Stewart v. Placer Foreclosure
Filed 6/20/13 Stewart v. Placer Foreclosure CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE
DISTRICT
(San
Joaquin)
RUSSELL STEWART,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
PLACER FORECLOSURE,
INC. et al.,
Defendants;
SHERMAN
PEARL, as Trustee, etc., et al.,
Interveners and Respondents.
C069271
(Super. Ct. No. 39201000238438CUORSTK)
Russell
Stewart brought this action to quiet title to certain real property, and to
enjoin its disposition by a trustee sale proceeding pending resolution of his
underlying claim. Following an
unreported court trial, the court entered judgment quieting title in favor of
interveners Sherman Pearl and Geri Pearl (the Pearls), as trustees of the Pearl
Trust.
Stewart appeals on the judgment
roll. He contends that he was wrongly
denied the right to a jury trial, and the trial court erred in relying on a
“fraudulent probate spousal order†in ruling in favor of the Pearls. We find no error, and shall affirm the
judgment.
BACKGROUND
We treat this case as an appeal on
the judgment roll, because it reaches us based on a clerk’s transcript. ( ADDIN BA xc <@ru> xl 31 s
BRPZZV000001 xpl 1 l "Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.832" Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.832 (further references to rules are to the Cal. Rules of Court);
cf. ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 40 s
BRPZZV000002 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "
Cal.2d 673" Dumas v. Stark (1961) 56 Cal.2d 673, 674; ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 52 s BRPZZV000003 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "Allen v. Toten (1985)
we presume that the trial court's findings of fact are supported by substantial
evidence, and its conclusions of law are binding upon us unless error appears
on the face of the record. ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 63 s
BRPZZV000004 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "
924.)
Stewart initiated this action in
April 2010 by filing an ex parte application
against Placer Foreclosure, Inc., Jimmie E. Mason, and Carolyn McGuire for a
temporary restraining order and order to show cause why a trustee’s sale of
real property located on Shilling Avenue in Lathrop should not be enjoined. In his declaration submitted in support of
the request, Stewart averred that he is the owner of the property. The grant deed Stewart submitted to show his
ownership of the property reflects that Stewart, as “special administrator for
Barbara E. Jackson,†transferred the property to himself “as his sole and
separate property†in 2004. Stewart
further averred that defendants Mason and McGuire fraudulently used the Shilling Avenue property as collateral for a loan sometime
prior to April 2007 and recorded a deed of trust against the
property.
Following a hearing, the trial court
entered the requested restraining order against defendants Mason and McGuire.
The Pearls, as trustees of the Pearl
Trust, intervened in this action to obtain declaratory relief and to quiet
title to the Shilling Avenue property in themselves. The Pearls obtained two deeds of trust from
defendants Mason and McGuire in consideration for two loans recorded against
the property. The Pearls had no
constructive or actual knowledge that Stewart claimed an ownership interest in
the property.
The Pearls foreclosed upon the deed
of trust and obtained the property through the foreclosure sale recorded in
December 2010.
Following an unreported bench trial,
the court ruled that the grant deed recorded by Stewart in 2004, purporting to
convey the Shilling Avenue property to himself, “was without proper
authorization and failed to provide constructive notice of a conveyance of the
property.†The court found the Pearls
were therefore “bona fide purchasers of the property by virtue of their bona
fide encumbrancer status under the foreclosing . . . deed of
trust.†The court declared the grant
deed recorded by Stewart to be null and void and declared the Pearls to be
owners of the property and against Stewart’s adverse claims.
DISCUSSION
Stewart’s pro se appellate brief is
virtually incomprehensible.
