In re H.H.
Filed 8/22/12 In re H.H. CA2/5
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
FIVE
In re H.H., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
B238252
(Los Angeles
County
Super. Ct.
No. CK81467)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
D.B.,
Objector and Appellant.
APPEAL from
of Los
Angeles, Rudolph Diaz, Judge. Affirmed
Megan Turkat Schirn, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.
John F. Krattli, Acting County
Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Angela Williams, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
>
INTRODUCTION
D.B.
(mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating her parental
rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.
in failing to find the parental visitation exception to the termination of
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). The juvenile
court did not err.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March
12, 2010, the Department filed a detention
report stating that in February, 2010, then three-year-old A.H,
six-year-old Y.H, and nine-year-old H.H (collectively, the children), came to
the attention of the Department of Children and Family Services (Department)
because it was reported that a narcotic raid was conducted at the children’s
home and large amounts of methamphetamine and cocaine were recovered at the
premises, and mother possessed $3,000 in cash.
Mother was arrested by the Los Angeles Police Department. Father had been incarcerated for possession
of cocaine.
title="">[2] According to the detention report, upon
release from detention, both parents will be deported to Mexico.
The March 12, 2010, detention report
provided that A.H. said that she had been well-fed and clean in her parents’
care, and H.H. said she had been well-fed, clean, and attended school
regularly. H.H. said that she was aware
that drugs were in the house and where they were located and would see the
parents hide it. Y.H. refused to speak with
the children’s social worker (CSW) regarding the substance abuse in the home. Mother said she did not know why she was
arrested, and she and the children were unaware of drugs in the home. Father said that he had been arrested three
times in 2010 for drug related offenses, including for being under the
influence of drugs. The children were
initially placed with the paternal aunt and uncle, but because on March 9,
2010, the Department learned that the paternal uncle had been arrested for
possession of an unregistered handgun, and the parents had not provided the
Department with written authorization for the paternal aunt and uncle to care
for the children, the Department removed the children from the paternal aunt
and uncle’s home and placed them in foster care.
On March
12, 2010, the Department filed a petition under section 300, subdivisions (a),
(b), and (j) alleging that father physically abused H.H., mother failed to
protect H.H. from father’s physical abuse, the parents established a
detrimental home environment for the children because the parents possessed
methamphetamine and cocaine in the home within access of the children, father
abused cocaine, and mother failed to protect the children from father’s cocaine
abuse.
At the
March 2010, detention hearing, the juvenile court found a
children and ordered that they remain in foster care and the Department had
discretion to release them to any appropriate relative. In March 2010, and June 2010, the juvenile
ordered that the parents were to have monitored telephone visits with the
children. In August 2010, the juvenile
court ordered that the children be placed back in the home of parental aunt and
uncle.
the petition allegations.
At the
November 2010, adjudication hearing, mother waived her rights to a court trial,
and the juvenile court sustained the petition, as amended, regarding
father’s physical abuse of H.H., mother’s failure to protect
H.H. from father’s physical abuse, the detrimental home environment because the
parents possessed methamphetamine and cocaine in the home, father’s abuse of
cocaine, and mother’s failure to protect the children from father’s cocaine
abuse. At the November 2010, disposition
hearing, the juvenile court ordered no family reunification services for
parents, and monitored visits between the parents and the children, and set the
matter for hearing to select a permanent plan.
On March 14, 2011, the Department filed
a “366.26 WIC report” [Welfare and Institutions Code report] stating that
mother was incarcerated, and had been sentenced to state prison for a term of
four years. Mother and father had “a
hold for immigration deportation.”
According
to the report, paternal aunt indicated that she was devoted to adopting the
children and making them a permanent part of her family. The children seemed to be doing well under
paternal aunt’s care and supervision, and the Department recommended adoption
as the permanent plan for the children.
The children were adoptable as they were emotionally stable, healthy,
and had no developmental delays or physical limitations. Paternal aunt and uncle’s home study was
pending. On occasion, H.H. would avoid
the subject of adoption.
On September 12, 2011, the Department
filed a last minute information for the court report stating that the adoption
home study for paternal aunt and uncle had been approved. Also on September 12, 2011, the Department filed a status review
report stating that the children continue to live with paternal aunt and
uncle. The children have adjusted well
with living with them, expressed that they were happy living with their
maternal aunt and, according to the report, paternal aunt “provide[d] a
nurturing environment for the children . . . .” The social worker observed a “strong bond”
between paternal aunt and Y.H. and A.H.
According to the report, “The children’s placement is appropriate as
they are all receiving excellent care.”
