CA Unpub Decisions

Vincent Love appeals the grant of summary judgment to respondent, The Regents of the University of California, and the dismissal of his complaint against respondent for discrimination, breach of contract, retaliation and defamation. Appellant contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error by granting summary judgment and dismissing his case without determining that respondent's evidence was not substantial, or determining who was telling the truth. We affirm.

A modification decision.

Health and Safety Code section 7100 authorizes certain persons, most notably the next of kin, to control the disposition of the remains of a decedent unless the decedent leaves written instructions to the contrary that comply with Health and Safety Code section 7100.1.[1] In this case, the conservator, respondent Debra J. Dolch, petitioned the probate court for instructions as to who would be authorized to control the disposition of the remains of the conservatee, Madame Wong Shou Chen. The conservatee’s daughter, respondent Maria Fang, claimed authorization as next of kin. (§ 7100, subd. (a)(3).) The conservatee’s stepgrandson, appellant James Chen, claimed authorization under documents purportedly in compliance with section 7100.1. The probate court found the documents did not comply with the statute and ruled in favor of Maria Fang. Chen contends the ruling was in error. We agree with the probate court and affirm.

Michael R., defendant below, appeals from the order of the court, following a disposition hearing, that he be committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). Michael contends that the court abused its discretion in ordering a DJJ commitment because less restrictive alternatives were appropriate and there was no evidence that he would benefit from the DJJ commitment. Michael also contends that the order of commitment wrongly specified 12 years as the maximum period of confinement and requests that order be corrected to specify 11 years and 4 months as the maximum period of confinement.
We affirm the court’s order committing Michael to the DJJ and amend the commitment order to specify 11 years and 4 months as the maximum period of confinement.

Seeking to foreclose its mechanic’s lien on an office condominium project, petitioner McKenzie Builders, Inc. (McKenzie) timely sued the project owner, Willow Glen Investments, LLC (Willow), and 50 Doe defendants in February 2010. A few weeks after the statute of limitations to foreclose the lien expired, McKenzie learned that real party in interest East West Bank (EWB) had a security interest in the project that was subordinate to McKenzie’s interest. McKenzie applied ex parte for leave to file a second amended complaint adding EWB as a defendant. The superior court granted leave, and McKenzie filed its amended pleading. EWB answered, asserting as an affirmative defense that the 90-day statute of limitations in former Civil Code section 3144 barred McKenzie’s mechanic’s lien cause of action.
Instead of substituting EWB as a Doe defendant, McKenzie had simply added EWB to the caption of its second amended complaint. It made other attempts to add EWB as a defendant, but those too were procedurally defective. McKenzie did not seek leave to file a Doe amendment until April 1, 2011, 397 days after the 90-day statute of limitations had expired. The superior court denied the motion as untimely.
In this writ petition challenging the superior court’s order, McKenzie contends it was an abuse of discretion to deny leave “on the basis of delay, without a[n express] finding of prejudice.” We conclude that the superior court’s order incorporates an implicit finding of prejudice. Accordingly, we deny the petition.

Robert Gardner, doing business as The Gardner Marketing Group, began providing services to Baby Trend, Inc. as an independent sales representative in 1988. In 1999, the parties entered into an agreement making Gardner vice-president of sales and marketing for Baby Trend, while also agreeing he would continue to work as an “independent contractor” and be allowed to represent other companies in the same territory “as long as there is no conflict.” Baby Trend terminated this relationship in 2004.
Gardner sued, contending he had become an employee of Baby Trend, and alleging wrongful termination in violation of public policy, failure to reimburse business expenses, unlawful deductions of wages earned and waiting time penalties, violation of the Independent Sales Act, retaliation, unfair business practices, breach of an oral contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, emotional distress, and a count seeking an accounting. He won an 8.1 million dollar verdict.
Baby Trend and its president, Denny Tsai, appealed. We reversed the judgment, but remanded the matter with instructions not only to enter judgment in favor of Tsai, but also to conduct a new trial on Gardner’s breach of contract claims. Gardner petitioned for a rehearing and we granted his petition.
While awaiting rehearing, the parties arrived at a settlement. As part of that settlement, they have filed a stipulated request to reverse the judgment below.

