P. v. Dillon
Filed 8/9/12 P. v. Dillon CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
PATRICK MARK DILLON,
Defendant
and Appellant.
E054317
(Super.Ct.No.
INF063886)
OPINION
APPEAL
from the Superior Court
of
County. Richard A.
Erwood, Judge. Affirmed.
Athena
Shudde, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, and
Garrett Beaumont and Vincent P. LaPietra, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
On
June 1, 2011, a jury found
defendant Patrick Mark Dillon guilty of premeditated
murder (Pen. Code,
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] § 187, subd. (a)) and that he personally
used a deadly weapon within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1)
and section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(23)).
On August 15, 2011,
defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 26 years to life. He appeals, contending the evidence is
insufficient to establish premeditation.
We affirm.
I. FACTS
On
December 15, 2008,
defendant was hitchhiking near the Arizona-California border. Luz Caldera
site near the Colorado River. He spent the night with them.
The
next day, defendant went with the Calderas to fish. They picked up Donald Thomas
like fishing, because when they got to the river, he turned around and did not
take a pole. Defendant and Carlos argued
at the fishing site. Thomas overheard
Carlos tell defendant that he (Carlos) was not going to buy cigarettes for, or
otherwise support, defendant. The group
left after approximately 45 minutes.
Defendant and Carlos continued arguing in the car. Thomas recalled defendant saying that he
could not be traced because he had no fingerprints; he further described the
situation between Carlos and defendant as tense.
After
dropping off Thomas, the Calderas returned to their camp site with
defendant. Defendant and Carlos went
back to the river to fish. Defendant
later returned to the camp site smiling.
Luz testified she had not seen him smile before then. As defendant began packing up his things, Luz
asked if he was leaving, and he replied in the affirmative. Luz asked him if he had said goodbye to
Carlos. Defendant went back and then
took off.
Defendant
hitched a ride from Denise LeSieur, who lived a few blocks from the camp where
the Calderas were staying. When Denise
asked defendant where he was going, he said, “away from here.” He told her he wanted to go to Slab
City in Yuma. Denise testified that initially she thought
defendant seemed “a little anxious,” but after she started driving, defendant
was very calm. The two stopped at
McDonald’s and she bought dinner for him before dropping him off at Quartzsite.
Back
at the camp site, when Luz went down to the river to get Carlos because it was
getting late, she discovered his body lying on a rock. He had blood all over his face. The police were called. Carlos’s body had over 40 stab wounds,
including defensive wounds to his hands.
He had been stabbed in the neck and had suffered an injury to his
jugular vein that would have been sufficient to kill him by itself. There were no shoes on Carlos’s feet, even
though the weather was very cold and overcast.
His right pocket was turned inside out, and his wallet was located
approximately 10 feet from his body. A
sweatshirt was found in a trash can just inside a nearby bathroom.
When
Denise heard about the murder, she contacted the sheriff’s department and
reported her encounter with defendant.
Defendant was arrested at Quartzsite and subsequently interviewed after
advisal and waiver of his rights. He
acknowledged going to the river with Carlos; however, he claimed that Carlos
attacked him with a hammer. Defendant
said he reacted and assaulted Carlos, picking up his knife and stabbing Carlos
in self-defense. The Riverside County Sheriff’s
Department dive team searched the river for a hammer but none was found.
Deputies
recovered defendant’s belongings from a wash area off of Highway 95. A knife was included among items that were
secured inside a dead tree.
II. EVIDENCE OF PREMEDITATION
The
People alleged that defendant committed first degree murder on the sole theory
that the killing was willful, deliberate and premeditated. The jury was not instructed on any other
theory of first degree murder. The jury
returned a special finding to this effect.
Defendant contends, as a matter of law, that the jury’s true finding of
willful, deliberate and premeditated murder was not supported by substantial
evidence.
“Review
on appeal of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding of
premeditated and deliberate murder involves consideration of the evidence
presented and all logical inferences from that evidence in light of the legal
definition of premeditation and deliberation . . . . Settled principles of appellate review
require us to review the entire record in the light most favorable to the
judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is,
evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find that the defendant premeditated and
deliberated beyond a reasonable doubt.
