CA Unpub Decisions

On July 22, 2010, a felony complaint charged defendant and appellant Cyril Robert Slama with one count of receiving stolen property under Penal Code[1] section 496, subdivision (a). The complaint also alleged that defendant had suffered one prior conviction for a serious or violent felony under section 667, subdivisions (c) and (e)(1), and section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1).{CT 1}
On August 23, 2010, the complaint was amended to allege an additional count of receiving stolen property, for a total of two counts of receiving stolen property (counts 2 and 3), as well as an additional count of theft with a prior under sections 484 and 666 (count 1).{CT 4-5} That same day, defendant pled not guilty to each count and denied the prior strike allegation.{CT 3}
On October 12, 2010, defendant withdrew his not guilty plea. Defendant then pled guilty to the theft count (count 1), and one receiving stolen property count (count 2). Defendant also admitted the prior strike. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, on October 20, 2010, defendant was sentenced to the middle term of two years on the theft charge, doubled under the three strikes law, plus a two-year concurrent sentence on the receiving stolen property count, for a total of four years in state prison. The remaining receiving stolen property count was dismissed.{CT 8-13, 15-16}
On December 14, 2010, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.{CT 17}

Defendant Curtis Lamont Duhart attempted to rape a pregnant woman with a mental disability. A jury convicted defendant on one felony count of a lesser included offense of attempted rape of an incompetent person (§§ 664/261, subd. (a)(1)) and a second misdemeanor count of dependent adult abuse. (§ 368, subd. (c).) The court found true three of defendant's prison prior convictions and his strike prior conviction. The court sentenced defendant to a nine-year prison term.
On appeal, defendant argues there was insufficient evidence concerning the victim's inability to consent and the trial court erred in excluding the victim's sexual history. Defendant also argues insufficient evidence supports his conviction on count 2. He further charges it was prejudicial error to give a special instruction about the victim's pregnancy.
In his reply brief, defendant concedes his argument lacks merit about the insufficiency of evidence to support the trial court's finding that his prior 1990 conviction was a strike. The remainder of defendant's appellate arguments do not justify reversing his convictions. The parties agree the abstract of judgment should be corrected to reflect that defendant was convicted in a jury trial, not a court trial. We affirm the judgment with directions.

A jury found defendant Julian Sanchez guilty of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), two counts of robbery (§ 211),[1] and one count of actively participating in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)(1)). In regard to the two assault convictions and two robbery convictions, the jury found true the allegations that defendant committed the offenses to benefit a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)
Defendant admitted suffering two prior convictions for (1) robbery, in California (§ 211); and (2) willful or intentional discharge of a weapon at or into a dwelling or any building used for public or business purposes, in Oklahoma (21 Okl. St. § 1289.17A). The court found true the allegations that the two prior convictions (1) resulted in prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)); (2) qualified as serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)); and (3) qualified as strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A).) The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for a determinate term of 36 years plus an indeterminate term of 25 years to life.
Defendant raises three arguments on appeal. First, defendant contends his sentence for actively participating in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)(1)) should have been stayed because the act at issue was punished in a different way by a different provision of law (§ 654). Second, defendant asserts his sentence for the four gang enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) should be modified to reflect concurrent terms. Third, defendant contends there is insufficient evidence the prior Oklahoma conviction qualifies as a serious felony and strike under California law. We affirm in part, and reverse in part.

Anita T. appeals the orders entered at the termination of parental rights hearing held under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, she asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.

Rodrigo E. appeals the orders entered at the termination of parental rights hearing held under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, he asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.

Jesse H. and Tonya K. (together, the parents) appeal a juvenile court order terminating their parental rights to their minor daughter, Savannah K., under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 366.26. The parents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption did not apply to preclude terminating their parental rights. We affirm the order.

George G. (Minor) challenges the trial court's order denying his motion to suppress a switchblade knife and marijuana that a police officer found on his person after detaining him on the street as part of an investigation of a recent painting of gang graffiti in the vicinity of the detention. We affirm.

