Arman v. Poojani





















Filed 7/24/12 Arman
v. Poojani CA3















NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED







California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.









IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE
DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----






>

SAM ARMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ALI POOJANI et al., Defendants and Respondents.

C067227 (Super. Ct. No. 34201000088655CUUDGDS)

Plaintiff Sam
Arman brought an unlawful detainer action
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1161 et seq.) against defendants, Ali Poojani and his wife,
alleging defendants had failed to pay rent as promised.

The trial court
granted defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling that
defendants are entitled to remain in possession of the premises, and to recover
attorney fees and costs. It ultimately
awarded defendants $14,587.50 in attorney fees, pursuant to the reciprocal
application of a provision in the parties’ lease agreement that provided, in a
suit brought for the recovery of rent or the recovery of the premises, “Lessee
shall pay to said Lessor a reasonable sum as and for attorney’s
fees . . . .”

In this pro se
appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in awarding defendants
attorney fees pursuant to Civil Codehref="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]
section 1717, and awarded fees in an unreasonable amount. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

This case involves
a long-term lease agreement. Plaintiff
owns property on which defendants own and operate a gas station and mini
market. In 1997, the parties entered
into a written agreement whereby they agreed defendants would take over the
existing lease between plaintiff and a former tenant. The attorney fees clause at issue in this
appeal appears in an agreement between the parties entitled “Original Lease
Terms” (in which plaintiff is defined as “Lessor” and defendants are defined as
“Lessee”) and states: “That in each suit
brought for the recovery of any rent due hereunder, or for the recovery of the
possession of said demised premises, or for the breach of any of the terms,
conditions or covenants of this lease, wherein said Lessor shall prevail, said
Lessee shall pay to said Lessor a reasonable sum as and for attorney’s fees
therein, the amount of which shall be determined by the court in such suit and
added to and become part of the judgment therein.”

In 2010, plaintiff
filed this unlawful detainer action against defendants, seeking possession of
the premises, past due rent, and reasonable attorney fees.href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">[2] Defendants answered, and raised various
affirmative defenses.

Simultaneous with
their trial brief, defendants filed a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that the court lacked
jurisdiction to hear the matter as a summary unlawful detainer action because
plaintiff failed to allege nonpayment of rent within the year prior to filing
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1161, subd. (2) [three-day notice to quit “may be served at
any time within one year after the rent becomes due”]), and sought late payment
fees and interest not recoverable under the lease.

The court granted
defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend, and
ruled defendants were entitled to attorney fees, in an amount to be
determined.

Defendants filed a
memorandum of costs, and a noticed motion seeking an award of $18,576 in
attorney fees. In support of the motion,
defendants submitted detailed invoices prepared by the law firm representing
them, the resumes of the attorneys performing work on the matter, and a
declaration by one attorney describing the work performed, his experience, and
billing rate.

Plaintiff opposed
the motion on the grounds the original lease provided only for >his recovery of attorney fees, and the
attorney fees sought were unreasonable because the lawsuit was relatively
brief, and required preparation of few documents.

After a hearing
(the transcript of which is not in the record on appeal), the trial court ruled
the attorney fee provision, although not “mutual in its express terms,” is
rendered mutual by virtue of section 1717, and defendants are entitled to
recover their attorney fees as the prevailing party.

The court also
found the hourly rates claimed by defendants for their attorneys are reasonable
and, after considering their “detailed bills and the subject matter, pleadings,
papers, and arguments of counsel,” it awarded defendants $14,587.50 in attorney
fees.

DISCUSSION

I

>The Court Did Not Err In Awarding Attorney
Fees

The determination
of the legal basis for an award of attorney fees is a question of law which we
review de novo. (Drybread v. Chipain Chiropractic Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1063,
1069-1070.)

