CA Unpub Decisions

We revisit the appeal of Ronnie Eugene Bacon after the California Supreme Court transferred the case back to this court. On count 1, appellant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a) (section 11377(a))).[1] On count 2, he was convicted of furnishing or giving away a controlled substance (§ 11379, subd. (a) (section 11379(a)).[2] He was sentenced to prison for three years on count 1, with a concurrent term of three years on count 2.
Appellant contends that (1) count 2 must be reversed because his actions did not constitute a violation of section 11379(a), and (2) count 1 must be stricken because it is a lesser included offense of count 2.
Subsequent to the initial briefing, the trial court denied appellant’s request for additional custody credits. During our initial consideration of this appeal, the issue was raised via supplemental briefing. In our opinion filed on July 1, 2010, we awarded appellant additional conduct credits pursuant to then recently amended Penal Code section 4019 (Senate Bill No. 18). (Pen. Code, § 4019, subds. (b) & (c), as amended by Stats. 2009, 3d Ex. Sess. 2009-2010, ch. 28, § 50; Sen. Bill No. 3X 18 (2009-2010 3d Ex. Sess.) § 50.)[3] Our ruling applied Senate Bill No. 18 retroactively.
Our initial opinion stayed appellant’s sentence on count 1 and awarded 10 days of additional conduct credits but otherwise affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Appellant filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court, which the court denied. However, our Supreme Court ordered review on its own motion and deferred further action pending consideration and disposition of the conduct credits issue in People v. Brown (Mar. 16, 2010, C056510), review granted June 9, 2010, S181963. Thereafter, in People v. Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th 314, our high court held Senate Bill No. 18 must be applied prospectively, and the equal protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a)) do not require retroactive application. (54 Cal.4th at pp. 318, 325-329.)

The three children of appellant L.T. (Mother), M.M., age 23 months, and Ru.M. and Ri.M., twins one month old (minors), were the subject of a November 2011 dependency petition. The petition alleged neglect, failure to protect, and failure to support due to serious domestic violence between Mother and her husband, the minors’ presumed father (Father), and substance abuse by Mother and Father. (Welf. & Inst. Code,[2] § 300, subds. (b) & (g).) At the time of filing, both parents were incarcerated.
The minors were found to be dependents of the court in December 2011. Reunification services were denied to Father as a result of his history of chronic substance abuse. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(13).) At the time of the six-month review in June 2012, the Sonoma County Human Services Department (Agency) recommended terminating reunification services to Mother as a result of her continued contact with Father, erratic compliance with a substance abuse program, and inability to accept responsibility for her conduct. After a contested six-month review hearing in September 2012, the juvenile court granted Mother an additional six months of services. The Agency again recommended termination of Mother’s reunification services at the time of the 12-month hearing in December. After a series of evidentiary hearings in February, March, and April 2013, the court terminated her services and scheduled a permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26, explaining its decision in a written order.

J.G. (minor) was found to have committed battery on a person with whom he had a dating relationship largely on the testimony of a witness who saw him beating a woman. The only evidence of a personal relationship between minor and the victim was minor’s own statement to police that the woman was his “girlfriend.” Minor contends the doctrine of corpus delicti required the prosecution to introduce evidence of the nature of the relationship independent of his statement. Finding no such requirement, we affirm.

Defendant Jeremy Dorough appeals from an order revoking his probation and sentencing him to prison. His court-appointed counsel has filed a brief raising no issues, but seeking our independent review of the record under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders). We find no arguable issues and affirm.

When an employee injures a bystander while fleeing the police, is the employer liable for those injuries under the doctrine of respondeat superior? The answer in this case is no, because assuming an employment relationship can be established, the flight from the police was not an activity within the course and scope of that employment. We also reject a claim that assisting another in evading the police amounts to an ultrahazardous activity giving rise to strict liability. We affirm the trial court’s order granting nonsuit on claims by plaintiff and appellant Bruce Cearlock against defendants and respondents 1054 Kearny, LLC and Peter Lambertson.

Following the denial of a motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5)[1], appellant Emma Price-Stewart entered a guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and admitted one prior felony conviction (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5). On appeal, Price-Stewart’s sole contention is that the seizure of her purse during a police investigation was unconstitutional because there were no particularized facts showing that she was armed or dangerous. As such, Price-Stewart argues the police officer’s observation of the gun after the illegal seizure must be suppressed as tainted evidence. We disagree and affirm.