Paternal aunt discussed the children’s school report cards with them,
and the report detailed the children’s completion of house chores. The children’s needs were being met,
including their educational and therapy needs, and they have been provided with
timely and appropriate medical and dental care.
The report
stated that H.H. said she wanted to be adopted, “but I also want to see my
parents.” Y.H. said he was happy, but
that he also missed his parents and he liked to speak with mother on the
telephone. H.H. and Y.H. created a
Mother’s Day card for both mother and paternal aunt. H.H. and Y.H. showed excitedly pictures of
their parents and when H.H and Y.H. were younger to the social worker, and the
social worker stated that they had many good memories to share. Paternal aunt facilitated “regular” telephone
contact between the children and mother.
On April 26, 2011,
the children had a face-to-face visit with mother at juvenile court, and the
report stated that the social worker would facilitate a face-to-face visit
between the children and mother at the county jail on September 9, 2011.
In September 2011, the juvenile court
identified adoption as the appropriate permanent plan. On October
12, 2012, the Department filed a 366.26 WIC report, stating that
H.H. said that when she lived with her parents, the children did not have an
established bedtime and they often went to bed after midnight. As a
result, H.H. was often “too tired” to go to school the next morning. H.H. also said that her parents argued about
her father’s girlfriend, and the arguments often resulted in mother taking the
children from the home to spend the night in a hotel.
The report
stated that both H.H. and Y.H. were receiving therapy to address case issues,
the loss of their parents due to incarceration, and possible adoption by the
caregivers. H.H. and Y.H. understood
what adoption meant and they said that they wanted to be adopted by the
parental aunt and uncle. H.H. said she
looks forward to being adopted by paternal aunt and uncle because they took
care of her and were doing a good job of raising her and her siblings. H.H. explained that they played with her,
helped her with her homework, taught her how to do chores, and established a
bedtime of 8:30 p.m. for her. She said she wanted to remain with paternal
aunt and uncle because she did not want to live in Mexico,
and that Mexico
was “scary and too dangerous.” Y.H.
stated that adoption meant that he would be able to stay with paternal aunt and
uncle. Y.H. also stated that adoption
meant, “I’m losing my parents,” but according to the report he “went on to say
that he likes living with [paternal aunt and uncle] and would like to be
adopted by them.” Y.H. stated that
adoption was a “good thing” because it makes him feel happy. He said paternal aunt and uncle take good
care of him and “put him to sleep at the right time.” A.A. said she likes
living with paternal aunt and uncle and she often refers to paternal aunt as
“mami.”
According
to the report, on September 10, 2011,
the social worker facilitated a face-to-face visit between the children and
mother at the county jail. When the
social worker asked mother about her wishes concerning adoption of the
children, mother responded, “I know that [paternal aunt] has been taking good
care of my children, and I know she would be the best one to have them.” The report stated that it was likely that the
children would be adopted.
At the October 12, 2011, contested
permanency planning hearing, mother waived her appearance. The juvenile court admitted into evidence the
March 12, 2010, detention report, the March 14, 2011, 366.26 WIC report, the
September 12, 2011, status review report, the September 12, 2011, last minute
information for the court report, and the October 12, 2012, 366.26 WIC report.
At the October 12, 2011, hearing, the
Department argued that there was clear and convincing evidence that the
children were adoptable, and it was mother’s burden to prove that an exception
to adoption existed. The children’s
counsel stated, “Your Honor, I agree with the Department. I know that the children love their parents
very much and have a close bond with their mother, but I believe in this case,
stability and permanency outweighs that.
And I have spoken to [the children] about it, and they have stated in
the most recent report, as well, that they would like to be adopted by
[paternal aunt and uncle].
At the
hearing, mother’s counsel argued that the parental visitation exception to the
termination of parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i)
applied, and requested that the juvenile court order a legal guardianship
instead of terminating parental rights.
The juvenile court stated, “ I’m going to deny mom’s request. [¶]
These parents put these children at great risk. Apparently, they had been engaged in
substantial trafficking in drugs, and they put them at such risk, and they ran
the risk themselves, but they decided to do so, and they were going to be
detained and in this case they’re both subject to deportation, father has been
deported already, and the same is going to happen to mom, most likely. [¶]
The children are entitled to permanency.
That is the objective of the system, and it appears that they’re stable
and they have someone who’s going to give them the appropriate care.” The juvenile court terminated mother’s parental
rights and found that the children were adoptable.
DISCUSSION
Mother
contends that the juvenile court erred in failing to find the parental
visitation exception to the termination of parent rights under section
366.26(c)(1)(B)(i). The juvenile court
did not err.