Section 1717
states in part: “(a) In any action on a
contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and
costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to
one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined
to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party
specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s
fees in addition to other costs.
[¶] Where a contract provides for
attorney’s fees, as set forth above, that provision shall be construed as
applying to the entire contract, unless each party was represented by counsel
in the negotiation and execution of the contract, and the fact of that
representation is specified in the contract.
[¶] Reasonable attorney’s fees
shall be fixed by the court, and shall be an element of the costs of
suit.”

This unlawful
detainer action, based as it was upon defendants’ alleged failure to pay the
agreed-upon rent, constitutes a contract-based action upon which section 1717
attorney fees may be awarded (cf. Drybread
v. Chipain Chiropractic Corp., supra,
151 Cal.App.3th at pp. 1073-1076), and there is no question that defendants
were the prevailing parties by virtue of the trial court entering judgment in
their favor.

Plaintiff argues
the trial court erred because the lease attorney fee provision is “not
mutual.” He is wrong. Where a contract provides a right to attorney
fees to one party but not the other, section 1717 creates a statutory
reciprocal right to attorney fees in all parties to the contract. (Santisas
v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 610.)
“The primary purpose of section 1717 is to ensure mutuality of remedy
for attorney fee claims under contractual attorney fee provisions” and “the
effect of section 1717 is to allow recovery of attorney fees by whichever
contracting party prevails, ‘whether he or she is the party specified in the
contract or not’ (§ 1717, subd. (a)).” (>Santisas, at pp. 610-611.)

We also reject
plaintiff’s suggestion that he may escape the mutual application of the
attorney fee provision by operation of the second paragraph of 1717,
subdivision (a) (“Where a contract provides for attorney’s fees, as set forth
above, that provision shall be construed as applying to the entire contract,
unless each party was represented by counsel in the negotiation and execution
of the contract, and the fact of that representation is specified in the
contract”) because defendants were represented by counsel. There is no specific language in the href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">“Original Lease Terms” agreement indicating
that “each party was represented by counsel in the negotiation and execution of
the contract” as required for this subdivision to apply. Moreover, this provision does not limit the
reciprocal application of section 1717; it was added to allow the parties to
limit the availability of attorney fees in connection with a bargained-for
contractual indemnity clause. (See >Myers Building Industries, Ltd. v. Interface
Technology, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 949, 970-973.) In any event, plaintiff has not met his
burden on appeal of showing how this paragraph applies in this case to prevent
an award of attorney fees to defendants.
(Denham v. Superior Court
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [it is a cardinal principle of appellate review that
error must be affirmatively shown].)href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title="">[3] Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did
not err.

II

>The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion


>In Determining The Amount Of Attorney Fees

Plaintiff appears
to contest the amount of the attorney fee award; his brief suggests the trial
court allowed defendants to recover some attorney fees that were not “within
the scope and framework of the case and should be verified.”

Trial courts have
broad discretion in determining the amount of a reasonable attorney fee award,
and that determination is necessarily ad hoc and must be resolved on the
particular circumstances of each case. (>Meister v. Regents of University of
California (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437, 452.)
In exercising its discretion, a trial court may accordingly “consider
all of the facts and the entire procedural history of the case in setting the
amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee award.”
(Ibid.) An attorney fees award “‘will not be
overturned in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial
error of law, or necessary findings not supported by href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">substantial evidence. [Citations.]’
[Citation.]” (>Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown
Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858, 894.)

In reviewing the
trial court’s exercise of its discretion here, we also recognize that “[t]he
‘experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional
services rendered in his [or her] court, and while his [or her] judgment is of
course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court
is convinced that it is clearly wrong.’”
(Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20
Cal.3d 25, 49.)

Plaintiff has not
shown that the trial court abused its discretion. To the contrary, the record indicates the
court thoughtfully considered all the materials before it on defendants’ motion
for attorney fees, and declined to award defendants everything they
sought. There was no abuse of
discretion.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Defendants shall recover their href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278 (a)(1)(2).)





ROBIE , J.

We concur:







HULL , Acting P. J.







MURRAY , J.