After a several-week jury trial, a Humboldt County jury convicted appellant of one count of second degree murder and one count of making criminal threats. It also found true several special allegations regarding the second degree murder count. Appellant appeals, contending that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 3472, which provides that the right of self defense may not be contrived. We find neither error nor prejudice in the giving of that instruction and hence affirm appellant’s conviction.

Elizabeth Karnazes, in propria persona, appeals from an order granting defendant John J. Hartford’s motion to quash service of the summons and complaint. She contends that the trial court erred in granting the motion because the service of process on Hartford substantially complied with the statute. We affirm.

In Schellinger Brothers v. City of Sebastopol (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1245 (Schellinger I), this court first encountered the controversy surrounding a proposed commercial development that had become ensnared in a bureaucratic and politically charged morass that saw the certification of an environmental impact report (EIR) stymied for five years. The frustrated developer sued the municipality for a writ of administrative mandate to halt the seemingly endless proceedings under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq. (CEQA)). We held that none of the developer’s statutory arguments could “be used to halt the decisionmaking process specified by CEQA that is still ongoing.” (Schellinger I, supra, at p. 1250.) We specifically rejected Schellinger’s central contention that one provision of CEQA—Public Resources Code section 21151.1—imposed a “mandatory, nonwaivable jurisdictional deadline” of one year for approval of an EIR. (Id. at pp. 1259‑1261.)

In Schellinger Brothers v. City of Sebastopol (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1245 (Schellinger I), this court first encountered the controversy surrounding a proposed commercial development that had become ensnared in a bureaucratic and politically charged morass that saw the certification of an environmental impact report (EIR) stymied for five years. The frustrated developer sued the municipality for a writ of administrative mandate to halt the seemingly endless proceedings under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq. (CEQA)). We held that none of the developer’s statutory arguments could “be used to halt the decisionmaking process specified by CEQA that is still ongoing.” (Schellinger I, supra, at p. 1250.) We specifically rejected Schellinger’s central contention that one provision of CEQA—Public Resources Code section 21151.1—imposed a “mandatory, nonwaivable jurisdictional deadline” of one year for approval of an EIR. (Id. at pp. 1259‑1261.)

Appellant Peter Crane (Crane) was a passenger in a taxi that was rear‑ended by a station wagon driven by respondent Colby Clark (Clark), an accident for which Clark admitted liability. Crane, who had a preexisting back condition, introduced evidence that in the three years following the accident he spent over $46,000 for medical care, and that future medical expenses could run over $2 million. Crane also sought damages for past and future pain and suffering, the upshot of which was a closing argument that sought millions of dollars in damages. Following brief deliberations, the jury awarded Crane $10,345, and the trial court denied his motion for new trial.
Crane appeals, primarily asserting three claims of evidentiary error: (1) admitting evidence that contradicted unresponded-to requests for admission that had been deemed admitted; (2) admitting photographs of the taxi and the station wagon; and (3) admitting evidence that did not meet the standard for expert testimony. He also asserts error in the denial of the new trial. We conclude that none of Crane’s contentions has merit, and we affirm.

Jeffrey Goldberg was committed to the Department of Mental Health for an indefinite term after a jury found him to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) within the meaning of the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA).[1] On appeal, he contends that his commitment cannot be sustained because the jury’s determination was supported by insufficient evidence, he was entitled to a jury instruction clarifying the definition of “diagnosed mental disorder,” and the SVPA is unconstitutional. We disagree and affirm.

Defendant Dwayne Lavell Robinson (appellant) admitted firing several gunshots into a group of people, killing one and injuring two others, but claimed he acted in self-defense. A jury disagreed, convicting him of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and assault with a firearm (id., § 245, subd. (a)(2)), and finding true firearms enhancements (id., §§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d), 12022.7, subd. (a)). He now appeals, contending (1) the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a new trial based on a newly-discovered scene in surveillance video footage (footage) of the shooting, (2) aspects of the prosecutor’s closing argument constituted prosecutorial misconduct, (3) the prosecution’s failure to disclose the scene from the footage was a Brady[1] violation, and (4) a ruling precluding the use of two witnesses’ prior convictions under Evidence Code section 1103 was prejudicial error. We reject appellant’s contentions and affirm.

Defendant Diovanni Jerrell Whitmire was convicted by a jury of murdering a convenience store clerk during the course of a robbery. Whitmire’s sole contention on appeal is that his conviction should be reversed because it was based on illegally seized evidence recovered from a vehicle in which he was a passenger. Whitmire does not challenge the legality of the traffic stop but instead claims the search of the vehicle premised on the driver’s probation status was unlawful. Because Whitmire did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle that was searched, we reject his claim and consequently affirm the judgment.