A. Standard of Review
Some courts
have held that challenges on appeal to a juvenile court’s determination under
section 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i) are governed by a substantial evidence standard of
review. (See, e.g., In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 207; In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52-53, fn. 4.) Under a substantial evidence standard of
review “‘“the power of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination
as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted,” to support the findings below.
[Citation.] We must therefore
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving
it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its
favor in accordance with the standard of review so long adhered to by this
court.’ [Citation.]” (Bickel
v. City of Piedmont (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1040, 1053; accord,
We do not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, reweigh the evidence,
or resolve evidentiary conflicts. (
judgment or finding must be upheld, even though substantial evidence may also
exist that would support a contrary judgment and the dependency court might
have reached a different conclusion had it determined the facts and weighed
credibility differently. (
212, 228.)
Other
courts have applied an abuse of discretion standard of review. (See, e.g., In re Aaliyah R. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 437, 449;
1339, 1351.) Under an abuse of
discretion standard of review, we will not disturb the juvenile court’s
decision unless the juvenile court exceeded the limits of legal discretion by
making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination. (In re
Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1351.) In this case, we need not
decide whether a juvenile court’s ruling on the section 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i)
exception is reviewed for substantial evidence or abuse of discretion, because,
under either standard,
name="_ftnref4" title="">[4] we affirm the juvenile court’s decision.
B. Applicable Law
The
parental visitation exception in section 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i) provides that
parental rights will not be terminated and a child freed for adoption if parent
has “maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child
would benefit from continuing the relationship.” Application of the parental visitation exception
requires a two-prong analysis. (
visitation and contact between parent and child. (Id.
at p. 450.) The second is whether there
is a sufficiently strong bond between parent and child that the child would
suffer detriment from its termination. (
The parent/child relationship must promote “the well-being of the child
to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent
home with new, adoptive parents. In
other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural
parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the
sense of belonging a new family would confer.
If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the
child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would
be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural
parent’s rights are not terminated.” (
567, 575; In re Dakota H.,
a parent fails to occupy a parental role in his child’s life. (In re
Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1350; In re Beatrice M. (1994)
29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-1419; In re
Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th
at p. 51.)
Parents
bear the burden of establishing that the visitation exception to termination of
parental rights applies. (
799, 809.) A relationship sufficient to
support the visitation exception “aris[es] from day-to-day interaction,
companionship and shared experiences.” (
“[T]o establish the exception in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A),
parents must do more than demonstrate ‘frequent and loving contact’ [citation],
an emotional bond with the child, or that the parents and child find their
visits pleasant. [Citation.]” (In re
Andrea R. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1108.) A parent must show that a benefit to the
child from continuing the relationship would result. (In re
Mary G., supra, 151 Cal.App.4th
at p. 207; In re Derek W. (1999) 73
Cal.App.4th 823, 826-827.) “The parent
must show he or she occupies a parental role in the child’s life, resulting in
a significant, positive, emotional attachment between child and parent. [Citations.]”
(In re Mary G.,
71, 80-81; In re Beatrice M.,
1416-1418.)
Whether the
exception applies is determined “on a case-by-case basis, taking into account
the many variables which affect a parent/child bond. The age of the child, the portion of the
child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect
of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs are
some of the variables which logically affect a parent/child bond.” (In re
Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th
at p. 576.)
C. Analysis
There was
substantial evidence
name="_ftnref5" title="">[5] to support the juvenile court’s conclusion
that mother failed to meet her burden of establishing that the parental
visitation exception to the termination of her parental rights applies. (In re
Zachary G., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th
at p. 809.) Regarding the first prong of
the exception—maintenance of regular contact and visitation—mother was absent
from the children’s life for approximately 19 months. Although the Department reported that
paternal aunt facilitates “regular” telephone contact between the children and
mother, mother did not cite to any evidence in the record of the frequency,
duration, or quality of that telephone contact or of the monitored visits
between the children and mother. There
is substantial evidence that mother failed to meet her burden of establishing
the first prong of the exception.
Regarding
the second prong—that the children would benefit from continuing the
relationship—substantial evidence establishes that mother’s relationship with
them did not promote their well-being “‘to such a degree as to outweigh the
well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with [a] new, adoptive
parent[]. . . .’
[Citation.]” (
Cal.App.4th at p. 229.) When the
children were in mother’s care, she put them at great risk. Mother exposed the children to a drug-abusing
lifestyle, and mother failed to protect H.H. from father’s physical abuse of
her. Mother also did not provide the
children with an established bedtime; they often went to bed after midnight,
and H.H. said this often caused her to be “too tired” to go to school the next
morning. Mother also often took the
children from the home to spend evenings in a hotel because mother had argued
with father. There is no evidence in the
record that mother’s situation has improved.
