CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant David Stanley Allred aided and abetted his brother in entering the home of their father and robbing him of his .380-caliber handgun. Defendants brother used a rifle during the robbery, and defendant stood behind his brother.

Defendant Dana Ray Johnson pleaded no contest to sale of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, 11360, subd. (a)) in exchange for an agreement that he would be placed on probation and receive 90 days in jail and a recommendation that the jail sentence could be served on county work project. Following his plea, defendant brought a Marsden motion, seeking to have his appointed attorney relieved and to substitute alternate counsel. Defendants motion was denied. The trial court sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement. According to the probation report and the factual basis stated by defendant at the time of his plea, the charge stemmed from an incident in which an undercover police officer asked defendant if he had any marijuana, and defendant replied he did not but his boy ha[d] some. Defendant left, returning shortly thereafter with the codefendant, who sold the officer three-quarters of a gram of marijuana.

This action arises out of a loan in the amount of $25,000 given by the plaintiff, Miguel Chee-Wong, to the defendant, Aina A. Chen. When the loan was not paid, Chee-Wong filed an action for breach of contract against Chen, and Chen filed a cross-complaint for emotional distress. Chee-Wong brought a motion for summary judgment on the complaint and cross-complaint, which the court granted.

Rowena Schooler (Rowena) died in October 2004, and left six adult children. Her daughter Jane Schooler (Jane) was the executor of her estate and trustee of her trust. Four years after Rowena's death, three of Jane's brothers (Brothers) petitioned the probate court under the safe harbor statute for a determination whether their proposed objections to Jane's final estate account constituted a contest under the no contest clauses in Rowena's will and trust. (Prob. Code, 21320.) The Brothers challenged Jane's estate accounting and sought to surcharge Jane for breaching her fiduciary duties by failing to properly handle an estate asset and using estate assets for her own benefit.

This action was initiated by Jacqueline B. Reedy (Reedy), in her capacity as the trustee of the Helen Chamness Bussell Family Trust (the trust) and in her individual capacity as a beneficiary of the trust, against, among others, Todd Bussell, a beneficiary of the trust. The action sought to quiet title to a 131-acre ranch (the ranch) owned by the trust and to partition the ranch by sale. The court entered an interlocutory judgment quieting title in the trust and ordering a partition by sale.

Gloria Olson was sentenced in 1979 to concurrent 25-year-to-life sentences after a jury found her guilty of two counts of first degree murder. Olson, now 64 years old, has been imprisoned for 30 years. After several unsuccessful parole hearings, the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) found her suitable for parole at her 2008 suitability hearing because it concluded Olson did not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released. However, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger (the Governor) reversed the BPH's decision, finding Olson posed an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released. Olson successfully petitioned the trial court for writ of habeas corpus. The warden of California Institute for Women (the People) appeals the trial court's grant of Olson's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing the Governor's decision was supported by some evidence and therefore must upheld. We conclude, following the guidance provided by In re Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181 (Lawrence) and In re Shaputis (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1241 (Shaputis), the Governor's decision was not supported by some evidence, and we therefore affirm the trial court's judgment.

Charles S. suffers from chronic paranoid schizophrenia. He has had many psychiatric hospitalizations and was subject to six conservatorships in the 10 years preceding July 2009. In June 2009 the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency, through the office of the public conservator, filed a petition to reestablish the conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act) (Welf. & Inst. Code,
5000 et seq.). A jury found Charles "presently gravely disabled due to a mental disorder." The court entered a judgment reestablishing the conservatorship. Charles appeals.
Citing People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), and Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529 (Ben C.), Charles's appointed counsel asks that we independently review the record to determine whether there are any arguable appellate issues. Pursuant to Anders, counsel lists, as possible but not arguable issues, whether substantial evidence supports the finding that Charles is gravely disabled and whether the jury instructions were improper because there was a reasonable likelihood the jury misapplied the instructions.

In May 2009 the juvenile court entered a jurisdictional finding (Welf. & Inst. Code, 300, subd. (e));[1] removed seven-month-old Owen C. from the custody of his father, James C.; and placed Owen with his mother, Megan C. The court found the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) had satisfied its obligation to "investigate the circumstances leading to [Owen's removal] and advise the court whether . . . reunification [was] likely to be successful" ( 361.5, subd. (c)). The court ordered family maintenance services ( 362, subd. (b), 364, subds. (b), (c)) for Megan and denied reunification services for James ( 361.5, subd. (b)(5), (b)(6)). James and Owen appeal.
James contends the jurisdictional finding is not supported by substantial evidence, the Agency failed to meet its investigatory obligation and the court abused its discretion by denying him reunification services. Owen contends reunification services were not at issue because he was not removed from both parents' custody and that it was in Owen's best interests for James to receive family maintenance services. We reverse the order denying James reunification services and remand so that the juvenile court may exercise its discretion to determine whether it is in Owen's best interests for James to receive family maintenance services. In all other respects we affirm the judgment.

Darrick J. appeals orders from a six-month review hearing continuing his children, Mariah J., D.J. and Sierra J. (together the children), dependents of the juvenile court and denying his request that they be returned to his custody. He contends the court erred by finding he was provided reasonable reunification services and by not returning the children. He requests services be extended beyond the 18-month date. We reject his contentions and affirm the orders.

Appellant, D.M., father of minors E., Jv., and Jc., appeals from the juvenile courts dispositional order declaring the minors dependents of the court and removing them from his custody. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 360, 395.) He contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile courts finding of jurisdiction. Court affirm.

Crystal H. appeals an order of the juvenile court denying her reunification services and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She argues that the court erred by not ordering reunification services for her under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) because the evidence showed that she had made reasonable efforts to address the issues surrounding the dependency, and that reunification was in the best interests of Christopher, Luis and Bethany (together the minors.) We reverse the court's order.

Teri B. appeals an order for supervised visitation entered at a dispositional hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, she asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error. In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held that review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting . . . her custody of a child or . . . her status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We therefore deny appellant's requests to review the record for error and to address the Anders issue. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.) Appellant's counsel also requests leave for her client to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. The request is denied.

Ann V. appeals the judgment entered at the permanency planning selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, she asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting . . . her custody of a child or . . . her status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We therefore deny her requests to review the record for error and to address her Anders issue. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.)

In Rutland Park in Riverside, David Worman was shot in the abdomen and the head and died on March 16 or 17, 1994.

Defendant John Jason Montalvos jury trials in 2005 and 2007 ended in mistrials.

In 2008, a jury convicted defendant of first degree murder, including a true finding on the firearm use enhancement. ( 187, subd. (a); 1192.7, subd. (c); 12022.5, subd. (a).) The court sentenced defendant to a total indeterminate prison term of 28 years to life. On appeal, defendant raises issues related to the admission of gang evidence and the sufficiency of the evidence for the first degree murder conviction. Court reject his contentions and affirm the judgment.