In re J.G.
Filed 10/8/13 In re J.G. CA1/1
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
In re J.G.,
a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.G.,
Defendant and Appellant.
A137262
(Solano
County
Super. Ct.
No. J38856)
J.G.
(minor) was found to have committed battery on a person with whom he had a
dating relationship largely on the testimony of a witness who saw him beating a
woman. The only evidence of a personal
relationship between minor and the victim was minor’s own statement to police
that the woman was his “girlfriend.â€
Minor contends the doctrine of corpus delicti required the prosecution
to introduce evidence of the nature of the relationship independent of his
statement. Finding no such requirement,
we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In
a petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602,
subdivision (a) on October 23, 2012,
minor was alleged to have committed misdemeanor battery on a person with whom
he had a previous dating relationship (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (e)(1)).
Only
two witnesses testified at trial. The first,
a bystander, said he was driving in Fairfield
when he spotted minor sitting on top of a female, hitting her with both
hands. In one hand minor held a cell
phone, while the other was a closed fist.
The witness estimated minor took from four to six swings at the victim,
who was struggling to get out from beneath him.
When the witness stopped his car and approached them, minor ran
off. The “frantic†victim was crying and
shaking, had bleeding wounds, and complained of headaches. The witness called the police.
The
second witness, a police officer, testified she located minor after having been
alerted to the assault. After minor had
been detained, he said to the police, “Why are you guys stopping me? We were just in a fight. My girlfriend and I were just arguing.â€
Minor’s
counsel argued that because the victim had not testified, there was no evidence
the contact between them was nonconsensual.
He also contended there was “insufficient evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the nature of the relationship.â€
The
juvenile court found the allegations true.
Minor was continued as a ward of the court and placed in the New
Foundations program.
DISCUSSION
Minor
contends the jurisdictional allegations
are unsupported by the evidence because there was no independent evidence of
the nature of his relationship with the victim, as required by the doctrine of
corpus delicti.
“In
every criminal trial, the prosecution must prove the corpus delicti,
or the body of the crime itself—i.e., the fact of injury, loss, or harm, and
the existence of a criminal agency as its cause. In California,
. . . the prosecution cannot satisfy this burden by relying exclusively
upon the extrajudicial statements, confessions, or admissions of the
defendant.†(People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1168–1169 (
independent of the defendant’s statements is “to assure that ‘the accused is
not admitting to a crime that never occurred.’ †(People
v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 301 (Jones).) “ ‘ “The independent proof may be
by circumstantial evidence [citation], and it need not be beyond a reasonable
doubt. A slight or prima facie showing,
permitting the reasonable inference that a crime was committed, is
sufficient.†’ †(
1083, 1127–1128 (Gutierrez).)
The
“corpus†of a crime is not synonymous with the “elements†of the crime. (People
v. Hawkins (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 675, 680.) The prosecution, for example, need not prove
the identity of the perpetrator by independent evidence, nor is independent
evidence required to demonstrate the degree of a homicide. (Ibid.) “There is no requirement of independent
evidence ‘of every physical act constituting an element of an offense,’ so long
as there is some slight or prima facie showing of injury, loss, or harm by a
criminal agency. [Citation.] In every case, once the necessary quantum of
independent evidence is present, the defendant’s extrajudicial statements may
then be considered for their full value to strengthen the case on all
issues.†(Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1171.)
A
clear illustration of the distinction between the corpus of a crime and its
elements is found in Jones, supra, 17
Cal.4th 279. The victim in that decision was shot in
the head and left to die by a roadside.
Her underclothing had been removed, and residual semen was found on her
genitals and anus. (Id. at p. 291.)
Although there was no physical evidence that the victim had engaged in
oral sexual acts, the defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting forced
oral copulation because he had admitted the crime to police. On appeal, the defendant argued for a
reversal of this conviction under the doctrine of corpus delicti. In affirming the trial court’s decision to
overturn a magistrate’s dismissal of the charge, the court held: “[Penal Code] Section 288a, subdivision (a),
defines this crime as ‘the act of copulating the mouth of one person with the
sexual organ or anus of another person.’ [¶] Keeping in mind the low threshold
of proof required to satisfy the corpus delicti rule,
we conclude that the magistrate erred in finding this low threshold was not met
by the evidence presented at the preliminary examination. The state of the victim’s clothing (no
underwear or shoes) and the forensic evidence . . . indicates
multiple sexual acts occurred. That the
victim was forcibly abducted, beaten, shot in the head, and left by the side of
the road for dead gives rise to an inference that the sexual activity that
occurred was against the victim’s will.
