CA Unpub Decisions

Antonial Tate appeals a judgment committing him to the California Department of State Hospitals (CDSH) for treatment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) (Pen. Code, § 2962) following his commitment offense for forcible rape. We conclude, among other things, that substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Tate's mental disorder was a cause or an aggravating factor in his commitment offense. We affirm.

Sandra Ann Namchek appeals the judgment entered after she pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). The trial court placed her on drug treatment probation pursuant to Penal Code section 1210.1. Appellant was also found in violation of her probation in another case, and probation was revoked and reinstated.

The mother in this juvenile dependency proceeding is incarcerated in state prison until at least 2025. She seeks reversal of the juvenile court’s order limiting her right to make educational decisions for her child, D.R. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the order.

Plaintiff and appellant Marc Ashegian appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court sustained a general demurrer to the complaint he filed against defendants and respondents James G. Beirne, the Law Offices of James G. Beirne, Paul Mendoza Allen and the Law Offices of Paul M. Allen. Ashegian’s complaint alleged a cause of action under Business and Professions Code section 6158.4,[1] based on internet advertising by respondents that allegedly violated State Bar Act regulations (§§ 6158, 6158.1, and 6158.3) governing the content of electronic media advertising for legal services. The court sustained the demurrer on the ground that the complaint failed to allege that Ashegian previously had submitted a complaint regarding the allegedly unlawful advertisements to the State Bar and otherwise complied with the State Bar review procedures set forth in section 6158.4. On appeal, Ashegian contends that the plain language of the statute excuses California residents from following the State Bar review procedures before filing a civil enforcement action. We conclude that neither the plain language of the statute nor the relevant legislative history supports Ashegian’s interpretation, and we affirm the judgment.

Appellants, Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated, Bank of America Investment Services, Inc., and Charles Chester, appeal from an order denying their renewed motion to arbitrate a fraud action involving the sale of a "vanishing premium" life insurance policy. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1008, subd. (b); 1294.) We affirm.[1] (Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge Services (2005) 35 Cal.4th 376, 393-394.)

Plaintiff Jack F. Jiang appeals from the judgment of dismissal entered after the court sustained defendant Qian Liu’s demurrer to his complaint, without leave to amend. Because his appellate briefs and appendices suffer various fundamental defects, and fail to adequately address the bases of the claimed errors, plaintiff has not satisfied his burden on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm.

Appellant Jason Javon Thompson, convicted of one count of sexual assault of a child under the age of 14 and one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child, contends he was not competent to stand trial and that the trial court’s contrary finding was not supported by substantial evidence. He further contends: (1) the trial court erred in permitting the jury to see the videotape of his police interview because his Miranda waiver was not knowingly or intelligently made and the statements were obtained by coercion;[1] (2) the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of sodomy with a minor; (3) the court erred in excluding certain opinion testimony from appellant’s half-brother and stepfather concerning his intellectual ability; (4) the court abused its discretion in denying a request for a continuance to obtain the appearance of appellant’s psychological expert; (5) the denial of the continuance violated his due process rights; (6) counsel’s failure to secure the appearance of the psychologist represented ineffective assistance of counsel; (7) CALCRIM No. 1120 erroneously negates one of the elements of the crime of continuous sexual abuse and is argumentative; (8) the court imposed a consecutive sentence on the continuous sexual abuse count under the erroneous impression that it was mandatory; (9) the court failed to explain its reasons for imposing consecutive terms; and (10) the imposition of a $500 restitution fine was not supported by substantial evidence of ability to pay. We remand for resentencing on the continuous sexual abuse count and otherwise affirm.

Venturans for Responsible Growth, an unincorporated Association (Venturans) appeal a judgment denying its petition for peremptory and administrative writ of mandate. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1085, 1094.5.) Venturans contend that the City of San Buenaventura's (City) design approval for exterior modifications to an existing building and grant of a sign variance violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub. Resources Code § 21000 et seq.), and county and city codes. We affirm.

