CA Unpub Decisions

Julio Rodriguez challenges the judgment of conviction for the first degree murder of Larry Duran and for possession of a firearm by a felon. (Pen. Code, § 187 & former § 12021, subd. (a)(1).) The evidence against him on both charges was overwhelming, and he demonstrates no error. Respondent correctly identifies a sentencing error with respect to the determinate term for possession of a firearm by a felon. We affirm the judgment and remand the case for resentencing on the possession conviction.

Defendant and appellant Michael Shaun Ranger appeals from his conviction of assault with a deadly weapon causing great bodily injury. He contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury concerning the effect of the victim’s antecedent threats on defendant’s right to self defense. Defendant also contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his trial attorney’s failure to request two pinpoint instructions, one regarding the effect of antecedent threats on the measures taken in self-defense, and the other defining excessive force as “clearly vindictive.” We find no error and conclude that defendant has not established ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant Richard M. Zamarripa appeals from the judgment following his jury conviction of possession of a controlled substance and being under the influence of a controlled substance. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as the result of an illegal search and seizure, and that it abused its discretion in denying his motion to strike his prior strike conviction. We disagree.
Defendant also requests that we review the record of the in camera hearing on his Pitchess[1] motion. Our review indicates that proper procedure was not followed. We conditionally reverse the judgment and remand for a new Pitchess hearing.

Plaintiff and appellant Alan Dale Ridley appeals from a judgment of dismissal following an order sustaining a demurrer in favor of defendant and respondent Bank of America, N.A. (the Bank) in this action arising out of requests for loan modifications. Ridley contends he stated causes of action for fraud, breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent misrepresentation. We conclude he has failed to allege a misrepresentation upon which he relied to his detriment, an enforceable loan modification contract, or outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of decency. Therefore, we affirm.

Defendant Matthew R. Martinez (Martinez) appeals his convictions for attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187)[1] and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)). He contends: (1) the trial court erred when it gave an incomplete and/or erroneous instruction regarding when a mutual combatant or initial aggressor can reclaim the right of self-defense; and (2) the People failed to prove malice in the attempted murder count because there was insufficient evidence that he did not act in imperfect self-defense or heat of passion. We find no error and affirm.

A.R., a former Claremont High School (CHS) student brought an action against the Claremont Unified School District (CUSD), through her guardian ad litem, J.R., for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress alleging that CUSD failed to protect her from sexual victimization and rape by a fellow CHS student known by CUSD to have previously victimized another female student. The trial court granted CUSD’s motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication (summary judgment motion) and A.R. appeals. We reverse on all issues except as to the causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress. As to the other claims, there are triable issues of fact precluding summary adjudication.

Plaintiff has taken this appeal from a judgment in favor of defendant Notre Dame de Namur University (the University) following a trial before the court in his action for mandamus relief for his dismissal from the University’s teaching credential program. He claims the University failed to adhere to its contractual obligation to follow internal procedural rules before dismissing him, denied him procedural and substantive due process rights, and retaliated against him for exercising his free speech rights. We conclude that the University properly followed the procedural rules for dismissal from the “Single Subject Credential Program” (the Program), did not deny plaintiff his procedural and substantive due process rights, and did not act in retaliation for plaintiff’s criticism of the Program. We therefore affirm the judgment.

Appellant Carlos Luis was convicted, following a jury trial, of first degree murder in violation of Penal Code[1] section 187 and second degree fetal murder. The victims were his wife Bertha Luis and her unborn child. The jury found true the special circumstance allegation that appellant committed multiple murders within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a). The trial court sentenced appellant to life without the possibility of parole for the first degree murder plus 15 years to life for the fetal murder. Appellant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the first degree murder conviction. He also contends the trial court erred by admitting expert testimony on appellant’s mental state, admitting hearsay that appellant threatened to kill Bertha’s father, and instructing the jury that appellant could be convicted of second degree murder on the theory that he failed to seek medical help. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

Plaintiff and Appellant Alin Andrade appeals from the judgment entered in favor of Defendant and Respondent Gabriella De La Cerda-Lim following the sustaining of Defendant’s demurrer to the third amended complaint without leave to amend. Defendant is a licensed real estate broker. Defendant allegedly employed a licensed real estate salesperson, Natalie Tibbs, who also is named as a defendant in this action. Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant vicariously liable for Tibbs’ alleged misconduct in connection with Plaintiff’s investment in a real estate “flipping” venture. When Tibbs was hired, Defendant registered the fictitious name “Brookdale Properties” with the Department of Real Estate (DRE), and Defendant and Tibbs conducted business under the fictitious name “Brookdale Properties.” In sustaining Defendant’s demurrer, the trial court concluded that Defendant could not be held vicariously liable for Tibbs’ alleged misconduct after Defendant notified the DRE that she had terminated her affiliation with Brookdale Properties. Because we hold that Defendant’s cancellation of a fictitious business name does not establish, as a matter of law, that Defendant severed her alleged employment relationship with Tibbs, we reverse the judgment.

A jury found Angel Jose Orellana guilty of one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child, four counts of forcible lewd act upon a child, two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child, two counts of sexual penetration by a foreign object, and one count of forcible oral copulation. Orellana appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence that he used force, fear, or duress in all but one count, and that his convictions of two counts of aggravated sexual assault on a child must be reversed, as he was also convicted of continuous sexual abuse. We conclude that the evidence of force, fear, or duress was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. We reverse and remand to the trial court to dismiss the count alleging continuous sexual abuse and to resentence Orellana accordingly. In all other respects, we affirm his conviction.

A jury convicted Anthony Dawayne Moncrea of sexual battery by restraint. (Pen. Code, § 243.4, subd. (a).) On appeal, Moncrea argues the trial court erred in admitting a prior act of sexual assault pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108,[1] failing to instruct in accord with People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143 (Mayberry), and failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor sexual battery. We find the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct on the lesser included offense and reverse.

The People charged defendant Robert Gonzales with the first degree murder of Christopher Ash (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)),[1] with three special circumstances allegations, an allegation of a personal use of a deadly weapon (knife), and a gang enhancement. The jury acquitted him of first degree murder but convicted him of second degree murder. In addition, it found the gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)) to be true, but found the personal use of a knife enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) not to be true. The court sentenced him to a term of 15 years to life.
In this appeal, defendant raises two contentions. The first is that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for second degree murder. The second is that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a new trial based upon a claim of juror misconduct. We find no merit to either contention and therefore affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

This case arises from a multi-vehicle accident, which led to the death of 15-year-old Lauro Alberto Camberos (the decedent). The decedent’s parents, Lauro and Sandra Camberos, and his estate (appellants) sued the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) and one of its school bus drivers (Raymond Lewis) (Lewis) (collectively respondents) for wrongful death. The trial court granted respondents’ motion for nonsuit on the ground that appellants had no expert testimony on causation. We affirm. We also affirm the trial court’s order denying respondents’ motion for attorney fees.