CA Unpub Decisions

Christopher A. appeals the judgment reestablishing a conservatorship of his person under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act) (Welf. & Inst. Code, 5000 et seq.). Citing People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), and Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529 (Ben C.), his appointed counsel states he is unable to find any arguable appellate issues and asks that we independently review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues. Pursuant to Anders, he lists as possible but not arguable issues: whether the procedures for reestablishing the conservatorship conformed to the requisites of due process; whether the court improperly voir dired Christopher over the objections of trial counsel; whether it properly granted respondent's motion to strike Christopher's renewed request for a jury trial; and whether the renewed request for a jury trial may be considered the functional equivalent of a motion to withdraw consent to reestablishment of the conservatorship. The appeal is dismissed.

Juan Z. appeals following an April 4, 2008 post permanency planning review hearing on a Welfare and Institutions Code section 387 petition. At the hearing, the juvenile dependency court placed Juan's son, Fabian Z., with Fabian's mother, Christina M.; issued a temporary restraining order protecting Fabian and Christina from Juan; ordered Juan to comply with an order for supervised visitation; and continued Fabian's dependency. Juan, who was acting in propria persona in the juvenile court, contends the court violated his constitutional right to examine Fabian on the issues of visitation and continuing the dependency. The appeal is dismissed.

Defendant William Wayne Anno appeals from his conviction of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, 191.5, subd. (a) count 1) and boating under the influence causing injury (Harb. & Nav. Code, 655, subd. (f) counts 2 and 3) as well as true findings on the enhancement allegations that he personally inflicted great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), 12022.7, subd. (a); Veh. Code, 23558) and that he had previously been convicted of a serious or violent felony (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subd. (a)-(d)) and of driving a vehicle with a blood alcohol level of .08 percent or greater (Veh. Code, 23566, subd. (a), 23152, subd. (b)). On appeal, defendant contends (1) the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of the manslaughter victims methamphetamine use and aggressive lifestyle; (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the defense theory of intervening and superseding cause; and (3) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct in argument to the jury on the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Court find no prejudicial error, and Court affirm.

Defendants Brett Alan May (Defendant May) and Terrell Law (Defendant Law) were jointly tried before two separately empanelled juries. Defendants were charged with robbery, assault and murder. On August 3, 2006, Defendant Laws jury convicted him of one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code[1] 187, subd. (a)), one count of first degree robbery ( 211), one count of attempted first degree robbery ( 211, 664), and two counts of assault with a firearm ( 245, subd. (a)(2)). As to the murder, the jury further found a robbery-felony-murder special-circumstance allegation ( 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)) to be true. As to the robbery and attempted robbery, the jury also found that a principal was armed with a handgun ( 12022, subd. (a)(1)). Defendant Law was sentenced to a determinate term of six years in state prison followed by an indeterminate sentence of life without the possibility of parole. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant, Raul Augustine Rudy Silva, was convicted by a jury of attempted premeditated murder (Pen. Code, 664/187, subd. (a)), residential burglary ( 459), criminal threats ( 422), two counts of assault with a firearm ( 245, subd. (a)(2)), and possession of a firearm by a felon. ( 12021, subd. (a).) He received a sentence of 147 years to life and appeals the conviction, challenging the trial courts order excluding expert opinion testimony relating to the reliability of eyewitness testimony. Court affirm the conviction but reverse the sentence.

Defendant Steven Christopher Gilmore appeals his conviction for violation of Penal Code section 261.5, subdivision (d). He contends Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions CALCRIM No. 220, as given to the jury, failed to properly instruct that the evidence must induce a subjective certainty in each of the jurors to satisfy the due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Court find no error and affirm.

After a month-long crime spree, defendant was charged with 14 offenses. A jury convicted him of nine crimes against six victims. The court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate sentence of 44 years to life and a determinate sentence of 30 years four months, to be served consecutively. As discussed below, Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant Virgil Meakins was charged with possession of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11351, count 1), false personation (Pen. Code,[1] 529, count 2), and possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11359, count 3)). It was also alleged that count 1 was committed within 1000 feet of a school (Health & Saf. Code, 11353.6, subd. (b)), that defendant had served three prior prison terms ( 667.5, subd. (b)), and that he had three prior strike convictions ( 1170.12, subd. (a)(d) and 667, subd. (b)(i)). Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence under section 1538.5 (the motion). The court held a suppression hearing and denied the motion. Subsequently, defendant entered a plea agreement, pled guilty to count 1, and admitted one strike prior. The remaining counts and allegations were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. The court sentenced defendant to a total of eight years in state prison. Defendant now appeals the denial of the motion to suppress. Court affirm.

A juvenile court found true the allegation that Appellant Z.L. (minor) received, concealed or withheld stolen property. (Pen. Code,[1] 496, subd. (a).) The court declared minor a ward of the court and placed him on probation under certain conditions, in the custody of his parents. On appeal, minor contends: 1) there was insufficient evidence to support the true finding on the allegation; 2) the juvenile court abused its discretion in determining the offense to be a felony; and 3) the probation condition prohibiting him from associating with the victim, or being within 100 feet of her property, is unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent), and it is overbroad and unnecessarily infringes on his constitutional rights. Court affirm.

On September 11, 2002, Anderson listed her Corona home (the property) with F.M. Tarbell Co., dba Tarbell Realtors (Tarbell). Ralph A. Hernandez was her agent with Tarbell. On November 12, plaintiff submitted an offer to purchase the property through her broker/agent Century 21 Superstars and Edith Risso (Risso). Plaintiff also signed a written Buyers Inspection Advisory. Plaintiff was advised by Risso that she should have a physical inspection of the property by a licensed contractor. Following a few counteroffers, an agreement was reached. The judgment is affirmed.

Abner A., the minor, appeals from a judgment declaring him to be a ward (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602) and placing him on probation. He contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to establish a factual basis for the plea, despite the parties stipulation that a factual basis existed. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendants and appellants T.B. (Mother) and S.C. (Father) appeal from the juvenile courts order terminating their parental rights to three-year-old S.C. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] On appeal, Mother contends the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the sibling relationship exception set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v).[2] Father claims the juvenile court erred in (1) failing to apply the beneficial relationship exception set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i),[3]and (2) failing to return S.C. to him at the June 18, 2007, referral hearing. Court reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Jimmy Lee Snell appeals from a sentence imposed following the revocation of his probation. He argues we should reverse his sentence and remand his case for resentencing because the trial court failed to state adequate reasons for imposing a middle term sentence.
The judgment is affirmed.

The juvenile court entered judgments declaring T.A. and C.R. dependents of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, 300, subd. (b))[1]and removing T.A. and C.R. from the physical custody of their mother, J.A. (Mother) ( 361, subd. (c)(1)). Mother contends the juvenile court committed reversible error because (1) the evidence supporting the courts jurisdictional findings does not meet the substantial evidence standard; (2) the evidence supporting the courts dispositional findings does not meet the substantial evidence standard; and (3) the court failed to make the required findings prior to ordering the children be removed from Mothers physical custody. Court affirm the judgments.