P. v. Steele

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Filed 10/8/13  P. v. Steele CA1/2

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>NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b).  This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

 

 

IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 

FIRST
APPELLATE DISTRICT

 

DIVISION
TWO

 

 
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THE PEOPLE,             Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JACOB CHARLES STEELE,             Defendant and Appellant.

A135606         (Humboldt County       Super. Ct. No. CR1001497)

 

>I. INTRODUCTION

            After
a several-week jury trial, a Humboldt
County jury convicted appellant of
one count of second degree murder and one count of making criminal
threats.  It also found true several
special allegations regarding the second degree murder count.  Appellant appeals, contending that the trial
court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 3472, which provides that
the right of self defense may not be contrived. 
We find neither error nor prejudice in the giving of that instruction
and hence affirm appellant’s conviction.

>II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

            Appellant,
23 years old in early 2012, was a native of Eureka
who supported himself by selling drugs, and was a friend of the victim, Jerry
George, who lived a few blocks away and also dealt drugs and bought cocaine
from appellant.  After an argument in
front of several acquaintances on the night of January 21, 2010,href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]
appellant pulled out a .40 caliber gun and shot and killed George in
appellant’s home.  The versions of how
that shooting occurred and what happened thereafter varied somewhat, and we
will summarize those versions.

            According
to Hauna Kim, the victim’s girlfriend and the mother of their child, George
went over to appellant’s apartment on Reasor Road
in McKinleyville at about 7:30 p.m.
on the evening in question, January 21. 
At about 11 p.m. on that evening, George called Kim from appellant’s
phone, and told her he and appellant were arguing about a number of things,
including how many people drove Mercedes (as George did), and asked her if she
knew any other young people who did so; Kim responded in the negative.   When George had not returned to their home
several hours later, Kim called appellant at around 1:30 a.m., but appellant told her George had left 30
minutes earlier, although he was allegedly drunk.  When George never appeared at their home, Kim
called some of his family members and drove neighboring roads to try to find
him, but could not.  Later on January 22,
she filed a missing person’s report with the police department.  She also called appellant several more times
over the ensuing days asking him if he knew anything about George’s
whereabouts. 

            On
the evening in question, appellant’s cousin, Richard Steele, was at appellant’s
apartment when George arrived.  Also
there were Shawn Hof, appellant’s wife Lindsey, and a minor named Trey.  Richard Steele also recalled the debate
between appellant and George about young people driving Mercedes.  He also recalled appellant asking George to
leave, but the latter did not.  According
to Richard Steele, George stood up and said: “You are going to have to fucking
move me from here.”  The two men then got
face to face with appellant appearing “kind of . . . irritated”
and George said to him: “What are you going to do?  Pull your fucking pistol out?”  And, according to the cousin, appellant who
regularly carried a pistol on his right hip at that point in time, did so,
cocked it, and then moved backward from George. 
Richard Steele and appellant’s wife Lindsey, left the room at that
point, but the former heard a gunshot and came back into the room to find
George lying on the floor “with a hole in his head.” 

            Richard
Steele asked what had happened, and appellant replied that George had “rushed”
him.  Richard Steele told him he “should
have called the police [but appellant] said no. 
He wasn’t going to lose his son.” 
The two decided to work to “get rid of Jerry’s body.”  They commenced to do so by getting a tarp and
wrapping George’s body in it.  Appellant
then called Hof, who had apparently also left appellant’s house a few minutes
before.  They then put the body, wrapped
in the tarp, in the trunk of appellant’s car, and drove away and buried it at a
location unspecified by appellant’s cousin. 
In the process, and while driving along Highway 101, Richard Steele
threw the barrel of appellant’s gun out of the window of the car. 

            Hof
also testified for the prosecution about some of the events of the night in
question.  He was a methamphetamine
addict who worked on appellant’s several cars and also apparently lived close
by.  On the night in question, he was
working on one of appellant’s cars, but was also in and out of the house and
heard the debate between appellant and George about young people driving
Mercedes.  This debate “escalated into an
argument” according to Hof, and appellant asked George “to leave several
times.”  Appellant then “told everybody
to get out” but Hof did not, and “tried to get [appellant] to calm down.”  That effort failed and Hof saw appellant
shoot George, and then walk out behind Hof saying “I don’t have to deal with
that nigger no more.  I killed him.” 

