P. v. Meves
Filed 6/20/13 P. v. Meves CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
ROCKY RENO
MEVES,
Defendant and
Appellant.
F065386
(Super.
Ct. No. RF006314A)
THE COURT
name="_ftnref1" title="">*
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court
of
Jonathan E.
Berger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant Appellant.
Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Catherine Chatman and Raymond
L. Brosterhous II, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
Appellant
Rocky Reno Meves contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress evidence. Specifically, Meves
asserts (1) the deputy sheriff was within the curtilage of his (Meves’s) home,
which was constitutionally protected; (2) the deputy unreasonably was within
the curtilage; and (3) the subsequent search
and seizure was unconstitutional.
The trial court’s factual finding that the deputy was not within the
curtilage was supported by substantial evidence. Regardless, mere presence within the
curtilage of a residence does not constitute an unlawful entry and unconstitutional
search. The deputy reasonably was in the
location from where he made his observations.
We will affirm the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On March
28, 2012, Kern County Deputy Sheriff Darrin Clodt was in the small mining town
of Johannesburg in rural Kern County.
Clodt was in a patrol car with his partner, Deputy Sheriff Ralph
Parsons. Clodt and Parsons were headed
to 406 Goler Road in Johannesburg to serve a no-bail warrant on Ralph
Brisbon. Clodt had extensive previous
training in the recognition of individuals who were under the influence of
controlled substances.
Goler Road
is a dirt road and there are no dividing lines separating one property from
another. When the deputies arrived at 406
Goler Road, Clodt looked to his right from the patrol car and saw Meves, who
was standing about 20 yards from the patrol car. There was a house at the location. The area between the deputies and Meves was
“desert type,†with no lawn or fence between the deputies and Meves. Parsons testified that when Meves was first
approached by the deputies, Meves was standing about 15 feet west of the
residence on the property.
Clodt left
the patrol car, crossed the desert-like area, and approached Meves, whom he
knew from previous contacts. Clodt
noticed Meves had his hand in his pocket, was shuffling back and forth, and was
trembling. Meves spoke rapidly and was
not able to stand still. Clodt formed
the opinion that Meves was under the influence of a “central nervous system
stimulant.â€
Clodt asked
Meves to remove his hand from his pants pocket.
When Meves did so, he produced a knife and handed it to Clodt. When Clodt began a patdown search, Meves
admitted he had methamphetamine in his pocket.
A subsequent search of Meves disclosed two packages of methamphetamine
and a hypodermic syringe. The deputies
placed Meves under arrest.
Meves was
charged with possession of methamphetamine, using or being under the influence
of methamphetamine, and possession of narcotics paraphernalia. It also was alleged that Meves had served a
prior prison term and had suffered a prior strike conviction. Meves pled not guilty and denied the special
allegations.
On May 3,
2012, Meves filed a motion to suppress the evidence pursuant to Penal Code
section 1538.5.
title="">[1] The motion challenged the search as
presumptively illegal because it was a warrantless search. The People filed opposition and argued that
approaching Meves to talk to him about Brisbon’s whereabouts while Meves was
outdoors did not constitute a detention or unlawful entry, that after making
contact Clodt had probable cause to arrest Meves, and that thereafter a lawful
patdown and search incident to arrest were conducted.
The motion
to suppress was heard on June 8, 2012.
At the suppression hearing, three photographs of the scene where Meves
was arrested were admitted into evidence.
The photographs were marked defense exhibits A, B, and C. On October 29, 2012, this court granted a
motion to augment the record on appeal to include these three photographs. The three photographs were of the property
located at 406 Goler Road; however, according to the testimony at the
suppression hearing, there were differences between what was shown in the
photographs and the condition of the real property on March 28, 2012, when
Meves was arrested.
Exhibit C
shows what appears to be a swath of dirt road; to one side of the picture is a
house with trees around it and a low stone fence that encloses the trees; the
house is visible. A circle with an “Xâ€
inside is drawn on exhibit C, indicating the location where Meves was standing
when Clodt approached him. The circled
“X†mark indicates a location that is some distance from the house—outside of
the area that is enclosed by the low stone fence—and is in an unimproved
desert-like area. In the background of
exhibit C is a corrugated metal fence with a “No Trespassing†sign on it; the
fence is several feet in back of where the circled “X†is marked. Exhibits A and B depict what is on the other
side of the corrugated fence. That area
appears to be an area that is littered with junk and abandoned items.
