CA Unpub Decisions

The victim, referred to at trial and herein as John Doe (Doe), is the son of defendant John Cunningham (appellant). Doe, born in August 1989, testified that he lived with his mother, Wanda, for the first 10 years of his life. In December 1999, when Doe was 10 years old, he went to live with appellant. Doe testified that shortly after he moved in with appellant, appellant began forcibly sodomizing him and forcing him to orally copulate appellant. Sometimes while being sodomized by appellant, Doe screamed for help because it hurt very bad and appellant put his hand over Does mouth to stop Doe from screaming. Because appellant threatened to kill Doe if he told anyone about the abuse, Doe was fearful and did not tell anyone until December 2000. In January 2001, Doe was interviewed by San Pablo Police Officer Palmieri and told Palmieri that appellant sexually abused him numerous times beginning shortly after he moved in with appellant.

Appellant appeals from judgment and sentencing in Sonoma County Superior Court case numbers SCR466884 and SCR530960 with a certificate of probable cause. On appeal, he claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel below because counsel failed to raise or present a defense available to appellant under Californias Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (Health & Saf. Code, 11362.5 ) (Compassionate Use Act). Court disagree, and affirm.

In this juvenile dependency case, the mother of the minors did not file a writ petition seeking review of the juvenile courts order terminating reunification services and setting the case for a permanency planning hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] (section 366.26 hearing). Then, two weeks before the section 366.26 hearing, the mother filed a petition to modify the juvenile courts order under section 388. At the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court denied the section 388 petition and terminated the mothers parental rights. The mother now appeals, contending that: (1) her counsel in the juvenile court rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to seek writ review of the order setting the section 366.26 hearing; (2) the juvenile court erred in denying her section 388 petition without an evidentiary hearing; and (3) the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights. We reject all of these contentions, and affirm the juvenile courts order.

This is an appeal from the judgment of dismissal entered in favor of defendant Sharon Pipe after the trial court granted her motion to quash service of summons and then denied the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration. Court conclude the trial court properly found that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of demonstrating facts by a preponderance of evidence justifying the exercise of jurisdiction over Pipe in California, and thus affirm the judgment.

In A124470, appellants C.G. (mother) and D.D. (father) challenge the juvenile courts jurisdictional findings and order issued on March 23, 2009, concerning their baby daughter P.D. Mother and father both contend that (1) the trial court erred by sustaining jurisdiction over P.D. on the petition filed by respondent Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300; and, (2) the Agency failed to provide adequate notice to the relevant Indian tribes under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). In A126601, mother petitions for a writ of mandate pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, directing the juvenile court to vacate its orders terminating reunification services with P.D. at the 6-month review hearing and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. In A124470, Court affirm the trial courts jurisdictional findings and orders and remand the matter for ICWA compliance. In A126601, Court deny the writ petition.

Plaintiffs and appellants, Michael Tague and Michael Matamoros, are members of the Anchor Bay Campground LLC (Anchor Bay), which owns and operates a private campground on the Mendocino Coast. The case originated with a dispute over whether a certain model of trailerpark model trailerswould be allowed in the campground. Initially such models were allowed, but after a few were installed, a controversy developed over whether such models were aesthetically appropriate to the campground. On July 16, 2005, the Anchor Bay board of directors decided that members who had already purchased a park model trailer, or were in the process of purchasing one, would be allowed to have such trailers in the campground, but otherwise there would be a moratorium on park model trailers pending a vote by the membership in early 2006. The purpose of the grandfather clause was to avoid losses for members who had already invested in park model trailers. In February 2006, the members voted to make the moratorium permanent.

Plaintiffs Marianne Beck, Phil Head, Kurt Mueller, Ryan McCauley, and John Tynan are tenants in two adjacent properties owned by defendants Prana Eight Properties, LLC (Prana Eight) and James Vlahos. In 2008, plaintiffs learned defendants, in settling a lawsuit between them, had extinguished an easement that permitted the maintenance of a fire escape attached to the back of one of the properties and had made arrangements to demolish the fire escape, which plaintiffs used for access to a yard shared by the properties. Plaintiffs filed an action for a declaration regarding their rights in the easement and to enjoin demolition of the fire escape. While the lawsuit was pending, defendants demolished the fire escape, after obtaining appropriate permits from the City. Defendants then filed a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. [1] In opposing the special motion, plaintiffs argued their action was not covered by the anti-SLAPP statute and, in any event, they could demonstrate a probability of prevailing in the action by satisfying the justiciability requirements for declaratory relief. Although the trial court found the action to be covered by the anti-SLAPP statute, it concluded plaintiffs had demonstrated they were likely to prevail in their lawsuit. Court reverse.

