CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
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Defendant contends that the trial court and clerk failed to comply with Penal Code[1] section 1149, which requires that the jury be asked whether they have agreed upon their verdict. (§ 1149.) We do not reach the merits of this contention, because defendant forfeited any claim of section 1149 error by failing to object below. (See People v. Anzalone (2013) 56 Cal.4th 545 (Anzalone).)
Defendant also claims, and the People concede, that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the trial court’s true finding with respect to his prior strike. We agree. Finally, defendant argues that the court erred in using the same conviction to enhance and aggravate his sentence. This contention lacks merit. Therefore, we will reverse with respect to the prior strike finding only, and remand for possible retrial on that issue. |
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Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant Raul Regla-Ramirez pled guilty to committing four counts of lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 years with force of fear. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b).) In exchange, the remaining allegations were dismissed, and defendant was sentenced to a stipulated term of 30 years in state prison with credit for time served. Defendant appeals from the judgment, challenging the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea. We find no error and affirm.
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On February 10, 2005, defendant and appellant Hugo Arellano pled guilty to two felony counts of bringing a controlled substance into a prison or jail. (Pen. Code, § 4573.)[1] The trial court sentenced defendant to 36 months of probation. On June 8, 2012, defendant filed a motion to vacate the judgment and withdraw the plea. The court denied the motion. On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in denying his motion because he was not advised of the immigration consequences of his plea. We affirm the judgment.
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On July 31, 2010, defendant Estaban Melo was involved in an altercation with the victim in front of a bar in Old Town Temecula. Defendant, along with two other men, punched the victim in his face while he was on the ground. Defendant was convicted of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury within the meaning of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1).[1] The jury also found true the allegation that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of sections 12022.7, subdivision (a) and 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8). He was sentenced to five years’ probation and ordered to serve 180 days in county jail.
Defendant claims on appeal that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to counsel’s failure to properly oppose the People’s motion in limine to exclude postings on a Facebook website by the victim following the altercation. |
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Defendant Mark Anthony Hoover II is serving a five-year prison term after pleading guilty a second time to firearm charges with a strike prior and a prison term prior. He challenges the trial court’s denial of his Romero[1] motion, made after he entered into the plea agreement, which specifically set forth the sentence that was to be imposed. The People argue the defendant’s appeal should be dismissed because he did not obtain a certificate of probable cause from the sentencing court. As discussed below, we agree with the People and so dismiss the appeal.
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Pistone & Wolder, Thomas A. Pistone and Eric J. Medel for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Higgs, Fletcher & Mack and Mark K. Stender for Defendants and Respondents. Plaintiff, TownCenter Plaza, LLC (TownCenter), appeals a summary judgment for defendants,[1] entered after the trial court determined TownCenter cannot prove the breach and causation elements of its breach of contract claim against defendants for not disclosing a geothermal lease on unimproved property it sold TownCenter, because before the purchase TownCenter had notice of the lease through the preliminary title report and publicly recorded documents. (Civ. Code,[2] §§ 19, 1213.) TownCenter contends the judgment is improper because defendants did not meet their initial burden of producing evidence showing entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and thus the burden of production never shifted to TownCenter, and alternatively, TownCenter's evidence raised triable issues of material fact. We conclude the court correctly determined the causation issue, and thus we affirm the judgment. TownCenter also appeals a postjudgment order awarding defendants costs and contractual attorney fees. Because we affirm the judgment we also affirm the order. |
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Defendant and appellant, Rickey McPherson, appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial which resulted in his conviction of two counts of willfully and lewdly committing a lewd or lascivious act upon a 14- or 15-year-old child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (c)(1))[1] and one count of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who was more than three years younger than he (§ 261.5, subd. (c)). The trial court sentenced McPherson to three years four months in prison. We affirm.
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J.G., Sr., (father) appeals from the dependency court’s judgment and orders of October 11, 2012, declaring his three children (the children) dependents of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 360[1] and removing them from his custody. He contends substantial evidence does not support the jurisdictional finding that his conduct placed the children at risk of abuse or neglect or the order removing them from his custody. We conclude substantial evidence supports the finding and the removal order. Accordingly, we affirm.
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The jury found defendant and appellant Semaj Johnson guilty of inflicting corporal injury to a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)).[1] Defendant admitted the allegations that he suffered one prior serious or violent felony conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and served three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).[2]
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The jury found defendant and appellant Semaj Johnson guilty of inflicting corporal injury to a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)).[1] Defendant admitted the allegations that he suffered one prior serious or violent felony conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and served three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).[2]
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Defendant Amstem Corporation (Amstem) appeals from the default judgment for $1,436,766 against it. Amstem argues we must reverse the default judgment because (1) plaintiff London Finance Group, Ltd. (London Finance) did not sufficiently plead one cause of action and did not establish a prima facie case of another; and (2) the damages award was not supported by substantial evidence. We agree that London Finance did not make a prima facie case for its breach of contract cause of action and did not support the damages award with sufficient evidence. These defects do not affect the underlying default of Amstem, however. We reverse and remand for a new default prove-up proceeding.
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Plaintiff and appellant Shu Ping Chan appeals from the trial court’s order after trial denying attorney fees in her declaratory relief action against defendant and respondent Shang Jen Lo. Chan contends she was the prevailing party in an action based on a contract and therefore entitled to attorney fees under Civil Code section 1717. We affirm.
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Plaintiff Ara Melkonians appeals from the trial court’s judgment of dismissal sustaining the demurrer of the County of Los Angeles (County). This action arises from Melkonians’s discharge from the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (Department). The County argues the trial court properly sustained the demurrer because (1) Melkonians did not comply with the prelawsuit claim requirements of the California Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.),[1] (2) the prelawsuit claim he did file was untimely under the Government Claims Act, and (3) his failure to overturn the administrative decision affirming his discharge bars this lawsuit. We agree with the County that Melkonians did not comply with the administrative claim requirements of the Government Claims Act and need not address the County’s other contentions as a result. We affirm.
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