Clodt
testified that the corrugated metal fence depicted in the photographs was not
present on March 28, 2012.
Parsons testified that what
appeared to be a “No Trespassing†sign attached to the corrugated metal fence
was not present on March 28.
Kyla Gambill, who lived with Meves
at the time of his arrest, testified that on March 28, 2012, the residence at
406 Goler Road was fenced on three sides, but there was no fence between the
roadway and where Meves was detained.
Gambill also testified that a metal gate and a wooden gate shown in the
photographs were not present on March 28.
The trial
court determined from the testimony and a review of the exhibits that it
appeared “the area where the deputy approached [Meves], minus the metal fence
that did not exist at the time, is wide open to the street and it’s a
continuous dirt area that goes all the way from the street into an area that
looks somewhat like a junkyard.†The
trial court found that the deputies were contacting Meves on an unrelated
matter pertaining to a warrant for an acquaintance of Meves’s, that once
contact with Meves was made symptoms of being under the influence of a
controlled substance were noted, and that there was no violation of the law in
the arrest and search.
After the
denial of the suppression motion, Meves pled no contest to possession of
methamphetamine and admitted the prior prison term. The trial court dismissed the prior strike
allegation, suspended imposition of sentence, and placed Meves on formal
probation for three years, on condition he serve one year in county jail.
DISCUSSION
Meves
contends the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion. Specifically, he contends the deputies
entered the constitutionally protected curtilage of his residence; thus, any
observation of symptoms indicating he was under the influence of a controlled
substance was made from a position the deputies could not lawfully occupy. Meves is mistaken.
of Review
Section 1538.5 provides in relevant
part that a defendant may move for the return of property or to suppress as
evidence any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result of a search or
seizure if the search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable.
“‘“‘A proceeding under … section
1538.5 to suppress evidence is one in which a full hearing is held on the
issues before the superior court sitting
as a finder of fact.’ [Citation.]†[Citation.] … In such a proceeding the power
to judge the credibility of witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony,
weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences, is vested in the trial court. On appeal all presumptions favor the exercise
of that power, and the trial court’s findings on such matters, whether express
or implied, must be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence. The trial court also has the duty to decide
whether, on the facts found, the search was unreasonable within the meaning of
the Constitution. Although that issue is
a question of law, the trial court’s conclusion on the point should not lightly
be challenged by appeal or by petition for extraordinary writ. Of course, if such review is nevertheless sought,
it becomes the ultimate responsibility of the appellate court to measure the
facts, as found by the trier, against the constitutional standard of
reasonableness.’ [Citation.]†(People
v. Green (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 367, 372.)
Analysis
Meves challenges
the trial court’s factual finding that the deputies did not impermissibly enter
the curtilage of his residence. Meves
misconceives the nature of the doctrine of curtilage.
First, curtilage contemplates an
area that shares the same expectation of privacy as does the interior of the
home to which it relates. (
294, 300 (Dunn).) The “central component of [curtilage is]
whether the area harbors the ‘intimate activity associated with the “sanctity
of a [person’s] home and the privacies of life.â€â€™ [Citations.]†(Id.
at p. 300.) A road or driveway to a home
open to the public is not within the curtilage of a home. (U.S.
v. Evans (7th Cir. 1994) 27 F.3d 1219, 1228-1229 [open driveway leading to
garage from public street not private]; United
States v. Ventling (8th Cir. 1982) 678 F.2d 63, 65-66 [a driveway and
portion of the yard immediately adjacent to the front door of a home cannot be
considered to be out of public view]; U.S.
v. Rodgers (11th Cir. 1991) 924 F.2d 219, 221, fn. 3 [a pathway that leads
from a driveway to the front door of a home is not within the curtilage of the
home]; United States v. Humphries
(9th Cir. 1980) 636 F.2d 1172, 1179 [no expectation of privacy where an
automobile was parked on an unenclosed driveway open to view from the street].)
Second,
curtilage is the land immediately surrounding and associated with the home;
curtilage does not necessarily extend to a property’s boundary line. (Oliver
v. United States (1984) 466 U.S. 170, 180.) The area beyond the curtilage is “open fieldsâ€
that government agents may enter without regard to the constraints imposed by
the Fourth Amendment. (Oliver,
at pp. 179-180.)
