CA Unpub Decisions

A jury found defendant Harold Roy Griffin guilty of two counts of raping a child who was under 14 years of age and 10 or more years younger than defendant (Pen. Code,[1] 269, subd. (a)(1)),[2]one count of forcibly penetrating a child who was under 14 years of age and 10 or more years younger than defendant ( 269, subd. (a)(5)); and one count of willfully committing a lewd or lascivious act upon the body of a child who was under the age of 14 years by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of bodily harm ( 288, subd. (b)(1)). Defendant admitted suffering a prior strike conviction. ( 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1).) The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for an indeterminate term of 106 years to life.

Defendant and appellant Donald Ray Dison was charged with criminal threats (Pen. Code, 422, count 1), being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1), count 2), discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling (Pen. Code, 246, count 3), and resisting arrest (Pen. Code, 69, counts 4-6). It was alleged as to count 3 that defendant personally used a firearm (Pen Code, 667, 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). In addition, it was alleged that he had two prior serious felonies (Pen. Code, 667, subd. (a)), two prior prison terms (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)), and two prior strike convictions (Pen. Code, 667, subd. (c) & (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)). The People dismissed the charge in count 1 before trial. A jury subsequently found defendant guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm, discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling, and one count of misdemeanor resisting arrest (Pen. Code, 148, subd. (a) (1)). The jury was deadlocked on the other two resisting arrest charges, so the court declared a mistrial on those two counts. The jury found the personal firearm use enhancement to be true. Defendant admitted all of the prior conviction and prison prior allegations. The trial court sentenced him to a total prison term of 35 years to life. On appeal, defendant contends: 1) the trial court erred in admitting a statement from a witness at the scene who did not testify at trial, thereby violating defendants Sixth Amendment confrontation rights; and 2) the court abused its discretion by refusing to strike one of his strike convictions. Court affirm.

The trial court granted defendant James Wileys anti-SLAPP motion,[1]which resulted in plaintiff Robert Gruntzs first amended cross-complaint being stricken.[2] (Civ. Proc., 425.16.)[3] The trial court did not grant Gruntz leave to amend his first amended cross complaint. Gruntz appeals the trial courts order granting Wileys anti-SLAPP motion. Gruntz contends the trial court erred by granting the anti SLAPP motion because the court improperly concluded that Wileys actions, which were at issue in the first amended cross complaint, were protected by judicial immunity. Court affirm the judgment.

Following a jury trial, defendant Frank Torres, Jr., was convicted of being an active participant in a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, 186.22, subd. (a))[1]and petty theft with a prior theft-related conviction ( 484/666). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true that defendant had sustained one prior strike conviction ( 667, subds. (c)-(i), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), one prior serious felony conviction ( 667, subd. (a)), and three prior prison terms ( 667.5, subd. (b)). As a result, defendant was sentenced to a total term of 13 years 4 months in state prison. Defendants sole contention on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for being an active gang member. As explained below, Court agree and will reverse defendants conviction for being an active gang member.

Plaintiffs Christopher Castro and Jessica Santillan entered into a settlement agreement on the record pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 664.6[1]with defendants Palms Springs United School District (PSUSD) and Riverside County Office of Education (RCOE) regarding plaintiffs tort claims against defendants. Plaintiffs later filed a notice of rejection of the settlement contending it was a contingent offer rather than an enforceable settlement agreement. Defendants filed a motion to enforce the settlement, which the trial court granted. On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the settlement agreement was unenforceable because defendants did not comply with certain requirements of the California Rules of Court regarding settlement proceedings and because the agreement was contingent upon approval by defendants boards. Court hold that defendants complied with the statutory requirements of section 664.6 and that substantial evidence supports the courts determination that the parties entered into a binding settlement agreement.

