In re S.L.
Filed 6/13/13 In re S.L. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE
DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re S. L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
WILLIE L.,
Defendant and
Appellant.
G047936
(Super. Ct.
No. DP021652-001)
O P I N I O
N
Appeal from an order of
the Superior Court
of
County, Richard Y. Lee, Judge.
Affirmed.
Roni Keller, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Nicholas S. Chrisos,
County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Aurelio Torre, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
S.L. was born in May
2010. Her father is appellant Willie L.,
her mother Ashley C. We have already met
Ashley in a previous appeal, dealing with M.L., another child of Ashley and
Willie. M.L. was born two years after
her older sister S.L. In
for a writ of mandate vacating an order made in January 2013 that reduced
Ashley’s visitation with M.L. – who was in the dependency system because Ashley
was abusing methamphetamine at the time of her birth – in the wake of the
termination of reunification services
to Ashley.
The theme of drug abuse
also turns out to be the leitmotif in Willie’s appeal concerning S.L. About six months after S.L.’s birth, around
March 2011, Willie was arrested and convicted of driving under the influence. Because of his extensive criminal record, he
went to prison and would remain there until December 8, 2011. In the meantime, in September 2011, Ashley
was arrested for driving under the influence, which resulted in S.L’s being
made a dependent of the juvenile court on November 16, 2011.
Upon his release, Willie
met with a social worker on December
30, 2011, and agreed to a reunification plan that included, among
other things, attendance at a drug program and random observed urine
testing. During that reunification
period, Willie was able to visit S.L. on weekends and his visits, as a social
worker would later describe them, were “very appropriate.†But other than “appropriate†visits on
weekends, Willie made absolutely no progress on his reunification plan. He enrolled in no drug treatment classes, no
DUI classes, and no parenting classes.
He didn’t even contact any of the drug treatment programs until
May. He was not tested.
Willie appeared at the
six-month review on June 11, 2012
and his testimony was basically a compendium of the difficulties he faced in trying
to comply with both the juvenile court reunification plan and the conditions of
his parole. He and Ashley had been
evicted from a residence in March.
Thereafter he stayed with Ashley and her father in Orange
County a couple of days a week, and
the rest of the time he stayed with his mother or his brother in Los
Angeles County.
He admitted at the
six-month review he had given priority to the conditions of his criminal parole
over the juvenile court reunification plan.
Speaking of the criminal parole he said, “I know if I don’t do what they
ask, they will lock me up, no hesitation.â€
Even so, at least two warrants were issued for Willie’s arrest during
this period because he failed to enroll in any DUI classes, attendance at which
were apparently also a condition of his criminal probation.
Willie never found a
transitional living home. Communications
difficulties with his social worker meant he only got a bus pass twice. He couldn’t seem to get anything done through
the social worker, so decided to wait for his court date “to see if there was a
way that you all†– apparently referring to everyone then present in the
courtroom – “can handle it for me.†He
had some sort of mix up (the exact nature of which is not quite clear from the
bare record) with the color code for drug testing, so didn’t test.
And so it was not
surprising the court terminated reunification services at the June 2012
six-month review. Even so, the trial
judge offered Willie some hope, by telling him, on the record “you can petition
this court to perhaps reconsider offering reunification services to you again.â€
Willie brought no such
petition. About seven months went by
until a section 366.26 hearing
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2]
occurred on January 8, 2013.
Willie was not
there. When the case was called his
attorney told the court: “Your honor,
the father called me, he is not present, he called me at [10] o’clock this
morning and indicated to me that he couldn’t find a ride to court, that the bus
ride is over three hours and he doesn’t have the ability to get here. So he would like the matter continued. [¶] I
can’t assure the court that if the court continued it to another day that the
same problem will not occur. [¶] Unfortunately the father is, as in [
today, living between homes with relatives and friends and relies on
transportation from friends and he just had no one to bring him to court today
and so I don’t know if he would be able to line up any reliable source of
transportation if we picked a new date, but I will submit that to the court.â€
The trial judge denied
the requested continuance and terminated Willie’s parental rights to S.L. This appeal followed, in which the sole issue
is the claim the trial judge abused his discretion by not continuing the case,
particularly since Willie had not previously requested any continuances.
The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the continuance, particularly in light of the
proffered reason for the continuance – an inability to get to court – and the
previous excuses Willie had offered at the six-month review for his failure to
even begin to comply with his reunification plan – an inability to get to drug
counseling sessions, DUI classes, or whatever. Willie’s fundamental problem of rootless
transience had not changed since the six-month review, as shown by his
counsel’s admission that she could not guarantee his appearance even if a
continuance were granted.
Indeed, the denial was
doubly reasonable because of the contrast between juvenile dependency law and
other civil law on the subject of
continuances. In most civil law
situations, continuances may be granted for good cause, and professional
courtesy in stipulating to accommodate an opposing attorney’s schedule is
actually encouraged. (See Pham v. Nguyen
(1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 11, 15-16 [“Continuances play a legitimate role in
keeping a law practice manageable. Thus
. . . we would encourage trial courts . . . to ‘accommodate’
counsel whenever it is not ‘impractical’ to do so.â€].)
By contrast, juvenile
dependency law is time-intensive; each day and month in a child’s life is
literally irreplaceable. (See
1363, 1366 [“‘Children should not be required to wait until their parents grow
up.’â€].) Accordingly, the statute
governing continuances in juvenile law displays a distinct tilt against
continuances. Not only are continuances
abjured if they are contrary to the
court’s attention is directed to factors that militate against any continuance
sought by a parent, namely the child’s need for prompt resolution, a stable
environment, and avoiding prolonged temporary placements.
those dots and have declared, “Continuances should be difficult to
obtain.†(Jeff M. v. Superior Court (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1242.) We note Willie makes no argument any delay
would have been in S.L.’s interest.
We need only add that
any possible error was obviously harmless under the facts of this case. The evidence at the six-month review
demonstrated that – for whatever reason – Willie has simply not been able to
get his act together in terms of having enough stability in his life to even
begin to establish a meaningful parental relationship with S.L. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)
[parental bond exception to termination].)
The burden of establishing his continued presence in his child’s life
would confer a substantial benefit on that child was borne by Willie. The fact Willie still was shuttling between the homes of friends and relatives as
of the section 366.26 hearing amply demonstrates he could not have carried that
burden, even if he had been present. (
1243, 1252 [noting a parent who claims an exception to adoption at the section
366.26 hearing has the burden of proof of establishing by a preponderance of
evidence that the exception applies].)
The order is affirmed.
BEDSWORTH,
J.
WE CONCUR:
O’LEARY, P.
J.
MOORE, J.
name="_ftn1" title=""> [1] Indeed, a review of the reporter’s
transcript shows the trial judge was commendably attentive to the proceedings,
to the point of noting on the record how “charming†Willie appeared on the stand.
name="_ftn2" title=""> [2] All statutory references in this
opinion are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