[Citations.] The standard of
review is the same in cases such as this where the People rely primarily on
circumstantial evidence.
[Citation.]” (
1124.)
Our
review of any claim of insufficiency of the evidence is therefore a limited
review. If the evidence presented to the
trial court is subject to differing inferences, the reviewing court must assume
that the trier of fact resolved all conflicting inferences in favor of the
prosecution. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 326.) A reviewing court is precluded from making
its own subjective determination of guilt or innocence. (Id.
at p. 319, fn. 13.)
In
whether we are convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt, but whether any
rational trier of fact could have been persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant premeditated the murder.
[Citations.]”
“In
assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the
light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence
that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier
of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]
Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no
hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the
conviction].’ [Citation.]” (People
v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
Given
this court’s limited role on appeal, defendant bears a heavy burden in claiming
there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for first degree
murder. If the verdict is supported by
substantial evidence, we are bound to give due deference to the trier of fact
and not retry the case ourselves. “‘On
appeal, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and
must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier
could reasonably deduce from the evidence.
[Citation.]’” (
1206.) It is the exclusive function of
the trier of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses and draw reasonable
inferences from the evidence. (
623.)
Defendant’s
hurdle to secure a reversal is just as high when the prosecution’s case depends
on circumstantial evidence. (
792.) “‘“‘If the circumstances
reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing
court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.’” [Citations.]’
[Citation.]” (
“Murder
is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice
aforethought.” (§ 187.) To prove one variety of first degree murder,
the prosecution must show a willful, deliberate and premeditated killing. If it fails to do so, the murder is a second
degree murder. (§ 189.) A killing is deliberate and premeditated if
the killer weighs and considers the question of killing and the reasons for and
against such a choice and, having in mind the consequences, decides to and does
kill. (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 767.) “‘“The true test is not the duration of time
[of reflection] as much as it is the extent of the reflection.”’” (People
v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1080.)
“‘A
verdict of deliberate and premeditated first
degree murder requires more than a showing of intent to kill. [Citation.]
“Deliberation” refers to careful weighing of considerations in forming a
course of action; “premeditation” means thought over in advance. [Citations.]
“The process of premeditation . . . does not require any
extended period of time. ‘The true test
is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great
rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at
quickly. . . .’
[Citations.]”’ [Citation.] [¶] In
People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d
15, 26-27 [(Anderson)], [our state’s
highest] court reviewed earlier decisions and developed guidelines to aid
reviewing courts in assessing the sufficiency of evidence to sustain findings
of premeditation and deliberation.
[Citation.] We described three
categories of evidence recurring in those cases: planning, motive, and manner of killing. [Citations.]
The Anderson decision
stated: ‘Analysis of the cases will show
that this court sustains verdicts of first degree murder typically when there
is evidence of all three types and otherwise requires at least extremely strong
evidence of [planning] or evidence of [motive] in conjunction with [evidence
of] either [planning] or [manner of killing].’
[Citations.] Since
guidelines are descriptive and neither normative nor exhaustive, and that
reviewing courts need not accord them any particular weight. [Citations.]”
(People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42
Cal.4th 379, 419-420.)
Thus,
while the Anderson factors are not
exclusive or exhaustive, they provide a sound basis to determine if the
evidence supports the jury’s finding that a murder was willful, deliberate, and
premeditated. (See People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 517.) “Given the presumption that an unjustified
killing of a human being constitutes murder of the second, rather than of the
first, degree, and the clear legislative intention to differentiate between
first and second degree murder, we must determine in any case of circumstantial
evidence whether the proof is such as will furnish a reasonable foundation for
an inference of premeditation and deliberation [citation], or whether it
‘leaves only to conjecture and surmise the conclusion that defendant either
arrived at or carried out the intention to kill as the result of a concurrence
of deliberation and premeditation.’ . . . [Citation.]”