At the time
the juvenile court terminated mother’s parental rights, mother was incarcerated
and was subject to deportation to Mexico. H.H. said she wanted to remain with paternal
aunt and uncle because she did not want to live in Mexico,
and that Mexico
was “scary and too dangerous.” For
approximately 14 months the children had settled into the home of the paternal
aunt and uncle. As argued by the children’s
attorney at the hearing terminating mother’s parental rights, although there is
evidence that the children love mother, the children are entitled to permanency
by terminating the parents’ parental rights and allowing the children to be
adopted by paternal aunt and uncle who will give them appropriate care.
Mother
failed to establish that she had a parental relationship with the children that
would benefit them significantly enough to outweigh the strong preference for
adoption. (In re Jasmine D., supra,
78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350.) The
conclusion reached by the juvenile court that no compelling reason existed to
conclude termination of parental rights would be detrimental is amply supported
by substantial evidence and not an abuse of discretion.
Mother
relies on In re S.B. (2008) 164
Cal.App.4th 289 to support her contention that she maintained a significant
relationship with the children. In that
case, the juvenile court determined that the parental relationship exception
did not apply because the relationship between the child and her father was not
parental in nature and there was no evidence that terminating the relationship
would be greatly detrimental to the child.
(Id. at p. 296.) The appellate court reversed, noting that the
juvenile court had found that the child and her father had “frequent and loving
visits” and shared “‘an emotionally significant relationship.’” (Id.
at p. 298.) In addition, the undisputed
evidence demonstrated that the father had “maintained a parental relationship
with [the child] through consistent contact and visitation. His devotion to [the child] was constant, as
evinced by his full compliance with his case plan . . . .” (Id.
at pp. 300.) When the child was removed
from father’s custody, he “immediately recognized that his drug use was
untenable, started services, maintained his sobriety, sought medical and
psychological services, and maintained consistent and regular visitation with
S.B. He complied with ‘every aspect’ of
his case plan.” (Id. at p. 298.)
its particular facts. It does not, of
course, stand for the proposition that a termination order is subject to
reversal whenever there is ‘some measure of benefit’ in continued contact
between parent and child.” (
922, 937.) In this case, unlike
find that mother and the children enjoyed “frequent and loving visits” or
shared “‘an emotionally significant relationship.’” (In re
S.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at
p. 298.) Mother did not provide evidence
concerning the frequency, duration, or quality of her telephone contact or
monitored visits with the children. In
addition, there is no evidence in the record that mother recognized the
impropriety of possessing methamphetamine and cocaine in the home within access
of the children, failing to protect the children from father’s abuse of
cocaine, or failing to protect H.H. from father’s physical abuse. Mother also failed to establish that she had
undergone counseling to address case issues, including possession and use of
illicit drugs and domestic violence.
cited by mother, is also inapplicable.
In that case, the juvenile court found that the parent-child
relationship exception of section 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i)
did not apply because the prospective adoptive parents said that they were
willing to allow the biological parent to have continued visitation and contact
with the children. (Id. at p. 119.) The court
reversed, reasoning that, “[I]f a juvenile court determines that a parent has
‘maintained regular visitation and contact’ (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)),
that there is a ‘substantial, positive emotional attachment’ between child and
parent benefitting the child (In re
Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th
at p. 575), and that the benefit from continuing that parent-child relationship
in a tenuous placement ‘promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree
as to outweigh’ the benefit that child would gain from the stability and
permanency of adoption (ibid.), then
the parent-child relationship exception is established. In those circumstances, the court cannot
nevertheless terminate parental rights based upon an unenforceable expectation
that the prospective adoptive parents will voluntarily permit future contact
between the child and a biological parent, even if substantial evidence
supports that expectation. The purpose
of the parent-child relationship exception is to protect the parent-child
relationship when its continuation is more beneficial to the dependent child
than a permanent plan of adoption and, in such case, a court cannot leave the
protection of such a relationship dependent upon the hoped-for goodwill of the
prospective adoptive parents.” (Id.
at pp. 128-129.) Here, unlike in
terminate mother’s parental rights because of evidence that the prospective
adoptive parents will voluntarily permit future contact between the children
and mother.
Mother
contends that the juvenile court should have ordered legal guardianship as the appropriate permanent plan for the children
instead of terminating mother’s parental rights. We disagree.
