CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant appealed after he was placed on probation following his plea. His counsel has asked this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) After denial of his motion to suppress below, defendant pleaded no contest to one felony count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a)). He was placed on probation for two years on the condition that he successfully complete a Proposition 36 rehabilitation program. According to evidence presented at a combined preliminary hearing and hearing on defendants motion to suppress pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5,[1] Officer Charles Blazer was conducting a narcotics investigation with Detective Phil Galer around 4:00 p.m. on August 21, 2008, in Pittsburg. They were focusing on a specific person (not defendant), who was in a wheelchair. Over the course of about 45 minutes, Officer Blazer saw people he recognized from prior contacts drive up, and the man in the wheelchair would approach their windows and speak to them for a short time before they drove away. At a certain point, the man in the wheelchair began waving [people] off, as if he were out of narcotics to sell. The man in the wheelchair eventually boarded a bus and traveled to a shopping mall.

Defendant and appellant Morgan David Morris appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. Imposition of sentence was suspended and Morris was placed on probation for three years pursuant to Proposition 36. The evidence against Morris was discovered during a police search pursuant to a warrant. The warrant was supported in part by information provided by one or more confidential informants. A one-page portion of the affidavit was sealed to protect the identity of the informant(s). Morris brought a motion to quash and traverse the warrant, which was denied. Because the trial court did not retain the sealed, one-page portion of the affidavit in the court file, Morris asserts that meaningful appellate review of his motion to quash and traverse the warrant and suppress evidence is impossible. Therefore, he asserts, the trial courts denial of his motions must be reversed and the evidence suppressed, necessitating reversal of his conviction. Alternatively, Morris requests that we review the record to determine whether the trial court properly denied his motion to quash and traverse the warrant.

Following the trial courts failure to rule on his request for accommodation of his disabilities, Marc Stern appeals from issuance of a restraining order against him and from a default judgment awarding a condominium to his former wife as her separate property. Court reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Both parties appeal from an order awarding attorney fees and costs to the defendant following plaintiffs voluntary dismissal of his action with prejudice. Plaintiff maintains that the parties contracts do not authorize attorney fees to defendant for defending against plaintiffs noncontract causes of action. Defendant contends that the court erred in denying it attorney fees for defending against plaintiffs breach of contract, equitable and statutory causes of action, failing to award it a reasonable amount of attorney fees on the tort causes of action and failing to award it expert witness fees and other costs. We conclude that defendant is not entitled to attorney fees on any of plaintiffs causes of action and that the court ruled correctly in denying defendant its costs for expert witnesses, trial exhibits, messenger services and other miscellaneous items.

Appellant pled guilty to several offenses and admitted prior prison terms. The trial judge suspended execution of the four-year prison sentence and placed appellant on probation. Several years later, after appellant violated his probation, a different judge ordered the execution of the previously suspended four-year sentence. Appellant contends this sentence was illegal because one year earlier the original sentencing judge had reduced the suspended sentence from four years to two years. Court reject this contention and affirm.

The jury convicted defendant Delvion Lamar Adams of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211) and attempted second degree robbery ( 211, 664), and the trial court imposed a third strike sentence of 35 years to life. In this consolidated appeal and petition for a writ of habeas corpus, defendant raises related issues of ineffective assistance of counsel and denial of due process. For the reasons that follow, Court affirm the judgment on appeal and dismiss the petition without prejudice.

A jury convicted appellant Troy Lonzell Jelks of multiple counts of robbery and related offenses and found true personal firearm and criminal street gang allegations. The trial court imposed a total prison sentence of 129 years eight months. Appellants sole claim on appeal is that the judgment must be reversed because the trial court erroneously denied his Wheeler motion. Court affirm.

Reginald E. Davenport appeals in propria persona a judgment in an unlawful detainer action awarding the landlord possession and damages. Davenport claims the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the corporate plaintiff was misnamed on the summons and complaint. Court affirm the judgment.

Joel Gallegos appeals from judgment after conviction by jury of three counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211) and one count of assault with a deadly weapon ( 245, subd. (a)(1))[1] The jury found true allegations that two of the robberies were committed for the benefit of a street gang within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivisions (b)(1)(B) and (b)(1)(C). The trial court sentenced appellant to 20 years and four months in state prison.
Appellant contends that there was no substantial evidence to support the findings that the robberies for which his sentence was enhanced were committed for the benefit of a street gang. Court affirm.

Defendant and appellant Christopher Hernandez appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in his convictions for attempting to dissuade a witness, attempted murder, and making criminal threats, all for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Hernandez was sentenced to 35 years plus life in prison.
Hernandez contends the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his prior arrests, and committed instructional error. The People request that the abstract of judgment be corrected to comply with the trial courts oral pronouncement of judgment. Court correct the abstract of judgment as requested, and in all other respects affirm.

Antwain Washington was convicted by a jury of selling cocaine (Health and Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)) and possessing cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5). In a separate court trial it was found that he had sustained one prior conviction within the meaning of Penal Code sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d) and 667, subdivisions (b) through (i), that he had served a prior prison term within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), and that he had sustained two prior convictions within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a). He was sentenced to 12 years in prison. He appeals, contending that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not make a Pitchess motion, he was wrongfully denied a continuance of his sentencing hearing, and the finding with respect to one of his prior convictions is not supported by constitutionally sufficient evidence. Court find his contentions to be without merit and affirm the judgment.

Noah A. Ayala appeals from the judgment following his conviction by jury of felony vandalism (Pen. Code, 594, subd. (a)).[1] It also found true allegations that he committed the crime for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further or assist the gang ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)). Appellant admitted, and the court found true, allegations that he suffered three prior prison term convictions ( 667.5, subd. (b)), and a prior serious or violent felony strike ( 667, subds. (b)- (i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The court sentenced him to state prison for nine years, including a six-year upper term for felony vandalism and a three-year gang enhancement. Appellant argues that there is no sufficient evidence that the vandalism caused at least $400 of damage, and that the court committed prejudicial evidentiary and instructional errors. Court affirm.

V.C. (Mother) appeals from a November 14, 2008 juvenile court order declaring her son T.V. a dependent of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 358 and 361[1]and removing T.V. from V.C.s custody (Case no. B212459). Mother also appeals from an order entered at a March 25, 2009 six-month review hearing continuing T.V.s placement with Father under court supervision (Case no. B215617). We treat the appeals as consolidated for purposes of discussion.
After Mother filed her brief in the second appeal, the juvenile court, in an order dated June 23, 2007, returned T.V. to the home of parents. After the Los Angeles Department of Child and Family Services (DCFS) filed its respondents brief in the second appeal, the court terminated its jurisdiction in an order dated October 2, 2009, pursuant to a family law order awarding joint legal and physical custody of T.V. to Mother and Father. DCFS has filed a motion to dismiss the appeals as moot. Court conclude that the issues Mother raises are moot, and we dismiss the appeals.

Appellant James Packard appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of possession of cocaine base. (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a).) The jury found true that appellant had suffered a prior serious or violent felony conviction within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d). The jury also found true that appellant had served three prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced appellant to six years in state prison, consisting of the upper term of three years for possession of cocaine base, doubled pursuant to sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d). Court affirm.