Appellant, Nicholas M., a minor, was initially adjudged a ward of the juvenile court in November 2011, based on his admissions of allegations that he committed three misdemeanors: making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422), vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(2)(A)), and resisting, delaying or obstructing a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)). The court placed appellant on probation.
In the instant case, in February 2012, the court found true an allegation that appellant committed first degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a)). Following the subsequent disposition hearing, the court continued appellant as a ward of the court and continued him on probation, with conditions of probation that included confinement in juvenile hall for 60 days, with 22 days of predisposition credit and with the final 15 days of the commitment to be served on home confinement.
Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d. 436.) Appellant has not responded to this court’s invitation to submit additional briefing. We affirm.

It was alleged in an information filed September 8, 2011,[1] that appellant, Saul Lara Valente, committed the following offenses: willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a); count 1), battery with infliction of serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d); count 2), and assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1); count 3). It was further alleged that appellant inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of the count 1 and count 3 offenses (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (e)) and that he personally used a deadly weapon in committing the count 1 offense (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1)).
On October 27, pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant pled guilty to count 1 and admitted both enhancement allegations, and the court dismissed the remaining counts.
One of the terms of the plea agreement was that appellant would receive a prison sentence of no more than three years. On November 29, the court imposed a three-year prison term, consisting of the two-year lower term on the substantive offense and one year on the weapon use enhancement. The court also imposed a three-year term on the count 1 serious bodily injury enhancement, but thereafter struck that term. The court awarded presentence custody credits of 190 days, consisting of 166 days of actual time credit and 24 days of conduct credit.
On December 14, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. He did not request, and the court did not issue, a certificate of probable cause (Pen. Code, § 1237.5).
Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d. 436.) Appellant has not responded to this court’s invitation to submit additional briefing. We affirm.

The court has read and considered the record in this proceeding and has concluded that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is required to resolve this matter as expeditiously as possible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1088; Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178-179; Alexander v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1218, 1222-1223, disapproved on another ground in Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital (2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 724, fn. 4.)
The Supreme Court has stated that “it is usually more appropriate to review constitutional and other challenges to ballot propositions or initiative measures after an election rather than to disrupt the electoral process by preventing the exercise of the people’s franchise, in the absence of some clear showing of invalidity.” (Brosnahan v. Eu (1982) 31 Cal.3d 1, 4 (Brosnahan I).)

A modification decision.

Appellant I.V. (father), formerly the custodial parent of minors K.V. and A.V., appeals the disposition orders of the juvenile court placing them with M.S. (mother) and transferring the case to Contra Costa County. We will affirm.

Defendant and appellant Vernon Paul Williams appeals his conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. He contends that the court’s incomplete instructions on self-defense and on defenses applicable to attempted voluntary manslaughter deprived him of his due process right to present a defense.
We will affirm the conviction.

Ramona Plank filed an action under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657, for damages for elder neglect and financial abuse. Her father, George Mount, died of undiagnosed end stage metastatic lung cancer at the age of 88, while being cared for by his daughter (and Ramona’s sister), defendant Tanya Mount, aided by Tanya’s son, codefendant Joaquin Renteria. Specifically, plaintiff asserted that Tanya’s failure to obtain hospice care for Mr. Mount early enough to provide palliative care and prevent dehydration and malnutrition caused Mr. Mount harm. After a bench trial, the court concluded that Mr. Mount was capable of refusing medical treatment, and that his malnutrition and dehydration were not caused by any lack of care by defendants. Plaintiff appealed.
On appeal, plaintiff asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support the judgment. We affirm.

Plaintiffs Leslie Andrews and Holly Fallon appeal from a summary judgment in favor of defendant Aurora Charter Oak Hospital in a lawsuit alleging the wrongful death of their 18-year-old son, Eric Andrews. The trial court denied a motion to continue the summary judgment motion because plaintiffs failed to specify what admissible evidence they expected to be able to obtain if the continuance were granted. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion because plaintiffs failed to produce admissible evidence showing the existence of triable issues of material fact concerning plaintiffs’ claims that the hospital was vicariously liable for the negligence of the attending physician, Dr. Gillespie, and that the hospital was liable for negligent hiring or supervision of its staff.
We will affirm the judgment.