This case returns to this panel following remand by the Supreme Court. In January 2006, defendants Jose Jesus Medina, Raymond Vallejo, and George J. Marron were convicted of first degree murder and attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a), 664, 187, subd. (a).)[1]The jury found that during the commission of the crimes a firearm was used and intentionally discharged, and in the case of the murder, that the discharge caused great bodily injury or death to the victim. The jury also determined that the crimes were committed with the intent to benefit a criminal street gang. ( 12022.53, subds. (b) through (e); 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) Defendants were sentenced to the state prison for a term of 50 years to life.

Defendants and appellants, Toyre Tempson, Casey Rowland, Clifton G. Brown, Bertrum Jam Westbrook and Gregory Morris, appeal the judgments entered following their convictions, by jury trial, for six counts of attempted premeditated murder, evading an officer with willful disregard for safety (Rowland only) and false imprisonment by violence or menace (Rowland only), with firearm (except Rowland and Westbrook), criminal street gang, and prior serious felony conviction (Westbrook only) enhancements (Pen. Code, 664/187, 236/237, 12022.53, 186.22, 667, subd. (a)-(i); Veh. Code, 2800.2). The defendants were sentenced to state prison for the following terms: Tempson and Brown were each sentenced to terms of 215 years to life; Westbrook was sentenced to 185 years to life; Rowland was sentenced to 92 years, 8 months to life; and, Morris was sentenced to 25 years to life. The judgments are affirmed in part and reversed in part.

A jury found defendants and appellants Juan Solis and Isaac Martinez guilty of two counts of first degree special circumstance premeditated and deliberate murder and two counts of minor in possession of firearms.[1] On the murder counts, they were sentenced to two terms of life without the possibility of parole plus two 25-years-to-life terms for gun use. They raise numerous claims on appeal about: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to support the premeditated and deliberate findings and the gang enhancement and special circumstance allegations; (2) the admission of evidence that Solis had a gun that was not the murder weapon; (3) the admission of bad character evidence; (4) the admission of Martinezs statement that allegedly implicates Solis; (5) the aiding and abetting instructions; (6) the flight, gang special circumstance and motive instructions; and (7) various sentencing errors. Court either find no error or harmless error; therefore Court affirm the judgment.

A modification deicision.

In the underlying action, the trial court granted summary judgment against appellant Rose Fitzpatrick in her action for discrimination, retaliation, and harassment against her employer, respondent Long Beach Publishing Company, d.b.a. Press-Telegram (PT), and respondents MediaNews Group, Inc., Los Angeles Daily News Publishing Company, Rich Archbold, and John Futch. Court affirm.

Cesar Cabrera appeals from the judgment entered following his convictions by jury on three counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, 664, 192, subd. (a)), each a lesser included offense of attempted murder (Pen. Code, 664, 187; counts 1 through 3)) with personal use of a firearm (Pen. Code, 12022.5, subd. (a)), personal and intentional use of a firearm (Pen. Code, 12022.53, subd. (b)), personal and intentional discharge of a firearm (Pen. Code, 12022.53, subd. (c)), and personal and intentional discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 12022.53, subd. (d)), and with, as to the attempted voluntary manslaughter which is a lesser offense of count 1, personal infliction of great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 12022.7, subd. (a)), and following his convictions by jury on count 4 shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (Pen. Code, 246) with personal use of a firearm (Pen. Code, 12022.5, subd. (a)), personal and intentional discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 12022.53, subd. (d)), and personal infliction of great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 12022.7, subd. (a)) and on count 5 assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(2)) with personal use of a firearm (Pen. Code, 12022.5, subd. (a)) and personal infliction of great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 12022.7, subd. (a)). The court sentenced appellant to prison for 5 years plus 25 years to life. We modify the judgment and, as so modified, affirm it with directions.

Wife appeals the trial court's post-judgment order on reserved issues. Wife, an attorney, represented herself below and does so again on appeal. She disputes the trial court's ruling on five issues: (1) imposition of sanctions against her; (2) consideration of husband's overtime pay, vehicle use and unreimbursed business expenses in the calculation of his income; (3) each party's entitlement to home equity reimbursements; (4) wife's entitlement to reimbursement for dental care; and (5) travel restrictions for the minor child. Court conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion, and affirm.