CA Unpub Decisions

Javon Gibbs pled guilty to one count of selling cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)). The parties stipulated to a five-year "split" term, such that Gibbs would serve one year in custody followed by four years of supervised probation. The trial court sentenced Gibbs to the stipulated term, but denied Gibbs's request for placement in a drug treatment program. We affirm the judgment.

Objector and appellant R.H. (mother), the mother of C.R. and E.R. (the twins), appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders entered pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) and section 361, subdivision (c)(1).[1] According to mother, there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that her past drug abuse problems and current methadone treatment posed a substantial risk of harm to the twins. In addition, mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s order removing custody of the twins from her and that there were reasonable means available to protect the twins without removing them from her custody.
We hold that there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings on the jurisdiction and disposition orders. We therefore affirm those orders.

In late 2003 Anthony Salas Aguon was civilly committed to the custody of the California Department of Mental Health (DMH) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq., hereafter the SVPA or the Act) (undesignated statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code) after he was found to be a sexually violent predator (SVP). In 2008 he was again found to be an SVP and was recommitted for an indeterminate term.[1]
Aguon's section 6608 petition
In August 2010 Aguon filed a petition under section 6608 (discussed, post) seeking either (1) an order conditionally releasing him from Coalinga State Hospital (CSH) and the custody of DMH and placing him with "an appropriate forensic conditional release program operated by the state for one year"; or (2) an order unconditionally discharging him from his civil commitment. In support of his petition, Aguon claimed he is "terminally ill" and, as a result of his medical condition and "poor" prognosis, it is "not likely that he would engage in sexually violent criminal behavior, due to his diagnosed mental disorder, while under supervision and treatment in the community," and it is "unlikely [he] would be a danger to the community if he were unconditionally discharged" from his civil commitment.

Lorne R. Nathan pleaded guilty to attempted possession of cocaine base (Pen. Code, § 664; Health & Saf. Code, § 11350) and admitted having a prior strike (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). As stipulated by the parties, the trial court sentenced him to 16 months in prison, of which he had to serve 80 percent. Against this sentence, the trial court awarded him 301 days of presentence custody credit, consisting of 201 days of actual custody and 100 days of conduct credit. The trial court also ordered him to pay various fines and fees, including a $154 criminal justice administration fee (Gov. Code, § 29550.1) (booking fee), a $570 drug program fee (Health & Saf. Code, § 11372.7) and a $190 lab analysis fee (Health & Saf. Code, § 11372.5).
Nathan appeals, contending we must vacate the drug program and booking fees because the trial court failed to determine his ability to pay before imposing them. He also contends he is entitled to additional presentence conduct credits because of amendments to Penal Code section 4019 that took effect after his sentencing hearing. Lastly, he contends we must direct the trial court to modify the abstract of judgment to separately list, along with the statutory basis, any penalty assessments included in the drug program and laboratory fees.
We agree with the latter contention and direct the trial court to modify the abstract of judgment accordingly. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

Norton pleaded guilty and admitted the truth of the allegations. He was guaranteed a sentence of 11 years in state prison.
Norton thereafter brought a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the court denied. Norton was sentenced to a prison term of 11 years—10 years on the carjacking conviction (twice the middle term due to his prior strike), plus one year for being vicariously armed with a firearm.
On appeal Norton asserts that the court erred by (1) failing to appoint new counsel and requiring him to present his motion to withdraw his plea in propria persona when one of the grounds for withdrawing his plea was ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) approving his request to represent himself, without conducting an adequate inquiry under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta), and not advising him that he had the right to newly appointed counsel for his motion to withdraw his plea. We affirm.

In this custody credit case, Santana E. Belmont has been given credit for all time served after he was taken into custody by local authorities in the current case. What makes this case somewhat unusual is the fact that at the time Belmont was put in local custody in the current case, he was serving a prison sentence in a prior case and that prior sentence was later vacated in an unrelated habeas proceeding.
Although it is clear Belmont served more time in the prior case than was lawful, Belmont is not entitled to credit in the current case for any period before he was charged in the current case. Neither the applicable statutes nor logic require we find Belmont was held in custody in the current case during any period prior to commencement of the current case.
We must also reject Belmont's alternative argument that he should be given custody credit in the current case from the time the trial court in the current case sent the prison warden where Belmont was incarcerated an order directing the warden to produce him to local authorities. As we explain, although an order to produce is, as a practical matter, similar to a law enforcement agency "hold" and will likely operate to prevent an inmate's release in the event he is no longer being incarcerated on an earlier conviction, there is nothing in the record here which establishes when the prison received notice of the order to produce Belmont. It is well established the defendant in a criminal proceeding bears the burden of establishing his entitlement to presentence credit, including in this case when the prison received notice of the order to produce. Having failed to show when the prison received notice of the order to produce, Belmont is not entitled to credit for any period before he was actually taken into custody on the new allegations. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

