CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Rocky Reno Meves contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. Specifically, Meves asserts (1) the deputy sheriff was within the curtilage of his (Meves’s) home, which was constitutionally protected; (2) the deputy unreasonably was within the curtilage; and (3) the subsequent search and seizure was unconstitutional. The trial court’s factual finding that the deputy was not within the curtilage was supported by substantial evidence. Regardless, mere presence within the curtilage of a residence does not constitute an unlawful entry and unconstitutional search. The deputy reasonably was in the location from where he made his observations. We will affirm the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion.

This is a breach of contract action in which plaintiff sued defendants for payment under a contract pursuant to which plaintiff marketed defendants’ computerized learning program to schools and school districts. Defendants cross-complained against plaintiff, asserting it failed to properly account for money it received and it sold sublicenses for the program at prices less than those called for in the contract or a valid modification of the contract. The trial court found in favor of plaintiff and awarded substantial damages. Defendants appeal, contending the trial court’s interpretation of the contract was incorrect and resulted in an unconstitutional gift of public funds to plaintiff, substantial evidence did not support the damage award, and any oral modifications of the pricing schedule for sale of the sublicenses were unenforceable because the contract required all modifications to be made in writing. We reverse the award in plaintiff’s favor on the complaint and affirm the judgment in its favor on the cross-complaint.

Appellant/defendant Ramon Lopez Tapia sold drugs in Wasco. Augustine Villagomez and his girlfriend, Cecilia Saldana, purchased methamphetamine from him, but they were upset because they received a smaller quantity than they had paid for. A few days after the sale, Villagomez and defendant confronted each other in an alley and fired shots at each other. Defendant used a nine-millimeter handgun, and he was with a man who had a shotgun. No one was hurt. A few days after that shooting, defendant’s vehicle followed Saul Arrellano’s vehicle through Wasco; Arrellano was driving and Villagomez was in the front passenger seat. Arrellano had not been involved in the previous drug dispute. There were multiple gunshots fired from defendant’s vehicle into Arrellano’s car from two different weapons: a nine-millimeter handgun and a shotgun. Villagomez was killed from shots fired from the handgun, and Arrellano was wounded by shotgun pellets. After the homicide, defendant told a friend that, “ ‘[I]t’s done, I shot his head out,’ ” and that Arrellano had not been the target.

Christi F. seeks review of a juvenile court order setting a hearing under section 366.26. She contends the court improperly applied the disentitlement doctrine, which deprives a party of the right to present a defense as a result of the litigant's violation of the processes of the court. Christi contends the denial of her right to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses at the 12-month review hearing requires reversal of the order terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing.
Although the application of the disentitlement doctrine at review hearings in juvenile dependency proceedings will be rare, on this record we cannot conclude that the court erred in applying the doctrine. Accordingly, we deny the petition.

A jury convicted Thomas Reyes Espiritu of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code,[1] § 191.5, subd. (a); count 1), driving under the influence causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a); count 2), and driving with a measurable blood alcohol level causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b); count 3). As to counts 2 and 3, the jury also found true allegations Espiritu had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.15 percent or more (Veh. Code, § 23578) and personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
The court sentenced Espiritu to six years in state prison for count 1 and, at the parties' request, stayed the convictions for counts 2 and 3 under section 654. The court additionally awarded him 200 days of presentence credit, consisting of 134 actual days and 66 conduct days under section 4019.
Espiritu appeals, contending the court prejudicially erred by admitting an irrelevant and unduly inflammatory autopsy photograph, admitting irrelevant and unsupported expert accident reconstruction testimony, excluding relevant evidence of the victim's narcotics use, and refusing to give a requested pinpoint instruction on the definition of gross negligence. Additionally, he contends the cumulative prejudicial impact of these errors deprived him of due process and a fair trial. He also contends we must reverse his convictions for counts 2 and 3 because they are lesser included offenses of count 1, and he is entitled to additional presentence conduct credit under the current version of section 4019.
The People concede and we agree we must reverse his convictions for counts 2 and 3. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

A.L. appeals from the juvenile court's order declaring him a ward of the court after sustaining an amended petition alleging he violated Penal Code[1] section 148, subdivision (a)(1) (resisting, delaying or obstructing a peace officer; count 1) and section 594, subdivision (a) (vandalism; count 2), and after making a true finding that A.L. committed the vandalism for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further or assist criminal conduct by gang members in violation of section 186.22, subdivision (d).
A.L. contends the trial court erred when it found he resisted or obstructed a police officer in count 1 because the police officer who arrested him used excessive force and was therefore acting unlawfully. A.L. also contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence stemming from his arrest on count 2 because the arresting officer only had probable cause to believe that A.L. committed a misdemeanor, not a felony, and therefore the arresting officer first had to obtain an arrest warrant because the crime was not committed in the officer's presence.
As we explain, we disagree with these contentions and affirm the order declaring A.L. a ward of the court.