Ivery Lee Mobley appeals his conviction and sentence for one count of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle with a prior plus enhancements. He contends the trial court improperly admitted evidence of a prior conviction and improperly instructed the jury on the elements of the crime. He also argues the trial court abused its discretion in imposing an upper term for his sentence. We affirm.

Defendant Jose R. Ramos appeals from a judgment sentencing him to 24 years in prison after a jury found him guilty of nine counts of lewd act upon a child under the age of 14. (Pen. Code,[1] § 288, subd. (a).) He contends the trial court (1) gave an erroneous instruction to the jury on evaluating witness demeanor; (2) erred by allowing evidence regarding the victim’s disclosure of the abuse; (3) erred by failing to instruct on attempted lewd conduct and on battery as lesser included offenses; and (4) abused its discretion by denying defendant’s motion for a new trial. He also contends that (1) his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a limiting instruction for the testimony regarding the victim’s disclosure of the abuse; (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct by injecting a purported fact outside the record during closing argument and by asking inflammatory and irrelevant questions during defendant’s cross-examination; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction on one of the counts. We affirm the judgment.

This appeal involves two cases: MA054155 and MA054636. In MA054155 a jury found Micquawn Warr (appellant) guilty of possession of marijuana for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359.) The jury found true an "on bail" allegation. (Pen. Code, § 12022.1.) Appellant admitted one prior serious or violent felony conviction ("strike") within the meaning of California's "Three Strikes" law. (Id., §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).)
In MA054636 a jury found appellant guilty on count 1, transportation of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360, subd. (a)), and on count 2, possession of marijuana for sale. (Id., § 11359.) The jury found true an "on bail" allegation and a prior strike allegation.
In MA054636 the trial court imposed the upper term of four years on count 1, transportation of marijuana, doubled to eight years because of the strike, plus two years for the "on bail" allegation. On count 2, possession of marijuana for sale, the court imposed a concurrent sentence of the middle term of two years, doubled to four years because of the strike. The total prison sentence for MA054636 is 10 years.
In MA054155 the trial court imposed a consecutive sentence of eight months (one-third the middle term of two years), doubled to one year, four months because of the strike. The court struck the "on bail" allegation. Thus, the aggregate sentence for both cases is 11 years, 4 months.

At defendant and appellant John Fernandez’s jury trial for marijuana-related offenses, the trial court refused to instruct on a medical marijuana defense under Health and Safety Code section 11362.775[1] of the Medical Marijuana Program Act (MMPA). Because there was evidence Fernandez possessed and transported the marijuana for reasons related to his membership in a marijuana collective sufficient to warrant instruction on the defense, we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

At defendant and appellant John Fernandez’s jury trial for marijuana-related offenses, the trial court refused to instruct on a medical marijuana defense under Health and Safety Code section 11362.775[1] of the Medical Marijuana Program Act (MMPA). Because there was evidence Fernandez possessed and transported the marijuana for reasons related to his membership in a marijuana collective sufficient to warrant instruction on the defense, we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Collect Access, LLC (Collect Access) is the assignee of an unpaid account on a credit card issued by Advanta Bank Corp. (Advanta). Account statements for the card bear two names as account holders: Rapid Touch Communications (Rapid Touch) and Belal Arabi (Belal). Rapid Touch was the fictitious business name of Alex Arabi, Belal’s brother.
Collect Access sued Belal, Rapid Touch, and Alex (naming him using various aka’s, including, as here relevant, “Alex Arabi d.b.a. Rapid Touch Communications”), alleging causes of action for breach of contract, money due on an open account, and money due on an account stated. Belal failed to file an answer to the complaint, and Collect Access obtained a default judgment against him. It then moved for summary judgment against Alex, and the trial court granted the motion. Alex appeals from the judgment against him. As in the trial court, Alex represents himself on appeal. We affirm the judgment.[1]