The defendant sexually abused the twin daughters of his girlfriend over a period of more than three years. He also committed a lewd act on a neighbor girl. Convicted by jury of many lewd acts and rape and sentenced to state prison for 19 consecutive indeterminate terms of 15 years to life (an aggregate term of 285 years to life), the defendant appeals.
On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence obtained from his computer hard drive, (2) the court violated his rights to due process and a fair trial by admitting evidence of the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS), (3) the court improperly instructed the jury on CSAAS, (4) the court improperly admitted evidence of uncharged sexual acts on the same victims, (5) admission of uncharged sexual acts to show the defendant’s propensity to commit such acts violated his due process rights, (6) the court improperly allowed lay witnesses to testify concerning their perceptions of the victims’ truthfulness, (7) the cumulative effect of errors requires reversal, (8) the court improperly imposed consecutive sentences for multiple acts committed on a single occasion, (9) the court improperly imposed a 10-year parole term instead of the five-year term under the law existing at the time the defendant committed his crimes, and (10) errors in the abstract of judgment must be corrected.
We conclude that the proper parole period was five years and order the judgment to be modified accordingly. We also conclude that several errors in the abstract of judgment must be corrected. Finding no further prejudicial error, we affirm the judgment as modified and remand for preparation of an amended abstract of judgment.

Promise Hospital of East Los Angeles appeals from the order denying its petition to compel the City of Long Beach to arbitrate a dispute arising from the City’s failure to pay for medical services that the hospital provided to a City employee who was covered under the City’s health insurance plan. We affirm that order because the City was not a party to the contract that contained the disputed arbitration provision and because the exceptions that allow for enforcing such provisions against non-contracting parties do not apply here.

Defendant, Christopher David DeHuff, purports to appeal from a February 24, 2012 postjudgment order denying his motion to quash a detainer. Because the postjudgment order did not appear to be appealable, we issued an order to show cause re: dismissal. We have a duty to raise issues concerning our jurisdiction on our own motion. (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126; Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 398.) We allowed the parties to brief the issue and permitted the matter to be argued. The postjudgment appeal from the denial of the motion to quash is not appealable. (Pen. Code, § 1237, subd. (b); see People v. Hopkins (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 305, 308; People v. Gainer (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 636, 642; People v. Soukup (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 858, 863 disapproved on other grounds in In re Bakke (1986) 42 Cal.3d 84, 88 641; People v. Niren (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 850, 851; 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Appeal, § 59, pp. 304-305.)
The appeal is dismissed.

Following a court trial,[1] defendant and appellant Jhelmax Faria was found guilty in counts 1, 2, and 4 of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211),[2] second degree burglary in count 3 (§ 459), and assault with a firearm in count 5 (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)). The trial court found defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) as to all counts other than count 3.
Defendant was sentenced to state prison for a total term of 17 years 4 months. The trial court imposed the midterm of three years for the robbery in count 1, enhanced by 10 years for the firearm use allegation. A consecutive sentence of one year was imposed for the robbery in count 4, enhanced by three years four months for the firearm use. Concurrent sentences were imposed in counts 2 and 3, and the sentence in count 5 was stayed under section 654.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment. This court appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. On June 5, 2012, appointed appellate counsel filed a brief raising no issues but requesting this court to independently review the record for arguable contentions under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Defendant was advised by letter on June 5, 2012, of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days. The 30-day period has lapsed, and no brief has been filed by defendant.

Minor Conner S. appeals from the juvenile court’s order of December 21, 2011, declaring him a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, after sustaining an allegation he committed the crime of resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer in the performance of his duties (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)),[1] a misdemeanor. He was placed home on probation. Minor contends substantial evidence does not support the sustained allegation. We affirm the judgment.

Objector and appellant R.H. (mother), the mother of C.R. and E.R. (the twins), appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders entered pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) and section 361, subdivision (c)(1).[1] According to mother, there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that her past drug abuse problems and current methadone treatment posed a substantial risk of harm to the twins. In addition, mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s order removing custody of the twins from her and that there were reasonable means available to protect the twins without removing them from her custody.
We hold that there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings on the jurisdiction and disposition orders. We therefore affirm those orders.

Defendant Jorge L. Rodriguez was convicted by jury of one count of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459). On appeal, defendant argues there was insufficient evidence that he had the specific intent to commit a felony when he entered the victims’ home. Because there was substantial evidence that defendant entered through a crawlspace and ransacked the home before he was interrupted by neighbors and police, we affirm.

This is an appeal from a decision to grant the petition of respondents Darlene L. Latty and Rebecca Kinsfather (by and through her guardian ad litem, Lythan Gage) for reformation of The Rufus T. Crosslin and Mary L. Crosslin Irrevocable Family Trust (trust), and to deny the petition of appellant William J. Crosslin to enforce a settlement agreement related to the trust that he entered into with respondent Latty. Appellant is the son of Rufus and Mary Crosslin (hereinafter, parents or settlors/trustees), the sister of respondent Latty and the uncle of respondent Kinsfather. He challenges the trial court’s grant of the reformation petition and refusal to enforce his and Latty’s court -approved settlement agreement on the ground that the court’s actions undermine his parents’ clear intentions as settlors/trustees that he should be permitted to reside in the family home upon their deaths. For reasons set forth below, we affirm.