CA Unpub Decisions

Petitioner and plaintiff Sylvia Ingoglia (plaintiff) is one of the four plaintiffs who filed a class action against real parties in interest and defendants Sara Lee Fresh, Inc., Sara Lee Corporation, Grupo Bimbo S.A.B. De C.V, Bimbo Bakeries USA Inc. and Earthgrains Distribution, LLC (collectively defendants). Out of three petitioners, two of the plaintiffs settled their case with defendants shortly before the oral argument in this matter, leaving just plaintiff Sylvia Ingoglia as the remaining petitioner.
Plaintiff alleged she was an employee denied wage and hour benefits under the Labor Code. Plaintiff also alleged that if she were an independent contractor, defendants violated state antitrust laws by setting the price at which plaintiff was required to sell baked goods to those stores and by imposing territorial restrictions. Plaintiff alleged in her 12th and 13th causes of action violations of Business and Professions Code section 16720, California’s antitrust law (Cartwright Act), and in her 15th cause of action violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 (Unfair Competition Law).

Cody Bleichner appeals from a judgment of conviction after a jury found him guilty of three counts of first degree burglary. For two of the counts, the jury also found true allegations that another person other than an accomplice was present in the residence during the commission of the burglaries. Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), appellant’s counsel filed an opening brief requesting that this court review the record and determine whether any arguable issues exist on appeal. We have reviewed the entire record and find no arguable issues. We therefore affirm the judgment. We do find however, that the amended abstract of judgment contains a clerical error, and incorrectly states the conviction on count 3 included a finding that the burglary was committed while another person was present, so a corrected abstract of judgment must be issued as provided herein.

Appellant, Robert A., a minor, was declared a ward of the court and placed home on probation. On appeal, he contends the juvenile delinquency court erred in (1) finding that he had violated Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a) because sufficient evidence did not show that he had the specific sexual intent to commit the crime; and (2) setting a maximum period of physical confinement. As we shall explain, although sufficient evidence supports the conclusion that appellant injured the four-year-old victim and was guilty of a battery, the record does not support a true finding beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had the requisite specific sexual intent to violate Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a). Accordingly, we reverse.

The trial court sustained without leave to amend the defendant’s demurrer to the plaintiff’s first amended complaint for gender and age discrimination and ordered plaintiff’s complaint dismissed. The plaintiff appeals. We reverse.

Gabriel Orozco appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by a jury of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)),[1] possession of concentrated cannabis (Heath & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (a)) and possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). Orozco’s sole contention on appeal is his presentence custody credits should be corrected. We affirm the judgment as modified.

Pasqual Martinez appeals from the judgment entered on his conviction of first degree murder. Before this court the appellant claims that the trial court erred when it failed to grant his motion for a mistrial after a police detective testified during the trial that appellant had been “detained” by police on one occasion for an unrelated gang incident several months before the murder occurred. As we shall explain, appellant has failed to demonstrate prejudicial error as to this claim. The reference to his detention was brief, ambiguous and non-responsive to the question posed, and any error was harmless in light of the other evidence of appellant’s guilt presented during the course of the trial. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Ismael Bermudo filed suit against Farhad Tahmassebi and Euro American Auto Co., Inc. (Euro; collectively defendants) for damages arising out of Bermudo’s purchase of an automobile. In brief, although defendants were obligated to pay off the balance of a loan used to finance Bermudo’s trade-in vehicle, they did not pay off the loan. As a result, Bermudo was subject to collections efforts by the bank holding the loan, his credit score declined, and he was forced to file suit against the bank and defendants. Following a bench trial, the court entered judgment in Bermudo’s favor and awarded him $31,760 in damages. On appeal, defendants argue insufficient evidence supported the court’s liability findings on claims for fraud and unlawful business practices, and the damages award was not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm the trial court judgment.

Kahtan Bayati, Trustee of the Kahtan Bayati Living Trust, dated June 17, 1997, (Bayati) appeals an order imposing $6,000 in discovery sanctions against him in favor of respondent Town Square M. Properties, LLC (Town Square).[1] Bayati contends that the imposition of sanctions was unreasonable and constituted an abuse of discretion. We conclude that the order awarding sanctions is not appealable and dismiss the appeal.

Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a).) Appellant contends the trial court failed to excuse a juror for cause and there was insufficient evidence to support the judgment. His contentions are meritless.

Appellant Robert Thomas Giles appeals from the judgment upon his conviction for grand theft after he pled no contest to the charge. Appellant argues that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel during the negotiation phase of his plea deal. More specifically, appellant contends that his counsel: (1) failed to challenge the sufficiency of the charges; (2) failed to present evidence that could have mitigated his sentence and could have possibly resulted in a reduction of the charges against him; (3) did not file a written discovery motion; and (4) failed to file a motion to exclude appellant’s incriminating statement to police. As we shall explain, there is no evidence in the record on appeal as to why counsel acted (or failed to act) in the manner which appellant complains about on appeal. Appellant has thus failed to carry his burden to prove ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Appellant Steven Lawson appeals from the judgment upon his conviction and sentence for one count of corporal injury to a cohabitant. Before this court, appellant challenges only his sentence, asserting that the court committed two errors in sentencing him. First he claims that in sentencing him under the “Three Strikes Law,” the court relied upon a prior conviction appellant sustained in Alabama for “third degree robbery” that does not qualify under California law as a “strike” and/or a serious felony prior conviction, under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1). Second, appellant asserts that the trial court calculated and awarded appellant conduct credits under the wrong section, namely, Penal Code section 2933.1. He claims that his conduct credits should have been determined pursuant to Penal Code section 4019. Respondent concedes the matter must be remanded as to both sentencing issues. We agree, and accordingly, appellant’s sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.

F.V. appeals from an order finding that he committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (id., § 245, subd. (a)(4))[1] and ordering that he remain a dependent of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The court placed F.V. in the camp-community placement program for six months, with a maximum term of confinement of six years. On appeal, F.V. argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings that he committed robbery and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. We affirm.

The issue in this case is whether a father’s sexual abuse of his step-daughter supports a determination that his son is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in the absence of evidence that the father sexually abused or otherwise mistreated him. Our Supreme Court recently affirmed a jurisdictional finding on facts very similar to those before us and disapproved a line of Court of Appeal cases relied on by Father. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 775-781 (I.J.); see also Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services v. Superior Court (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 962, 963-970.) We conclude that I.J. is dispositive of the issue and affirm the jurisdictional finding.
The minor’s mother also appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence of her failure to protect her son, and contending that the juvenile court erred in removing the child from her custody. We see no error in the finding or order and so affirm.

Masood Mahmood sued Bank of America, N.A. (the Bank) after the Bank refused his demand for payment of approximately $325,000 from an account opened by his deceased brother in which plaintiff claimed a joint interest. The trial court ruled on summary adjudication that plaintiff had presented no evidence to support his contention that he was a joint owner of the account. Plaintiff contends on appeal that the trial court erred by excluding admissible evidence to support the claim and improperly granted the Bank’s summary judgment motion. We concur with the trial court that plaintiff failed to establish that there was a disputed issue of material fact regarding the account’s ownership, and so affirm the judgment of dismissal.