Here, the deputies had an unobstructed
view of Meves while in their patrol car on a public street. Meves was standing in an area that was desert
like; he was some distance from his residence, the trees, and the area that was
enclosed by the stone fence on March 28, 2012.
Meves was visible from the public roadway.
The United States Supreme Court in Dunn
rejected a contention a barn was within the curtilage of the
residence. (Dunn, supra, 480 U.S. at pp. 300-303.) In addition, that court rejected the
defendant’s contention he possessed an expectation of privacy, independent from
his home’s curtilage, in the barn and its contents. (Id.
at p. 301.) We similarly reject
Meves’s contention that the desert-like junk yard area of his property was
within the curtilage or that he had any expectation of privacy while standing
in that area. The area where Meves was
standing was not adjacent to or near the home; it was not at that time enclosed
or shielded by any fence; the area’s use was not tied to the home itself,
rather, it appeared to be a desert area, a portion of which was littered with
junk; and there were not any “No Trespassing†signs in place on March 28, 2012.
We conclude the trial court’s
factual finding that the area in which Meves was standing was outside the
curtilage was supported by substantial evidence.
Moreover,
the presence of an officer within the curtilage of a residence does not
automatically amount to an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. It must be determined under the facts of each
case just how private the particular observation point actually is. Police with legitimate business may enter
areas of the curtilage that are impliedly open, such as access routes to the
house. In doing so, they are free to
keep their eyes open. An officer is
permitted the same license to intrude as a reasonably respectful citizen. A substantial and unreasonable departure from
such an area, or a particularly intrusive method of viewing, however, will
exceed the scope of the implied invitation and intrude upon a constitutionally
protected expectation of privacy. What
is reasonable cannot be determined by a fixed formula. Rather, it must be based on the facts and
circumstances of each case. (
923, 943 (Thompson).)
The Fourth Amendment protection of
the home never has been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield
their eyes when passing by a home on a public street. Nor does the mere fact an individual has
taken measures to restrict some views of his activities preclude an officer’s observations
from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders the
activities clearly visible. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home, is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection. (
829-831 (Camacho).)
Even if the area in which Meves was
standing were part of the curtilage, the deputies legitimately could approach
him where he stood. The area was not
shielded from the road; Meves could have no reasonable expectation of privacy
where he stood since the area was visible to the public; and Clodt’s approach
was open and direct and for a legitimate purpose. (Thompson,
supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 943.)
What a person knowingly exposes to the public is not subject to Fourth
Amendment protection. (
829-831.)
A police officer who makes an
uninvited entry onto private property does not per se violate the occupant’s
Fourth Amendment right of privacy.
“Absent express orders from the person in possession against any
possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it
illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person’s right of privacy, for
anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on
the front door of any man’s ‘castle’ with the honest intent of asking questions
of the occupant thereof—whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an
officer of the law.†(
327 F.2d 301, 303.) This essentially is
what Clodt did when he approached Meves while Meves was standing outside his
home in an area open to public view.
Clodt lawfully entered onto the property to
speak to Meves. Here, Clodt determined
from observing Meves that Meves appeared to be under the influence of a
controlled substance, which gave Clodt probable cause to arrest Meves for a
misdemeanor violation of Health and Safety Code section 11550, subdivision
(a). The methamphetamine and paraphernalia
in Meves’s possession were uncovered as a result of a search incident to a
lawful arrest. (People v. Avila (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1076-1077.)
We conclude the trial court’s
factual finding that the area in which Meves was standing was outside the
curtilage was supported by substantial evidence. (People
v. Green (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 367, 372.)
Under California law, “‘“it is ‘the ultimate responsibility of the
appellate court to measure the facts, as found by the trier, against the
constitutional standard of reasonableness.’â€
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]†(People
v. Gallegos (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 252, 261-262.) Clodt’s entry onto the property to speak to
Meves was lawful and the resulting arrest, search,
and seizure of the contraband were reasonable and did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed. The request for
judicial notice filed October 4, 2012, is denied.
name="_ftn1" title="">* Before
Cornell, Acting P.J., Kane, J. and Peña, J.
further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
