CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Kevin Michael Danley committed his offenses on March 14, 2008. Arrested the next day, he remained in local custody until his release on bail in September 2008. In April 2010, he pleaded no contest to battery with serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d))[1] and misdemeanor active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)); he also admitted that he had suffered a prior juvenile adjudication that qualified as a â€

James Acosta was charged by information with a total of 14 offenses. Seven crimes were alleged to have been committed on December 6, 2006, against Amy K. and her property, namely first degree burglary (count 1), kidnapping to commit robbery (count 2), first degree robbery (count 3), sexual battery by restraint (count 4), false imprisonment by violence (count 5), making criminal threats (count 6), and car theft (count 7). Counts 8 and 9 alleged first degree robbery and first degree burglary, both of which took place on January 17, 2007 and were committed against Trang Nguyen and his property. Acosta was also charged with two counts of receiving stolen property (counts 10 & 14), the April 27, 2007 first degree burglary of a residence inhabited by Kim Le and Allison Moriya (count 11), the May 3, 2007 first degree burglary of a residence inhabited by Alijan Hasmik (count 12), and the May 3, 2007 first degree burglary of a residence inhabited by Jeanne Shobe (count 13).
A jury convicted him of count 1 and counts 3 through 14. The trial court dismissed count 2 due to the jury's inability to reach a verdict on that count. The court found true allegations Acosta had served three prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b))[1] and been convicted of two prior serious felonies (§ 667, subd. (a)), prior convictions that also qualified as â€

E.M. (father) appeals from a juvenile court order terminating parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to his four-year-old son, Jonathon.[1] Father contends termination would be detrimental to Jonathon because he had a beneficial relationship with both of his parents (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)). Father also argues termination would substantially interfere with Jonathon's sibling relationships (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v)). Therefore, in father's view, there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's decision. On review, we disagree and affirm.

Norma P. (mother) appeals from a juvenile court order terminating parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to her four-year-old son, Jonathon.[1] She contends termination would be detrimental to Jonathon because he had a beneficial relationship with her (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)). She also argues termination would substantially interfere with Jonathon's sibling relationships (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v)). Therefore, in her view, there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's decision. On review, we disagree and affirm.

Petitioner N.D. (father) is the father of the infant R.J. (minor), who was born in April 2011. Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it went against the recommendation of minor's counsel and the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) and decided not to offer him reunification services pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code, section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(12) and (c).[1] As discussed below, the discretion invested in the juvenile court to make this important decision is quite broad, and we simply cannot say that the court abused this discretion.

Defendant and appellant Jacob Lee Haughton was charged by information with inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a), count 1),[1] assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1), count 2), and resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1), count 3). The information also alleged that he served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and had two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)).
Defendant pled not guilty to the charges and denied the prior convictions. He then filed a motion pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). At a change of plea hearing, the information was orally amended to add one count of felony witness intimidation. (§ 136.1, subd. (a), count 4.) Defendant pled guilty to counts 1 through 4. He admitted the two prison priors, but did not admit the prior strike convictions at the time of the plea. The trial court stated for the record that the strike priors had not been admitted, and that there would be a subsequent hearing to discuss the strikes and the Romero motion.
The trial court held a Romero hearing. The prosecutor reminded the trial court that the status of the strikes had not been litigated yet, and stated that she had the certified records of the prior convictions. The trial court denied the Romero motion and then asked if defendant was prepared to admit the strikes. Defendant asked the trial court to make a finding after review of the record, and he waived his right to a jury trial. The trial court reviewed the documentation and found the prior strike allegations to be true. The trial court then indicated its tentative sentence. Defense counsel objected, for the record, to the late oral addition of count 4 at the plea hearing. The trial court noted the objection. Defense counsel then requested that the trial court run the sentence on count 4 concurrent. The trial court denied the request and sentenced defendant to 25 years to life on count 1, a consecutive 25 years to life on count 4, and one consecutive year on each of the prison priors. The trial court imposed 25 years to life on count 2, but stayed it pursuant to section 654. The trial court imposed 180 days in county jail on count 3 and gave defendant credit for time served.

A jury found true a petition filed by the People to extend the commitment of defendant Willie Lee Williams, who had previously been adjudged not guilty by reason of insanity (Pen. Code, § 1026.5). Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error per se by denying his challenge for cause, of a potential juror who had limited English skills. We disagree and affirm. Defendant forfeited his objection to the juror by not exercising a peremptory challenge against the juror, after denial of his challenge for cause. Defendant also did not express dissatisfaction with the jury as finally empanelled. Furthermore, there was no abuse of discretion in denying defendant's challenge for cause.

