CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant J.G. (Mother) contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile courts removal of her son, E., from her custody. Court will affirm.

Between 2006 and 2009, six petitions were filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging appellant, T.P., committed felonies and misdemeanors. On May 7, 2009, the juvenile court conducted a disposition hearing in which it committed appellant to the Youth Correctional Center Unit and determined his maximum term of confinement at eight years. Appellant contends, and respondent concedes, that appellants maximum term of confinement is seven years four months. Court agree and will reverse the juvenile courts order setting the maximum term of confinement.

On January 16, 2009, the prosecutor filed a first amended felony complaint alleging respondent, Jason Shawn Ray, violated Penal Code section 290, subdivision (f)(1)(b)[1]by failing to register as a sex offender between September 18, 2008, and October 12, 2008. The complaint further alleged that Ray had four prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of the three strikes law. On April 23, 2009, Ray appeared in court. The prosecutor noted Ray was going to enter a no contest plea. The court noted it was inclined to give Ray the benefit of the doubt and was going to strike the prior serious felony convictions. The court warned Ray that, if he failed to meet the registration requirement, he had four strikes and faced a sentence of 25 years to life.

A jury convicted Juan Manuel Avelar of first degree murder with special circumstances and street terrorism. (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a), 186.22, subd. (a); counts 1 & 2.)[1] The jury found true enhancements alleging the murder was gang related ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), that Avelar was an active participant of a criminal street gang and committed murder to further the activities of the gang ( 190.2, subd. (a)(22), and that he personally discharged a firearm proximately causing death ( 12022.53, subds. (d) and (e)(1)) The court found Avelar had previously suffered two prior serious felony convictions under section 667, subdivision (a). At the sentencing hearing, the court struck the gang enhancement associated with count 1, pursuant to People v. Lopez (2005) 34 Cal.App.4th 1002, and sentenced Avelar to life without the possibility of parole, plus a consecutive term of 30 years to life.

This is plaintiff Craig Harrisons third lawsuit against The Capital Group Companies (CGC) a company for whom he worked as a contractor for several months in 2003. On this occasion, he sued CGC and one of its employees, Susan Sherwood, for defamation arising out of a conversation that Sherwood had with a third party in October 2003. The trial court found, and we agree, that Harrisons claim is barred by the statute of limitations. We find that his remaining arguments, relating to the recusal of the trial judge, discovery matters, the denial of a continuance, and a new trial motion, also lack merit. Court therefore affirm the judgment.

Defendant G & K Automotive Conversion, Inc., demurred to plaintiffs State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companys first amended complaint on grounds each claim in the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. The court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, ruling the delayed discovery and fraudulent concealment rules did not toll the statute of limitations. By sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, the court found as a matter of law that no reasonable person could conclude plaintiff diligently investigated its claim or reasonably relied on defendants misrepresentations. Court disagree and reverse.

The minor is five years old. He was brought into protective custody on August 22, 2006 due to allegations of general neglect and abuse of a sibling. The courts minute order of September 17, 2008 states: Court adopts recommendation of Social Services Agency per report of 9-17-08. The Orange County Social Services Agencys (SSA) recommendation read: [I]t is respectfully recommended that the Court find that the Social Services Agency has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the conditions still exist which would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction under Section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code or that such conditions are likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn; further that the Court find that reasonable services have been offered or provided which were designed to aid the parent to overcome the problems which led to initial removal; further, that the child be continued a dependent child of the Juvenile Court and that the child remain in the custody of his father under the supervision of the Social Services Director . . . .

T.W.s three children were removed from her custody after it was discovered they were being severely physically abused by T.W. (Mother) and their father Richard W. (Father). After 12 months, the juvenile court terminated reunification services for both parents, who refused to address their problems with drug abuse, child abuse, and domestic violence. At the permanency hearing, the court determined the children were not adoptable due to their maladjusted and aggressive behavior after years of abuse, and it ordered the children to remain in long term foster care.