Under
section 366.26, the statutory preference is to terminate parental rights and
order the child placed for adoption. (§
366.26, subd. (b)(1).) “The Legislature
has thus determined that, where possible, adoption is the first choice. ‘Adoption is the Legislature’s first choice
because it gives the child the best chance at [a full] emotional commitment
from a responsible caretaker.’ [Citation.] ‘Guardianship, while a more stable placement
than foster care, is not irrevocable and thus falls short of the secure and
permanent future the Legislature had in mind for the dependent child.’ [Citation.]”
(In re Celine R. (2003) 31
Cal.4th 45, 53.)
In support
of her contention that the juvenile court should have ordered legal
guardianship as the appropriate permanent plan for the children, mother relies
upon In re Scott B. (2010) 188
Cal.App.4th 452. In that case, the court
reversed the juvenile court’s order terminating the mother’s parental rights,
holding that compelling reasons existed to apply the parental visitation
exception to termination of parental rights.
(Id. at pp. 471-473.) The court remanded the matter to the juvenile
court suggesting that the juvenile court order legal guardianship as the
appropriate permanent plan for Scott B.
(Id. at pp. 471-473.)
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and autism, needed special education
services, had behavior problems at school, had problems interacting with his
peers, and had bladder control issues. (
years. (Id. at p. 471.) The mother
visited consistently after the child was removed from her care, and the child
was always clear in his desire to live with the mother. (Id.
at pp. 456-457.) When the child learned
he might be adopted, his behavior regressed to growling and biting. (Id.
at p. 458.) He was adamant at the
section 366.26 hearing that he no longer wished to be adopted. (Id.
at p. 464.)
In
reversing the order terminating parental rights, the court in
Scott’s life. That is what adoption is
supposed to do, but it may not in this case.
Given Scott’s strong emotional attachment to Mother, his continued
precarious emotional state, and his history of regressing and running away when
he is stressed, there is a very good chance that he will have a meltdown if his
usual frequent visitation with Mother does not continue. The only way to avoid that serious emotional
and developmental setback and ensure that Scott’s usual visitation with Mother
continues is by court order.” (
statement that “‘what is at stake is the fundamental question of whether Scott
will continue to thrive, as he has done since being placed with [his foster
mother].’ Termination of parental rights
is unnecessary given that a legal guardianship will provide Scott with
stability in his life.” (Ibid., fn.
omitted.)
The parent
in In re Scott B.,
standard that to overcome the preference for adoption and avoid termination of
the natural parent’s rights, by “showing
that severing the natural parent-child relationship would deprive the child of
a substantial, positive emotional
attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed.” (In re
Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 466.)
There was substantial evidence that Scott was at risk of suffering a
serious emotional and developmental setback if he were no longer able to see
his mother. As the father’s counsel
stated in In re Scott B.,
was “‘one of those rare cases’ where a parent [had] overcome the Legislature’s
preference for adoption and demonstrated a statutory exception to termination
of parental rights . . . .”
(In re Scott B.,
Here, the
juvenile court reasonably determined, and substantial evidence showed, that
terminating parental rights and discontinuing mother’s relationship with the
children would not be detrimental to them.
Unlike Scott, the children here are not emotionally fragile with social
difficulties and developmental special needs, and there is no indication that
the children will suffer an emotional or developmental setback if parental
rights are terminated.
Mother also
cites In re Brandon C. (1999) 71
Cal.App.4th 1530 in support of her contention that the juvenile court should
have ordered legal guardianship instead of terminating her parental
rights. In re Brandon C. does not assist mother. In that case, the appellate court affirmed a
finding that the beneficial parental relationship exception applied. Here, on the other hand, the issue is whether
the evidence supports a finding that the exception to adoption did not
apply. And, as noted above, mother
failed to show that an exception to termination of parental rights applies.
Mother
failed to establish that she had a parental relationship with the children that
would benefit them significantly enough to outweigh the strong preference for
adoption. (In re Jasmine D., supra,
78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350.) The children
are entitled to permanency by terminating mother’s parental rights and allowing
the children to be adopted. There is
sufficient evidence that the children’s adoption by the paternal aunt and uncle
was appropriate. The children lived with
the paternal aunt and uncle for approximately 14 months, and the children
benefited from the stable, safe, loving, and nurturing environment they
received from the paternal aunt and uncle.
The paternal aunt and uncle stated that they loved the children and were
willing to provide them with a permanent home by adopting them. Mother stated that paternal aunt had been
taking good care of the children and, concerning adoption, maternal aunt is
“the best one to have [the children].”
On September 12, 2011,
the Department reported that the paternal aunt and uncle’s adoption home study
had been approved. The children are
adoptable.
The juvenile court’s orders are
affirmed.
NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
MOSK,
J.
We concur:
TURNER,
P. J.
ARMSTRONG,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] All
statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise
indicated.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] Father
is not a party to this appeal.
