CA Unpub Decisions

Father D.M. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights to his son D. and daughter L. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] The children’s mother (Mother) is not a party to this appeal. Father’s sole contention is that the court failed to make an adequate inquiry into whether the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applies to him. We conclude that the court erred, and that because Father has made an offer of proof of Indian heritage on appeal, the error requires limited remand to make proper inquiry and comply with the notice of provisions of ICWA if Indian heritage is indicated.

Paul Stewart Wagner appeals a judgment following his no contest plea to corporal injury to a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), a felony. The trial court sentenced him to a three-year state prison term.

On August 16, 2011, Robert R., then 16 years old, was in a J.C. Penney store in Montebello with two friends. Robert R. took a black-and-white striped shirt from a rack, and put it on over his white t-shirt. After walking around some more, he exited the store without going to any cash register, still wearing the shirt.
A J.C. Penney loss prevention officer approached Robert R. outside the store and placed him under a private person’s arrest. Robert R. admitted to taking the shirt without paying for it. Back inside the store, the loss prevention officer filled out an acknowledgment form which stated that Robert R. took the shirt. The officer asked Robert R., who was handcuffed, if he wanted to sign it; he did not recall whether he told Robert R. he had the option not to sign. Robert R. signed the acknowledgment form.
The trial court found true one misdemeanor count of petty theft in violation of Penal Code section 484, subdivision (a). The court declared Robert R. to be a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and a ward of the court, and ordered Robert R. be placed home on probation. Robert R. filed a timely notice of appeal.
We appointed counsel to represent Robert R. on appeal. After examining the record, counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues and asking this court to independently review the record. On July 20, 2012, we advised Robert R. he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues he wished us to consider. To date, we have received no response.
We have examined the entire record and are satisfied that Robert R.’s counsel has fully complied with his responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 109–110; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.4th 436, 441.)

Rachel P. (Mother) and A.S. (Father) appeal from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders regarding their three children Ashley S. (born Dec. 2004), Kendell S. (born Nov. 2007), and R.S. (born Sept. 2008). Father contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the court’s findings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (c), while mother challenges only the subdivision (c) finding.[1] Both parents challenge the court’s dispositional order removing the children from their custody. We affirm.

Theresa Marie Campbell appeals the judgment entered after she pled guilty to petty theft with three or more priors (Pen. Code,[1] § 484, subd. (a)) and admitted serving a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced her to four years in county jail and awarded 210 days of presentence custody credit, consisting of 140 actual custody credits and 70 days conduct credit.
Appellant's crime was committed on July 18, 2011, and she was sentenced on November 4, 2011. Her sole contention on appeal is that she is entitled to additional conduct credits under the version of section 4019 that went into effect on October 1, 2011, notwithstanding the Legislature's express statement that the statute only applies to crimes committed on or after the statute's effective date. She claims that equal protection principles compel a retroactive application of the statute. We affirm.

Sandra Marie Frescas appeals the order revoking her probation following her guilty plea to identity theft (Pen. Code,[1] § 530.5, subd. (c)(2)), and her admission that she had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court directed execution of a previously imposed two-year state prison sentence and ordered appellant to serve that term in county jail. Appellant was awarded a total of 180 days presentence custody credit, consisting of 120 days actual custody credit and 60 days conduct credit.

After pleading no contest to one count of possession of methamphetamine, Paula Sue Hughes was placed on three years of formal probation pursuant to Penal Code section 1210.1 (Proposition 36). At the sentencing hearing Hughes was also found to have violated probation by leaving an earlier hearing before its conclusion. Hughes appeals from the order finding her in violation of probation. No meritorious issues have been identified by Hughes’s appointed counsel or by our own independent review of the record following receipt of supplemental briefing on an issue of the trial court’s jurisdiction to find a probation violation. We affirm.

Lisa Maki appeals from the order granting the special motion to strike and judgment of dismissal entered in favor of Joseph Yanny, his law firm, Yanny & Smith, P.C., and his client, Jon Peters, on Maki’s cross-complaint alleging Yanny and Peters had wrongfully interfered with her existing client relationships and defamed her. Maki also appeals from the order awarding Yanny attorney fees in the amount of $54,208.28. We affirm.

Defendant John Roy Hogsett appeals from a judgment sentencing him to prison after he pled no contest to new charges and admitted a probation violation in a felony case. His court-appointed counsel has filed a brief raising no issues, but seeking our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders). We find no arguable issues and affirm.

Theodore Parfet (Parfet) and Amy Tucker (Tucker) are the parents of seven-year-old Alex. Parfet appeals an order awarding Tucker attorney fees she incurred opposing Parfet’s motions to modify child custody, visitation and child support. Parfet contends the trial court abused its discretion and committed prejudicial procedural error. We reject these contentions and affirm the attorney fees order. We also find that this appeal is frivolous and, therefore, we grant Tucker’s motion for sanctions.

A jury convicted appellant Nathan Gideon of voluntary manslaughter enhanced by the use of a deadly weapon. He also pled no contest to one count of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant in a separate matter. (Former Pen. Code,[1] §§ 192, subd. (a) [as amended by Stats. 1998, ch. 278, § 1, pp. 1228-1229], 273.5, subd. (a) [Stats. 2003, ch. 262, § 1, pp. 2412-2414], 12022, subd. (b)(1) [Stats. 2004, ch. 494, § 3, pp. 4042-4043].) Sentenced to 13 years in state prison for these offenses, he appeals. Gideon contends that (1) he should have been allowed to set aside his no contest plea to the injuring a cohabitant charge when his no contest plea to voluntary manslaughter was set aside after a People’s appeal; and (2) he is entitled to additional credit against his sentence. We order the trial court to modify the abstract of judgment to reflect some additional presentence credit and otherwise affirm the judgment.

Defendant Brendan Murdock appealed after a jury convicted him of first degree burglary and receipt of stolen property in connection with the taking of a laptop computer from a San Francisco dormitory. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress evidence discovered in connection with his detention after a police officer saw him holding a glass pipe and (2) admitting eyewitness identification evidence. We affirm.

Plaintiff Demetria DeLarge appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer of respondent Service Employees International Union, Local 1021 (SEIU). Delarge contends the trial court erred in concluding that the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) has exclusive initial jurisdiction over her claims against SEIU. We affirm the judgment.

Defendants Keith Millet and Tyrone Jackson, who are African-American, were charged with kidnapping, robbing, and raping Jane Doe, who is white. During voir dire of the jury panel, the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to excuse two prospective jurors who were African-Americans. On appeal from their conviction following the jury trial, Millet and Jackson claim the prosecutor violated their state and federal rights to due process, equal protection, and trial by jury as articulated in Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson), and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler). They contend the prosecutor improperly used a peremptory challenge against one of the two African-American prospective jurors. We conclude that the record supports the trial court’s finding the prospective juror was not excused for a discriminatory purpose, and affirm the judgment.