D.Z. (father) challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile courts ruling denying him reunification services based on his history of drug abuse and resistance to treatment. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 361.5, subd. (b)(13), hereafter sometimes 361.5(b)(13).) Counsel for fathers now four-year-old son, S.Z., opposes the petition. Contrary to fathers claims, substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts conclusion father suffered, within the meaning of the statute authorizing denial of reunification services, an extensive history of drug abuse and that his previous treatment program was court-ordered. (Ibid.) Consequently, Court deny fathers writ petition.

Defendant Adan Flores was convicted after jury trial in case No. SS061706A of second degree murder (Pen. Code, 187),[1] and unlawful possession of a firearm ( 12021, subd. (a)(1)). The jury further found that defendant personally used a firearm during the commission of the murder ( 12022.53, subd. (d)), and that both offenses were committed for the benefit of or in association with the Sureo criminal street gang ( 186.22, subd. (b)). Defendant admitted having served a prior prison term ( 667.5, subd. (b)). In case No. SS051910A, defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine for sale, on condition that he receive a two-year sentence to be served concurrent with the sentence in case No. SS061706A. The trial court sentenced defendant in the two cases to 46 years to life in prison and imposed restitution fines of $10,000 and $400.

Defendant Richard E. Warren, Jr. appeals in propria persona from the judgment of the Napa County Superior Court in favor of plaintiff and respondent Borrette Lane Estates, LLC, declaring that the option agreement that was the subject of litigation was valid and binding on interveners John and Katherine Ford (the Fords), appellant Warren, and appellants successors in interest. Appellant contends the court erred in ruling: (1) that appellant and the Fords were collaterally estopped from challenging the validity of the option by a settlement agreement and a previous adjudication of the options validity in a bankruptcy proceeding by appellants predecessor in interest; (2) that the option did not constitute an unreasonable restraint on alienation in violation of public policy; (3) that the option did not violate the Subdivision Map Act (Gov. Code, 411 et seq.); and (4) that appellant was not a bona fide purchaser as he had notice, both constructive and actual, of the option. Appellant further contends the court erroneously limited his cross-examination of intervener John Ford on the issue of valuation of the property burdened by the option. This timely appeal followed. Court shall affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Kaeleen Costa sued her former landlord, defendant Joyce Sneed, for violating Oaklands Just Cause for Eviction Ordinance. On appeal from an order denying Sneeds special motion to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure[1] section 425.16commonly referred to as the anti-SLAPP statuteSneed contends the trial court erred in concluding the conduct giving rise to Costas complaint was not protected petitioning or free speech activity. court affirm the order denying Sneeds anti-SLAPP motion.

Appellant Paul Mitchell (Mitchell) was charged with multiple felony counts of sexual assault. After discharge of a series of retained or appointed counsel, he successfully sought to exercise his right of self-representation. Several months later, at the time of trial, his request for reappointment of counsel was denied, although he was provided advisory counsel during part of the trial. He was convicted by a jury of eight counts of sexual penetration by a foreign object (Pen. Code, 289, subd. (a)(1)),[1] three counts of forcible oral copulation ( 288a, subd. (c)(2)), and one count of forcible rape ( 261, subd. (a)(2)). Mitchell appeals, contending that the trial court violated his federal constitutional rights in that it: (1) abused its discretion by denying his request at the time of trial for the reappointment of counsel, and by refusing to further continue the trial; (2) erred in allowing advisory counsel to interfere with his control of the case; (3) improperly ordered him restrained and removed from the courtroom; (4) erred by failing to properly instruct the jury concerning his restraints; and (5) committed cumulative errors requiring reversal. Court find no prejudicial error and will affirm.

Defendant Sosa Granite & Marble, Inc., (Sosa Granite) appeals from an order denying its motion to vacate the default and default judgment entered against it by plaintiff Perry Morgan. Court reverse the order and remand the matter for a determination of whether Sosa Granite is entitled to relief from default on equitable grounds.