            Hof
went over to his girlfriend’s house, but appellant kept calling him, insisting
that he come back, and said if he did not Hof “could end up just like
him.”  Hof then returned and helped bury
George’s body in a ditch; he also made arrangements with several other friends
to clean up appellant’s apartment, i.e., the bloody part of the carpet, etc.href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">[2] 

            At
some unspecified time later, appellant, his cousin Richard, and his father,
Donny Steele, met a mutual friend named Brian Dulac at a boat landing off of an
exit from Highway 101.  Appellant told
Dulac that a “big black guy” had stolen some of his property earlier, and that
when they were “drinking together” later “things got out of hand” and the
“black guy rushed him and he shot him.” 
Appellant and his family sought Dulac’s advice regarding “getting rid of
a body,” and Dulac advised them (1) where and when at the mouth of the Eel
River was the best place to dispose of a body and (2) “they were going to have
to open him up so he wouldn’t pop up out on the ocean and wash up on the
beach.” 

            Several
days later, according to the testimony of Nathaniel Willis, he, appellant, and
appellant’s father transported George’s body to the Eel River and put it into
the water.  Willis later “burned
everybody’s clothes” that had been worn that day.  

            In
the same month all this occurred, the Humboldt County Sheriff’s Department
began an investigation into the disappearance of George.  In the course of that investigation, both
appellant and his cousin, Richard Steele, stated that George had left
appellant’s house at 10:45 p.m. on the evening in question, after he “and
several friends had been drinking throughout the evening.”  Appellant did not tell the sheriff’s
investigator anything about a quarrel between them.  In the course of the same investigation,
appellant was interviewed by the sheriff’s office, and a recording made of it
and later played for the jury.  In the
course of that interview, appellant again said nothing about his having a
quarrel with George. 

            A
technician in the Humboldt County Sheriff’s office then went to appellant’s
Reasor Road apartment and examined various devices there, as well as some of
his vehicles.  She found blood stains on
both a carpet cleaner and a vacuum cleaner as well as on a speaker cover.  The bed of appellant’s truck and a bloody
spare tire cover were taken into evidence. 
The same technician obtained two toothbrushes in order to secure the DNA
of George, and also got a sample of the DNA of his sister, April George.  A senior criminologist for the Department of
Justice’s office in Eureka testified that the DNA obtained from several of the
Reasor Road sources matched the DNA of the victim, Jerry George, i.e., the DNA
obtained from his toothbrushes.

            Apparently,
Shawn Hof began cooperating with the investigators because, in early August
2010, he took an investigator from the Humboldt County District Attorney’s
office to a location in McKinleyville, where George’s body had first been
buried.  They found pieces of tarp, duct
tape, and two shoes identified as belonging to the victim. 

            After
the close of the prosecution’s case, appellant was called as a witness by his
attorney.  He conceded that, on the night
in question, he had indeed shot and killed George.  He explained that, on that evening, he,
George, Hof, and his wife Lindsey, were all drinking at his home, in the course
of which they started arguing about cars, including whether (1) a Cadillac El
Dorado was a two-door or four-door car and (2) any other “young people” in the area
drove Mercedes, besides appellant.  This
led to further arguments between appellant and George and the former’s request
that George leave, which, with his fists allegedly clenched, the latter
declined to do.  Appellant reiterated his
request that George leave his apartment, to which George responded: “You are
going to have to fucking move me from here.” 
Appellant “kept asking him to leave politely over and over again and he
just kept refusing”  but then yelled at
appellant: “You better go get your fucking gun” and took a step toward
appellant.  Appellant then stood up from
the couch where he had been sitting, pulled out his gun, cocked it, and asked
the other people to leave the room, which they did.  Then, when George started moving toward
appellant, the latter raised his gun and fired it, killing George.

            Appellant
then left the house, but returned shortly thereafter with his cousin, Richard
Steele.  The two of them decided to
“cover this up.”  There followed, as
related above, the various “cover ups,” including appellant and Hof first
burying George’s body, throwing away the barrel of the gun, cutting off the
bloody portions of the carpet and putting them into garbage bags.  Later they met with two persons who advised
them how to dispose of the body permanently in the Eel River, which appellant,
his father and cousin, and Nathaniel Willis then did, after which they burned
the clothes they were wearing.  The next
day, appellant was interviewed by the sheriff’s investigators, and denied that
anything untoward had happened to George. 