This circumstantial evidence of multiple forcible sexual acts
sufficiently establishes the requisite prima facie showing of both (i) an
injury, loss or harm, and (ii) the involvement of a criminal agency. [¶]
. . . [¶] . . . [W]e have never interpreted the corpus delicti rule so strictly that independent evidence of every
physical act constituting an element of an offense is necessary. Instead, there need only be independent
evidence establishing a slight or prima facie showing of some injury, loss or
harm, and that a criminal agency was involved.â€
(Id. at pp. 302,
303.) In short, the court affirmed the
conviction despite the lack of any independent evidence of the primary element
of the crime, sexual contact with the victim’s mouth. Other cases have similarly held the corpus
delicti doctrine does not require independent
evidence of penetration for a conviction of rape (People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 368–369) or knowledge and
intent for a conviction of aiding and abetting (Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1128).
The
bystander’s testimony left little doubt minor had committed a crime. He said minor struck the victim repeatedly as
she struggled to escape and appeared to have inflicted wounds. When the witness approached, minor ran away,
suggesting awareness of the wrongfulness of his conduct. This testimony constituted more than adequate
independent evidence of “both (i) an injury, loss or harm, and (ii) the
involvement of a criminal agency.†(
p. 302.) The prosecution having
provided independent evidence of the corpus of a crime, “the [minor’s]
extrajudicial statements [could] then be considered for their full value to
strengthen the case on all issues.†(
In
considering the requirements of corpus delicti, it is noteworthy that minor’s
statement to police did not constitute the admission of a crime. He merely told the police the victim was his
girlfriend. As a result, there was no
risk minor would be convicted, solely on the basis of his statement, of a crime
that never occurred. Rather, minor’s
relationship with the victim was criminally material only because it affected
the potential penalty.
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2] It was in the nature of a sentencing
enhancement, which need not be supported by independent evidence. (People
v. Shoemake (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 243, 252, 256.) In effect, the fact of a dating relationship
“does no more than aggravate the penalty for the underlying offense†and
therefore required no independent evidence.
(People v. Miranda (2008) 161
Cal.App.4th 98, 102.)
Minor
relies largely on cases discussing the concept of corpus delicti in deciding
which factual issues must be submitted to the jury. (E.g., People
v. Henderson (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 349, 358–359; People v. Jones (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 710, 716.) Because the cases were decided prior to
virtually all the decisions cited above and employ the concept of corpus
delicti in a different context, we find them unhelpful in determining which
issues must be proven by independent evidence.
Even
if minor’s contention had substantive merit, we would find it forfeited. As minor acknowledges, his counsel did not
object on grounds of corpus delicti in the juvenile court. We are persuaded by the reasoning of
26 Cal.App.4th 1098 (Martinez)
and People v. Sally (1993) 12
Cal.App.4th 1621, 1628 (Sally) that
an objection was required to preserve the issue for appeal because “ ‘[i]t
may well be that “proof of the corpus delicti was available and at hand during
the trial, but in the absence of [a] specific objection calling for such proof
it was omitted.†’ †(
Minor
contends the Supreme Court rejected Martinez
and Sally in footnote 8 of
the contrary, the Alvarez footnote
stated only that the Supreme Court had never addressed the particular
forfeiture issue raised here.
name="_ftnref3" title="">[3] Further, although the Alvarez footnote claimed that subsequent Court of Appeal decisions
addressing forfeiture were “split,†the two decisions addressing the particular
issue raised here, Martinez and
trial court to preserve a claim of insufficiency of independent evidence. The differing case cited by
issue, the requirement for an objection to preserve a claim that the court failed
to give a corpus delicti instruction. (
appellate decisions are unanimous in requiring objection below.
Finally,
minor contends his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to
object on grounds of sufficiency of the independent evidence under the corpus
delicti doctrine.
“ ‘ “ ‘Reviewing courts will reverse convictions [on
direct appeal] on the ground of inadequate counsel only if the record on appeal
affirmatively discloses that counsel had no rational tactical purpose for [his
or her] act or omission.’ â€
[Citation.]’ [Citation.] If the record on appeal ‘ “ ‘sheds
no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged[,]
. . . unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to
provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation,’ the
claim on appeal must be rejected.†’ †(People
v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 876.)
We
cannot say on the record before us that there could be no satisfactory
explanation for counsel’s failure to raise the issue. In particular, we cannot rule out the
possibility that counsel refrained from making the objection because it could
have led the prosecution to introduce additional, more damaging evidence of the
assault.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
_________________________
Margulies,
Acting P.J.
We concur:
_________________________
Dondero, J.
_________________________
Sepulveda, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1]
Proof of criminal agency requires evidence from which
it might be concluded that the injury or harm resulted from the intentional act of a human being. (People
v. Culton (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 363, 367.)
name="_ftn2" title="">[2]
Under Penal Code section 243, subdivision (a), the penalty for battery is a
fine and six months in jail. When the
battery is committed against a person with whom the defendant has a dating
relationship, however, the jail term is increased to a year. (Id., subd.
(e)(1).)