In October 2008, plaintiff and respondent Kirk Sanfilippo, an employee of the San Diego Port District (the District), who serves as its Harbor Police /chief (Respondent), petitioned for and obtained an injunctive order after hearing against harassment by appellant Gerald Patyten (Appellant), then a resident of the San Diego Bay port area. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6; all further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless noted.) The October 9, 2008 order (the original order) prohibited Appellant from leaving telephone messages at Respondent's work phone number, or coming within 100 yards of Respondent, his workplace or job at the District, his home or vehicles, for a period of three years. The order also prohibited Appellant from keeping or obtaining any firearms.
In April 2010, Appellant brought a motion to dissolve or modify the original order, and/or for leave to file a delayed special motion to strike the petition under anti-SLAPP provisions. (§ 425.16, subd. (f) [motion to be filed within 60 days of service of a complaint, unless court discretionarily allows otherwise].) The trial court denied Appellant's motion.

Dayana Cordova and Anna Salinas appeal from convictions of first degree murder, carjacking, kidnapping, and child endangerment.
Cordova argues: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support her child endangerment and kidnapping convictions; (2) statements made by Salinas during a joint interview were improperly admitted as adoptive admissions by Cordova, and the jury was not fully instructed on use of this evidence; (3) the trial court erred in giving a pinpoint instruction on the intent required for guilt based on an aider and abettor theory; (4) the trial court erred in excluding third party culpability evidence; and (5) the prosecutor improperly appealed to passion and sympathy in closing arguments to the jury.
We agree with Cordova that the pinpoint instruction on the intent for aiding and abetting was incorrect. However, we conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We also find no reversible error concerning her remaining contentions.
Salinas does not challenge her convictions, but raises only a sentencing error. She argues the sentence for child endangerment should have been stayed under Penal Code section 654 because the child endangerment involved the same objective as the kidnapping.[1] We reject this assertion.
Finally, Salinas and Cordova assert the trial court erroneously imposed restitution fines of $40,000 because the maximum permissible amount is $10,000 for each fine. The Attorney General agrees with this contention.
We affirm the judgments of conviction, and modify the judgments as to sentencing to reduce each fine to $10,000. As so modified, the judgments are affirmed.

A modification decision.

Petitioner Pit River Tribe (the Tribe) seeks an extraordinary writ to vacate the order of the juvenile court at a postpermanency planning hearing ( ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 27 s JTKHQV000001 xpl 1 l "Welf. & Inst Code, § 366.28" Welf. & Inst Code, § 366.28),[1] at which it found good cause to deviate from the placement preferences set forth in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). ( ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 24 s JTKHQV000002 xpl 1 l "25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq." 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) The Tribe contends the good cause finding was in error because there was a failure to comply with the ICWA's notice and placement requirements. Because the social services agency failed to use the services of the Tribe to secure a placement conforming to the ICWA placement preferences, failed to expeditiously evaluate the relatives recommended by the Tribe for placement, failed to assist in obtaining a criminal record exemption or adequately explain why it did not do so for one of the ICWA-compliant placement options, and failed to apply the Tribe's social and cultural standards when assessing the relative's home, we are compelled to agree.

After pleading guilty to corporal injury to a spouse (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)) with three prior convictions for the same offense (Veh. Code, § 23550), and admitting a prior prison term (Pen. Code, § 6675., subd. (b)), defendant Larry Andrew Johnson was sentenced to an aggregate term of six years eight months in state prison.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed the upper term and ordered defendant's sentences to be served consecutively based on an improper dual use of facts. Defendant further contends the trial court erred in failing to consider his mental illness and alcohol addiction as mitigating factors in sentencing. We affirm the judgment.

On March 4, 2011, defendant, Daniel Christopher Rodriguez, pled no contest to a felony charge and admitted the truth of a special allegation. Defendant's probable cause certificate issuance request was denied. We have a duty to raise issues concerning our jurisdiction on our own motion. (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126; Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 398.) We thus issued an order to show cause re dismissal and set the matter for oral argument.

Girardi & Keese appeals from an order under Code of Civil Procedure[1] section 1038 against it and in favor of respondent City of Los Angeles (the City). We reverse.