            On
July 6, 2011, an information was filed count 1 of which charged appellant with
first degree murder of George; that count also included four special
allegations that appellant personally used a firearm causing great bodily injury
and death.  (Pen. Code, §§ 187,
subd. (a), 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a)(1) and 12022.53, subds.
(b), (c), and (d).)  Count 2 charged
appellant with making criminal threats to Hof on January 22.  (Pen. Code, § 422.)  After a several-week jury trial, the
important testimony of which is summarized above, appellant was found guilty of
the second degree murder of George and of making criminal threats to Hof, as
alleged.  Several of the special
allegations were also found to be true.

            On April 10, 2012,
appellant was sentenced to 15 years to life on the first count, 25 years to
life on the firearm enhancement, and two years on the second count, i.e.,
making criminal threats.

            On
May 24, 2012, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

>III. 
DISCUSSION

            Appellant
presents only one issue for review, i.e., did the trial court err in
instructing the jury with, among many other instructions, CALCRIM No. 3472,
which reads:  “A person does not have the
right to self-defense if he or she provokes a fight or a quarrel with the
intent to create an excuse to use force.” 
(CALCRIM No. 3472.)

            We
find no error in the trial court’s inclusion of this instruction.  First of all, this one-sentence instruction
was one of four given regarding, in whole or in part, the issue of
self-defense.  The others given were
CALCRIM Nos. 505, 510, and 3475.  Two of
those, i.e., CALCRIM Nos. 505 and 3475 were specifically requested by defense
counsel, and she expressed no objection to No. 510.  The only one she objected to was CALCRIM No.
3472, and she did so only briefly, stating: 
“The objection is that it doesn’t reflect the state of the evidence.”

            The
court then allowed the prosecutor to respond, which he did by saying:  “As succinctly as I can, your Honor, I
believe it, in fact, does.  The state of
the evidence is that there’s a verbal argument taking place between—per the
defendant, between he and Jerry George. 
The defendant pulled a gun on Jerry George.  He escalated it into a situation
necessitating or creating a situation where Jerry George might act in
self-defense.  He’s the one that
escalated it into a fight; and at that point, Jerry George had a legal right to
defend himself.  And he can’t, then,
subsequently after pulling a gun on someone when someone actually allegedly
tries to take the gun from them say that when he shot that person, he was
acting in self-defense.  He, in fact,
created the scenario where he gets to kill Jerry George per his version of
events.”

            The court then
commented:  “Sure.  3472 is a correct statement of the law and I
think there is sufficient basis in which, depending on how you view the
evidence, to give 3472.  So the Court
will give 3472 as requested.”

            Defense
counsel offered no response to either of these statements.  Nor, in his brief to us, does appellant cite
much less discuss the one reported authority which addresses the argument that
the giving of that instruction was error. 
In People v. Olguin (1994) 31
Cal.App.4th 1355, 1381 (Olguin), the
court said:  “Without objection, the
trial court instructed the jury with a series of CALJIC self-defense
instructions which included CALJIC No. 5.55. [Now CALCRIM No. 3472.]  Counsel were specifically asked if they had
any objection to this instruction and said they did not.  Mora [one of the appellants] now argues the
instruction was erroneous as a matter of law because it does not require a
specific intent to create a self-defense pretext for assault, and because it
was inapplicable to the facts of the case.

            “We
agree the instruction had no antecedent in the facts of this case.  Neither we nor the Attorney General can find
facts that would support it.  But we are
mindful of the trial court’s unique position for determining such issues:  ‘A trial judge’s superior ability to evaluate
the evidence renders it highly inappropriate for an appellate court to lightly
question his determination to submit an issue to the jury.  A reviewing court certainly cannot do so
where, as here, the trial court’s determination was agreeable to both the
defense and the prosecution.’  (>People v. McKelvy (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d
694, 705 [lead opn. of Kline, P. J.].)