Civil Code section 1717 (section 1717), subdivision (b)(2) provides there is no prevailing party for purposes of contractual attorney fees "[w]here an action has been voluntarily dismissed" before trial. (Italics added.) CDF Firefighters v. Maldonado (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 158 (Maldonado), held that when there were two "separate and distinct" contract causes of action that could have been brought independently, the voluntary dismissal of one of them did not bar recovery of attorney fees incurred in the adjudication of the other one. (Id. at p. 165.)

In October 2012, defendant Laquisha Michelle Brewer accosted Tilena Bell and struck her several times on the head.
Defendant pled no contest to assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, an offense reasonably related to the charged offense of assault with a deadly weapon. In exchange, two related counts were dismissed with orders to stay away from the victims and a Harvey[1] waiver was taken as to the younger victim.
Imposition of sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on probation for five years on the condition, among others, that she serve 180 days’ incarceration with eight days’ custody credit and eight days’ conduct credit. She was ordered to make restitution to a victim and to pay a $240 restitution fine, a $240 restitution fine suspended unless probation is revoked, a $40 court operations fee, a $30 court facilities assessment, and a $25 urinalysis testing fee.

Appellant Joseph P. Gaudino appeals from an order denying appellant’s request to modify a prior order for visitation with his now 16-year-old daughter. Finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the order of the court.

A modification decision.

This appeal is from three separate cases involving defendant Gregory James Nicholas Woodward.

Defendant Patrick Gregory Baccari was convicted after a jury trial of rape of an unconscious person, sexual penetration of an unconscious person, first degree burglary, and assault with intent to commit rape during the commission of first degree burglary. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his burglary-related convictions and the legality of his first degree burglary conviction. We dismiss his first degree burglary conviction and otherwise affirm the judgment.
Facts and Proceedings
On March 21, 2009, Jane Doe held a party in her home to celebrate Lorraine G.’s birthday. After decorating the house, Doe, Lorraine G., Amy B. and Michelle P. prepared for the party in Doe’s upstairs bedroom. During this time, Doe drank one to two mixed drinks, containing beer, vodka and limeade. She also smoked some marijuana and shared an Ecstasy pill with one of the women. The women then made their way downstairs sometime between 8:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. to meet the party guests.

Russell Stewart brought this action to quiet title to certain real property, and to enjoin its disposition by a trustee sale proceeding pending resolution of his underlying claim. Following an unreported court trial, the court entered judgment quieting title in favor of interveners Sherman Pearl and Geri Pearl (the Pearls), as trustees of the Pearl Trust.
Stewart appeals on the judgment roll. He contends that he was wrongly denied the right to a jury trial, and the trial court erred in relying on a “fraudulent probate spousal order” in ruling in favor of the Pearls. We find no error, and shall affirm the judgment.

Wild Goose Club, Inc. (Club), operates a waterfowl hunting club on approximately 1,500 acres of real property in Butte County. Wild Goose Storage, LLC (Storage) uses depleted reservoirs located far below the surface of the same property to store billions of cubic feet (bcf) of natural gas for later resale on the energy market. Under the terms of a 1997 lease and surface rights addendum, Storage makes lease payments worth hundreds of thousands of dollars each year to lessor, Wild Goose Energy Company, LLC (Energy). However, Club receives no lease payments despite having surface rights to the property.
Starting in 2009, Club sought to receive lease payments from Storage as a third-party beneficiary of the lease. In addition, Club demanded that Storage abate the noise and emissions from its operations site on the property. Club communicated its claims for lease payments to Storage, Storage’s parent company, Niska Gas Storage Partners (Niska), and attorneys for insurers and underwriters who helped Niska issue stock in a public offering. After Storage rejected the demands, Club opposed Storage before the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), informed Niska about the third-party beneficiary claims, and filed the present lawsuit. Club’s complaint is based on its claim that it is the intended third-party beneficiary of the 1997 lease agreement between Storage and Energy. After Energy was joined as an indispensable party, Storage cross-complained against Energy and Club. Club responded with an “anti-SLAPP” motion to strike Storage’s cross-complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16 (Section 425.16).)[1] The motion was based on the assertion that Storage’s cross-complaint sought to chill Club’s right of petition. Storage opposed the motion, which was granted in part and denied in part by the trial court.