On December 25, 2007, defendant Noe Ponce went to a mobile home park in Thermal to pick up his girlfriend. While there, defendant and his friend took beer from the back of Efrain Gabriel Rodas car. When Efrain confronted defendant and his friend, an argument ensued. Defendant grabbed a gun from his car and shot once at the ground near where Efrains brother, Ezequiel, was standing. He paused, then pointed the gun at Efrain and fired one time. Efrain was hit in the upper chest and was permanently paralyzed as a result of the gunshot wound. Defendant was convicted of the attempted murder of Efrain along with several personal weapon-use enhancements, including causing great bodily injury and permanent paralysis. He was also convicted of assault with a deadly weapon against Ezequiel.

After a lengthy trial of this marital dissolution case, the trial court carefully evaluated the evidence and made specific findings of fact and conclusions of law that resolved the outstanding issues between appellant Gloria Palacios (Gloria) and her former husband, respondent Vicente Orduno (Vince), including date of separation, division of community property, spousal support and attorney fees.[1] Gloria filed the instant appeal from the judgment and from a denial of her motion to correct the judgment. The primary focus of her appeal, however, is not on the trial courts disposition of the issues as set forth in its statement of decision, but on a number of alleged pretrial errors that occurred earlier in the case before a different judge. Because Glorias appeal failed to demonstrate the existence of any prejudicial error, Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant Elias Gorostiza was the driver of a car, owned by one of the passengers, that was stopped by the police. After consent was given by the owner of the car to search the car, the police found a loaded pistol-grip shotgun and a cell phone. When the cell phone was opened, the officer saw an image of defendant holding a pistol-grip shotgun. The officer searched data inside of the cell phone and found two more images of defendant holding the gun. Defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon, unlawful possession of ammunition, and evading a law enforcement officer. He appeals, raising numerous issues regarding the images obtained from the cell phone found in the car and one sentencing issue. Except to modify the sentence, Court affirm.

On December 8, 2008, a petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging appellant, J.M., made a criminal threat (Pen. Code, 422, count one) for the benefit of or in association with a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, 186.22, subd. (b)(1)); that appellant was actively involved with a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, 186.22, subd. (a), count two); and appellant had violated the terms of his probation (Welf. & Inst. Code 777(a)(2), count three). At the conclusion of a jurisdictional hearing on February 25, 2009, the juvenile court found count one, count three, and the gang enhancement true. The court found count two not true.

Appellant, M.P., a minor, admitted an allegation that he committed a lewd act by means of force upon a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (b)(1)). The juvenile court ordered appellant committed to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF)[1]and declared his maximum term of physical confinement to be 8 years.
On appeal, appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to establish (1) that DJF commitment would be of probable benefit to him and (2) that there was no less restrictive alternative disposition available, and therefore DJF commitment violated appellants right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Court will affirm.

A modification decision.

Following a one-day bench trial, the trial court found defendants Jose Antonio Lopez and his wife, Irma Taira, sold a business they did not own, but the court declined to order disgorgement or other relief in favor of the rightful owners, plaintiffs Leonor and Jose Hernandez. The court allowed Lopez and Taira (collectively, Lopez) to keep the proceeds of the sale, concluding the Hernandezes first amended complaint failed to plead adequately claims for unjust enrichment, conversion, or trespass. We reverse and remand for a new trial that resolves plaintiffs claims under these quasi-contract and tort theories, which, fairly read, fell within the scope of the pleadings and within the facts alleged and proved at trial. In the interests of justice, we also reverse the trial courts determination Lopez did not breach the restaurant sales contract with the Hernandezes; the parties are free to relitigate that issue if they so choose.

In this marital dissolution action, Brian Gregory DeVries asserts the family law court erroneously valued his construction business in determining the amount of spousal support he should pay to Debra DeVries. Brian also maintains the court erred in dividing real property, ordering retroactive spousal support, and requiring he pay Debras attorney and expert fees. We affirm the judgment, except as to the spousal support award. The orders of spousal support and spousal support arrearages are reversed, and the matter is remanded as directed for another hearing on these issues.

Petitioner Joshua H. challenges an order denying him reunification services in connection with his now one and a half year old daughter, claiming there was insufficient evidence to show such services would be detrimental to the child. Court disagree and affirm.