            “Nor
are we convinced the instruction had any bearing on the outcome of the
trial.  It was part of a packet of a
dozen self-defense instructions, some of which were mutually exclusive.  It was obvious to anyone that not all of
those instructions could apply to the case, and the jurors were specifically
instructed they were to ‘Disregard any instruction which applies to facts
determined by you not to exist.’ (CALJIC No. 17.31.)  By all appearances, they understood their
charge in this regard.”

            “Mora
suggests the instruction might have kept the jury from evaluating his
self-defense claim, but we don’t see how. 
This very same argument about the same instruction was made—and
rejected—in People v. Crandell (1988)
46 Cal.3d 833 [(Crandell), overruled
on other grounds in People v. Crayton
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 326, 364-365], where the court concluded, ‘we are confident
the jury was not sidetracked by the correct but irrelevant instruction, which
did not figure in the closing arguments, and we conclude that the giving of the
instruction was harmless error.’ 
[Citations.]  So do we.”  (Fns. omitted.)

            For
several reasons, we have no difficulty in rejecting appellant’s argument—again,
his sole argument on this appeal—that the giving of CALCRIM No. 3472 was
error.  The first reason is that, unlike
the situation in Olguin and >Crandell, the facts here make clear that
the jury could well have found that appellant may have been provoking “a fight
or a quarrel” with George with the intention of trying to see if he could
create enough tension between them to provoke George to take some action which
might justify his taking out, cocking, and then firing the pistol he was
carrying in his waist.  Which is
precisely what happened.  Thus, per his
cousin, Richard Steele, appellant became “kind of . . .
irritated” during the course of his argument with George, an irritation which
may have derived from appellant’s earlier suspicions that George might have
stolen “stuff out of his safe.”

            Hof
testified that he, also, had tried to get appellant to “calm down.”  Neither he nor appellant’s cousin succeeded,
which led to the shooting.  Hof also
testified that, immediately after the shooting, appellant said: “I don’t have
to deal with that nigger no more.  I
killed him.”  This statement is certainly
consistent with appellant having provoked the fight. 

            Thus,
the point of CALCRIM No. 3472 was, unlike the situation in Olguin, directly relevant
here: there was, in fact, evidence in the record that appellant was, at least
in part, provoking “a fight or quarrel” which led to the shooting of
George.  Appellant is thus incorrect when
he argues that “there was no evidence in the record that appellant provoked a
fight with Mr. George as an excuse to use force.”  There may have been no testimony as to
appellant’s motive for behaving
threateningly to George, but there certainly was evidence in the record that
both men were behaving threateningly toward the other.  Indeed, appellant acknowledges such when he
states in his opening brief that several witnesses testified “that the argument
became heated with both Mr. George and appellant very angry and shouting at
each other.”  And, of course, appellant
was the one who was—and apparently always was—armed.

            Further,
the law is clear that: “A party is entitled to a requested instruction if it is
supported by substantial evidence.”  (>People v. Ross (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th
1033, 1049; see also People v. Flannel (1979)
25 Cal.3d 668, 684, superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in >In re Chrisitan S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768,
777 and 5 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal
Trial, § 674, pp. 1040-1041.)

            Lastly,
the holdings of our Supreme Court in Crandell
and of our colleagues in the Fourth District in Olguin are also relevant here: even assuming there were
insufficient factual bases for the inclusion of CALCRIM No. 3472 among the
several instructions given by the court relating to self-defense, appellant
makes no showing nor offers any reasonable argument in his briefs to us as to
why any such error was harmful to his defense in this case.  He does note that the prosecutor alluded,
albeit briefly, to the substance of this instruction, but fails to note that
this reference composed just a few lines in that counsel’s arguments to the
jury.  That argument consumed over 30
pages of the reporter’s transcript, and stressed appellant’s obvious dislike of
his “nigger” neighbor, his behavior toward George on the night in question, and
his oversight of the disposal of George’s remains after the killing.  In short, CALCRIM No. 3472 played an
extremely minimal part of the prosecutor’s argument to the jury, and thus any
error in giving it was clearly harmless. 


>IV. 
DISPOSITION

            The
judgment of conviction is affirmed.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                                                                    _________________________

                                                                                    Haerle,
Acting P.J.

 

 

We concur:

 

 

_________________________

Richman, J.

 

 

_________________________

Brick, J.*

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

            *
Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.