CA Unpub Decisions

Twenty-two and twenty years respectively after his guilty pleas to voluntary manslaughter and to possession of drugs for sale, Muhammed Hamawi asked the superior court to set aside his guilty pleas so he could avoid deportation. The court denied his motions and his requests for certificates of probable cause. Hamawi appeals contending he is not required to have a certificate of probable cause, that the court abused its discretion in denying his motions and that his convictions should be set aside because his attorneys were ineffective. As we will discuss, this appeal is not properly before us as a challenge to guilty pleas without compliance with Penal Code[1] section 1237.5. Even if we were to consider his issues on the merits we would affirm the trial court's orders.

B.A., a minor, was charged by petition with assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily harm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1); count 1)[1]; willful and unlawful use of force and violence resulting in the infliction of serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d); count 2); and attempt to prevent and dissuade a victim and witness of a crime from making a report (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1); count 3).
B.A. entered a settlement agreement under which she admitted to counts 1 and 3. The juvenile court found B.A. understood the nature of the conduct alleged, the possible consequences of her admission, and her admission was freely and voluntarily given. The court sustained the petition on counts 1 and 3 and dismissed count 2. The court declared B.A. a ward under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and placed her in the Youthful Offender Unit (Y.O.U) program for a period not to exceed 480 days. The court, however, stayed commitment for three months, placed B.A. on home supervision through the electronic surveillance program, and ordered her not to use a computer for purposes other than school work or social media such as Facebook.
A few weeks later, B.A. violated the terms of her home confinement through unauthorized computer use and extensive use of Facebook. The court lifted the stay on the order to the Y.O.U program.

John V. Adamski brought this petition for writ of mandate to set aside an administrative decision of the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (the Board) that treated a lump sum payment he received in the last quarter of 2008 as though he had received it in equal shares in each quarter of the calendar year 2008, a year which he applied for, and received, unemployment benefits.
The trial court upheld the administrative decision and rendered judgment denying the writ of mandate. Adamski appeals from that judgment.
Because the trial court did not apply the correct standard of review of the administrative proceedings, we shall reverse the judgment and remand the matter for the trial court to apply its independent judgment to the evidence.

Defendant Tracy Alan Laube pleaded no contest to failing to update his annual registration as a sex offender. (Pen. Code, § 290.120, subd. (a).)[1] He also admitted allegations he had been convicted of one strike offense in 1987 and five strike offenses in 1992, including four sex crimes, against a single victim. The trial court granted a defense motion to strike five of the six strikes and sentenced defendant to six years in state prison, consisting of the upper term of three years for the failure to register, doubled for the remaining strike.
The People appeal, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in striking the five prior serious felony convictions pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). (§ 1238, subd. (a)(10).) But because they have not shown the trial court acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or beyond the bounds of reason, we shall affirm the judgment. (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162 (Williams); People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124 (Rodrigues).)

Defendant Deandrea Jovell Farlow and a group of cohorts robbed a bank during business hours. A jury found him guilty of three counts of robbery, three counts of assault with a firearm, and 20 counts of false imprisonment. The jury also found that a principle used a firearm during the commission of the offenses. Sentenced to 11 years eight months in prison, defendant appeals. He contends the trial court erred in permitting two law enforcement witnesses to testify that it was defendant who appeared in a video tape and in a still photo, there was insufficient evidence of false imprisonment of two of the victims, and that the trial court should have stayed his assault and false imprisonments terms pursuant to Penal Code section 654 (unspecified section references that follow are to the Penal Code). We affirm the judgment.

Prenell Goodwin appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to possession of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) and his admission that he previously had been convicted of a serious or violent felony pursuant to the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The trial court sentenced Goodwin to 32 months in prison. We affirm.

D.B. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in failing to find the parental visitation exception to the termination of parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). The juvenile court did not err.

Graciela M. (Mother) appeals from orders denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1] petition and terminating parental rights to her child, Angel G. We conclude that Mother’s section 388 petition did not meet her burden of showing a change of circumstances or that the proposed modification of the order was in Angel’s best interests, and therefore denial of the petition was not an abuse of discretion. We also conclude that Mother did not establish the beneficial relationship exception to termination of parental rights in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), and affirm the order terminating parental rights.

Plaintiff, Eva Rocha, appeals from a November 15, 2011 order compelling arbitration of her individual wage and hour causes of action but dismissing her class claims. We conclude: the order under review are appealable; both defendants, Kinecta Federal Credit Union and Kinecta Alternative Financial Solutions, Inc., may compel arbitration; the agreement to arbitrate does not permit classwide arbitration; any issue concerning title 29 United States Code section 157 has been forfeited; and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to continue the hearing date on the motion to compel arbitration. We affirm the order under review.
Defendants moved to compel arbitration of plaintiff’s individual causes of action and dismissing her class claims. Plaintiff was employed by Nix Check Cashing in October 2006 as a manager in training. One month later she became a senior teller. Subsequently Nix Check Cashing was acquired by defendants. Plaintiff became an employee of Kinecta Alternative Financial Solutions, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Kinecta Federal Credit Union. Her job title was changed to branch supervisor with no pay change. On December 17, 2007, plaintiff was asked to sign an arbitration agreement with Kinecta Federal Credit Union and its wholly-owned subsidiaries.

D.B. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in failing to find the parental visitation exception to the termination of parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). The juvenile court did not err.

R.M. (mother) appeals jurisdictional and dispositional orders made with respect to her nine-year-old daughter, M.S. Mother contends the Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) failed to give adequate notice of the dependency proceedings as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Department has filed a letter brief in which it concedes the notices previously given lack crucial information and were not served on all relevant tribes. Thus, the Department has no opposition to remand for proper ICWA notice.

We affirm the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders but accept the Department’s concession and remand the matter to the juvenile court with directions to order the Department, if it has not already done so, to comply with the inquiry and notice provisions of the ICWA.

This case comes before us a second time. In 1996, a jury convicted defendant Joseph Evan Bush on 13 counts of second degree robbery and found he had used a deadly weapon in the commission of all but three of the offenses. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found defendant had suffered a prior serious felony conviction for federal bank robbery. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (a), 1170.12.)[1] Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate state prison term of 43 years. He appealed, and this court affirmed the judgment (People v. Bush (Apr. 14, 1997, B100672) [nonpub. opn.]). The California Supreme Court denied defendant’s petition for review.
On September 27, 2010, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the strike allegation. The trial court granted the petition on February 8, 2011, vacated defendant’s sentence and ordered a retrial of the strike allegation.
Following the retrial on May 26, 2011, the trial court found defendant’s federal bank robbery conviction qualified as a prior serious felony conviction under California law. In anticipation of resentencing, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the strike allegation in light of his post-conviction behavior while incarcerated in this case (§ 1385; People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497). On August 16, 2011, the trial court heard and denied the motion and re-imposed the aggregate state prison term of 43 years. Defendant appeals, contending the trial court abused its discretion in declining to dismiss his prior strike in the interest of justice. We affirm.

Appellant John R. was adjudged a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602,[1] and ordered home on probation. He contends the juvenile court erred in setting the maximum term of confinement because he was committed to the custody of his parents. We agree, and modify the dispositional order to strike any reference to the maximum term of confinement.

Fernando Villanueva appeals the judgment entered following his conviction by jury of second degree robbery in which he personally used a firearm. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 12022.53, subd. (b).) Villanueva contends the trial court erred in refusing to modify CALCRIM No. 3400, the standard instruction on the defendant’s burden of proof for an alibi defense. We reject Villanueva’s claim and affirm the judgment.