(Anderson,
With
this background, we consider the applicability of the Anderson factors to this case, keeping in mind our purpose of
differentiating between a deliberate and premeditated killing and a killing
perpetrated on “‘mere unconsidered or rash impulse hastily executed’
[citation] . . . .”
(Anderson,
The
first factor is planning: “(1) facts
about how and what defendant did prior
to the actual killing which show that the defendant was engaged in activity
directed toward, and explicable as intended to result in, the killing—what may
be characterized as ‘planning’ activity . . . .” (Anderson,
supra, 70 Cal.2d at pp. 26-27.) According to defendant, “there was no
evidence presented showing or suggesting planning activity, ‘the most important
prong of the Anderson test.’” Defendant points out that he had met the
victim the day before the killing; he spent the night at the victim’s
invitation; the victim chose the spot where he was killed; the victim’s mother
knew the location of the victim and defendant; and the knife used to kill the
victim was one that defendant found “during his travels and
used . . . for protection and as a tool incidental to his
transient living circumstances.”
In
contrast, the People point out that defendant had been arguing with the victim
because the victim refused to buy defendant cigarettes. Despite this argument, defendant accompanied
the victim to a lagoon area along the river where the victim went to fish. However, according to testimony, earlier in
the day, defendant showed no interest in fishing. He further stated he did not have a fishing
license and could not fish. Moreover,
defendant clearly took his knife with him, while his other belongings remained
at the camp site.
title="">[5] These circumstances support the inference
that defendant seized an opportunity to attack the victim.
The
second Anderson factor is
motive: “(2) facts about the defendant’s
prior relationship and/or conduct
with the victim from which the jury could reasonably infer a ‘motive’ to kill
the victim . . . .”
(Anderson,
resemblance to those cases where there was some preexisting motive for the
crime, such as avoiding discovery of a firearm, or an effort to avoid arrest . . . . Nor is this case similar to those cases where
a motive was apparent at the time of the crime.” Defendant faults the prosecution for
“completely gloss[ing] over the issue.”
The People argue that defendant’s motive stems from his argument with
the victim over the victim’s refusal to purchase cigarettes for defendant. According to the record, before picking up
defendant, the victim had gone to the bank to get money, and he later purchased
a pack of cigarettes for defendant.
Also, defendant stated the victim was “ordering [him] around” at the
camp. This evidence, coupled with the
evidence that the victim’s shoes were missing, his right pocket was turned
inside out, and his wallet was found approximately 10 feet from his body,
sufficiently support a finding that defendant was motivated to kill for money.
The
third Anderson factor is the manner
of killing, i.e., “(3) facts about the nature of the killing from which the
jury could infer that the manner of killing was so particular and exacting that
the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a ‘preconceived
design’ to take his victim’s life in a particular way for a ‘reason’ which the
jury can reasonably infer,” based on evidence of planning and motive. (Anderson,
supra, 70 Cal. 2d at p. 27.) According to defendant, the multiple stab
wounds to the victim’s body, “the majority of which were non-fatal,” are
“consistent with a frenzied attack characteristic of an unconsidered explosion
of violence.”
The
People contend the manner of killing supports a finding of premeditation. Because the victim was morbidly obese and not
wearing shoes when he was killed, the People argue this shows that defendant
struck at an opportune time. We also
note the victim had been awake since 4:00 a.m. that day. Defendant went through the victim’s pockets
and wallet, discarded his (defendant’s) sweatshirt, calmly packed up his
belongings, and then said goodbye to the victim’s mother. Defendant’s demeanor remained cool and collected
when he was with Denise. Thus, the
People maintain that the killing “was the result of ‘a pre-existing reflection’
and ‘careful thought and weighing of considerations’ rather than ‘mere
unconsidered or rash impulse hastily executed’
[citation] . . . .”
(Anderson,
III. DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
HOLLENHORST
Acting P. J.
We concur:
MCKINSTER
J.
KING
J.
name="_ftn1" title=""> [1] All further statutory references are to the
Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
name="_ftn2" title=""> [2] Luz died on March 12, 2011, at the age
of 84. Because she was unavailable to
testify at trial, her preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury.