Accordingly, we cannot determine the legal basis for his challenge to
the judgment after court trial. Since
the court’s judgment is presumptively correct ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 49 s
BRPZZV000007 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "
(1970)
BRPZZV000007 xpl 2 Denham))
and Stewart has provided no citations to applicable legal authority or legal
analysis, his arguments may be considered forfeited or abandoned. ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 63 s
BRPZZV000008 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "
(1998)
1115; ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 73 s
BRPZZV000009 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "
691, 699-700; ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 54 s
BRPZZV000010 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "
(1994)
To the extent Stewart’s brief may be
read to question whether the trial court erred in conducting a court trial,
rather than a jury trial, on the competing quiet title claims of Stewart and
the Pearls, he is mistaken. As a general
proposition, a jury trial is a matter of right in a civil action at law, but
not in equity. ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 46 s
BRPZZV000012 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "
Cal.App.4th 1229" Nwosu
v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1237, citing ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 70 s BRPZZV000013 xhfl Rep xqt xpl 1 l "C & K Engineering
Contractors v. Amber Steel Co. (1978)
Cal.3d 1" C & K Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co. (1978)
23 Cal.3d 1, 8) and actions to quiet title to property are generally
equitable claims. ( ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 47 s
BRPZZV000012 xhfl Rep xpl 1 Nwosu v. Uba, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1241; see ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 43 s
BRPZZV000014 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "
Cal.2d 671" Thomson v. Thomson (1936) 7 Cal.2d 671, 681.) Neither Stewart’s complaint nor any pleading
filed by the Pearls appears in the record on appeal but, even if they also
raised legal issues, “[w]here plaintiff's claims consist of a ‘mixed bag’ of
equitable and legal claims, the equitable claims are properly tried first by
the court. A principal rationale for
this approach has been explained as follows:
‘ “When an action involves both legal and equitable issues, the equitable
issues, ordinarily, are tried first, for this may obviate the necessity for a
subsequent trial of the legal issues.â€
[Citation.]’ †( ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 51 s
BRPZZV000012 xhfl Rep xpl 1 Nwosu v. Uba, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1238 and cases cited therein.)
Under such circumstances, “[i]t is beyond question that the trial court
had the authority to order a trial of the equitable claims before a trial of
[any] remaining legal claim[s].†( ADDIN BA xc <@$id> xl 14 s ID
xhfl Rep xpl 1 Id.
at p. 1242.)
Stewart also appears to suggest the
court erred in ruling in favor of the Pearls because it relied on a “fraudulent
probate spousal order†and failed to “treat appellant[’]s non fraudulent
probate order with due respect.†When an
appeal is on the judgment roll, we must conclusively presume evidence was
presented that is sufficient to support the court’s findings ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 47 s
BRPZZV000015 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "
Cal.App.3d 147" Ehrler v. Ehrler (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 147, 154) and we
must conclusively defer to the trial court on issues of credibility. (See ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 58 s BRPZZV000016 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc. (2001)
any error “appears on the face of the record.â€
(
ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 78 s BRPZZV000017 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "National Secretarial
Service, Inc. v. Froehlich (1989)
Cal.App.3d 510" National Secretarial Service, Inc. v. Froehlich (1989)
210 Cal.App.3d 510, 521; ADDIN
BA xc <@ru> xl 10 s BRPZZV000018 xpl 1 l "rule 8.163" rule 8.163.) The trial court expressly found Stewart had
no authority to convey the property to himself and that, in purporting to do
so, Stewart failed to provide constructive notice of a conveyance of the
property so as to undermine the Pearls’ position as bona fide purchasers. These findings may not be challenged on this
limited appellate record. ( ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 33 s
BRPZZV000007 xhfl Rep xpl 1 Denham,
supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The Pearls, as trustees of the Pearl Trust,
are awarded their costs on appeal. ( ADDIN BA xc <@ru> xl 17 s BRPZZV000019
xpl 1 l "Rule 8.278 (a)(2)"
Rule 8.278 (a)(2).)
BLEASE , J.
We concur:
RAYE , P.
J.
NICHOLSON , J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] The Pearls’ motion that we take
judicial notice of various documents admitted into evidence at the bench trial,
filed on September 17, 2012, remains pending.
We decline this request for judicial notice, as the documents are
neither necessary, helpful, nor relevant to our disposition of the case. (See ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 151 s
BRPZZV000005 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co.
(1994)
Cal.4th 1257"
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063-1065, overruled on other grounds
41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276.)
name="_ftn2" title="">[2]
For example, on page 8 of his
appellant’s brief, in the last sentence of a two-and-one-half-page paragraph,
Stewart writes: “The relationship between the courts of equity and the rights
of the beneficial owner to claim against the former legal owner where the sale
was improper. (Appellant[’]s position
could not be more clearly stated.)†It
is unfortunate that this sentence fragment represents the clearest statement of
Stewart’s position on appeal.