After the jury in his first trial was unable to reach verdicts on any counts, a second jury found defendant and appellant, Daniel Thomas Carmona (defendant), guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a child in violation of Penal Code section 288.5 (count 1) and two counts of committing a lewd and lascivious act on a child under the age of 14, in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a) (counts 2 & 3). The jury found defendant not guilty on two additional counts charging violations of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a). The trial court sentenced defendant to serve a total term of 14 years in state prison.

The County of Riverside (County) appeals following a judgment by the trial court confirming an arbitration award made in favor of the Riverside Sheriff's Association (RSA) on behalf of a corrections officer (the deputy). The arbitrator had determined that the officer had not been terminated for good cause, ordered that he be reinstated, and ordered the County to pay all lost wages and benefits, less interim earnings, including interest. The County tendered a check for $297,138.42, but because the parties disputed the amount of lost wages, RSA petitioned the superior court to confirm the award. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of RSA in the amount of $563,843.09, plus interest, and the County appealed.
On appeal, the County claims that (1) RSA failed to exhaust administrative remedy of contractual arbitration of damages and mitigation/offset; (2) the petition to confirm the arbitrator's award was untimely; (3) the trial court erroneously deprived the County of the opportunity to present evidence of offset or mitigation of damages; (4) remand is necessary to prevent double recovery by RSA and unjust enrichment; and (5) an accord and satisfaction was reached when the corrections officer cashed the check for $297,138.42.[1] We affirm.

Defendant Guadalupe Cabral appeals from judgment entered following jury convictions for committing forcible and nonforcible lewd acts upon Jane Doe 1 (Pen. Code, § 288, subds. (a) and (b)[1]; counts 1 and 2), and committing forcible lewd acts upon Jane Doe 2 (§ 288, subd. (b); counts 6 through 15). The charged crimes occurred during the period of January 1, 2006, to July 2007. The jury also found true the multiple victim allegation (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(5)) and a prior serious felony conviction enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 185 years to life in prison.

T.S. appeals juvenile court orders placing her minor children, Daisy T. and Hector T. (together, the minors) with their father, A.T., and continuing the court's dependency jurisdiction. T.S. contends the court abused its discretion by finding the minors' best interests would be served by placing them with A.T. She also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding that placing the minors with A.T. would not be detrimental to them. We affirm the orders.

M.G. and Benjamin E. (together, the parents) appeal a juvenile court judgment terminating their parental rights to C.E. and V.E. (the children), under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Benjamin E. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption did not apply, an argument, which M.G. joins. M.G. contends the court abused its discretion by summarily denying her section 388 petition seeking the children's return to her custody.[2] We affirm.

On March 15, 2010, Brandon Joseph Williams pleaded guilty to the following offenses in five cases: in case No. SWF009902, robbery (Pen. Code, § 211),[1] assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and misdemeanor resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)); in case Nos. SWF026941 and SWF024623, one count each of possessing "pruno" in jail (§ 4573.8); in case No. SWF020863, five counts of possessing "pruno" in jail; and in case No. SWF10000242, destroying jail property (§ 4600, subd. (a)); vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(1)), possessing a weapon in jail (§ 4502, subd. (a)) and manufacturing and possessing a weapon in jail (§ 12020, subd. (a)(1)).[2]
Williams waived jury and the court found true allegations he had served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and had suffered one prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)) and one strike (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). The strike, the serious felony prior and one of the prison priors were based on a 1992 conviction. The remaining prison prior was based on a 1997 conviction. [3]
The court sentenced Williams to 34 years eight months in prison. The sentence included 18 years in case No. SWF009902: twice the five-year upper term for robbery, a consecutive two-year term (one-third the middle term, doubled) for assault, a concurrent term for resisting arrest, five years for the serious felony prior and one year for the 1997 prior prison term; the court stayed sentence for the 1992 prison prior. The court imposed consecutive terms in the remaining cases: three years four months in case No. SWF026941 (16 months for the substantive offense--one-third the middle term, doubled--and one year for each prison prior); eight months in case No. SWF024623 (one-third the middle term); eight years eight months in case No. SWF020863 (16 months--one-third the middle term, doubled--on each count and one year for each prison prior); and four years in case No. SWF10000242 (two years for possessing a weapon in jail--one-third the middle term, doubled; stayed terms on each of the remaining counts; and one year for each prison prior).

Appellant, the mother of the minor, appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395; further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Appellant claims inquiry and notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) were insufficient. We reject these claims.