Agnew v. Mangini
In this malicious prosecution action, the trial court granted defendants' special motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.16)[1] based on plaintiff Jeffrey A. Agnew's inability to show a probability of prevailing. Agnew contends the court erred by finding his voluntary dismissal from the underlying action was not a favorable termination within the meaning of malicious prosecution law. We affirm the order, as defendants' undisputed evidence shows the dismissal was based solely on financial considerations, and does not reflect the merits of the underlying action. Contrary to Agnew's assertion, he adduced no evidence from which a jury could reasonably find favorable termination. Moreover, the question of favorable termination is based on the court's view of the underlying judgment as a whole, and Agnew challenges the merit of only one of three causes of action against him in the underlying action. He claims defendants realized the fraud cause of action lacked merit, but he ignores the causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence. Given our holding, we are not required to address the probable cause and malice elements of the malicious prosecution action.
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