the right to the servitude and the right to the servient tenement in the same person, operated to extinguish an express easement benefiting Union Venturess property and burdening La Curacaos property. Court affirm.