CA Unpub Decisions

In this case defendant Judith D. Andrews drove a three year old and a 10 month old in her car without car seats. The information charged defendant with two counts of felony child endangerment, but the information described the offenses as misdemeanor child endangerment (felony child endangerment is that likely to produce great bodily injury or death but the misdemeanor offense omits that requirement). The jury instruction similarly listed the elements only for misdemeanor child endangerment and the jury so found. At sentencing, the trial court reduced the convictions to misdemeanor child endangerment and placed defendant on four years’ informal probation.
We affirm.

Defendants and appellants Alex Ortega and Richard Abelar appeal their convictions for second degree murder, and appellant Andrew Sabo appeals his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, arising from an incident in which the trio fought with and killed a rival gang member. Ortega and Abelar were sentenced to 15 years to life in prison, and Sabo was sentenced to 11 years.

Aaron P. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating his parental rights to his young sons Justin P. and Simon P. (minors). (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.)[1] Father contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his request for a bonding study and erred in finding the beneficial relationship exception to termination of parental rights did not apply. We find no error and shall affirm.

Deborah H., the mother of 17-year-old Luke H., appeals from the findings and orders of the Sacramento County Juvenile Court adjudging Luke its dependent, removing him from mother’s custody, placing him with nonrelated extended family member (NREFM) Catherine A., and designating her, rather than mother, as the holder of Luke’s educational rights.
On appeal, mother contends the juvenile court’s order designating Catherine A. as the holder of Luke’s educational rights was an abuse of discretion. We shall affirm the findings and orders.

According to the factual basis for the plea, defendant entered the attached garage of John Kotarsky’s home on September 5, 2010, with the intent to commit larceny. When Kotarsky confronted defendant in the garage, defendant departed.
Defendant pleaded guilty to first degree burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459.)[1] He admitted a prior strike and a prior prison term. (§§ 1170.12, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced him to the stipulated term of nine years in prison.

A fight in the parking lot of a bowling alley ended in a stabbing. A jury convicted 17-year-old defendant James McFadden of assault with a knife (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and found he inflicted great bodily injury on his victim (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)). Sentenced to five years in prison, defendant appeals. He claims prosecutorial misconduct, instructional error, and error in the trial court’s imposition of certain fees. As we explain, we find no error and shall affirm.

The minor A.C. entered an admission to one of four allegations in a petition, was adjudged a ward of the court within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602,[1] and was granted probation. He appeals. He contends that the matter must be reversed and remanded because the juvenile court failed to conduct a hearing on his suitability for deferred entry of judgment (DEJ). He also challenges the $227.50 in penalty assessments as unauthorized and the 10 percent collection fee as having not been orally imposed but added by the clerk. We conclude that the minor’s conduct effectively rejected DEJ and that the juvenile court was excused from making a suitability determination. The minor’s contentions with respect to the assessments and fee are also rejected.

Brothers Ronald, Reginald and James Powell, and sister Anne Maretti, were involved in various legal disputes regarding the estate of their mother, Mary Powell.[1] Ronald, Reginald and James subsequently entered into a settlement agreement (agreement) providing, among other things, that (1) Ronald would pay $225,000 to Reginald, James, Anne, and the law firm Armstrong & Associates (Armstrong law firm);[2] (2) certain estate items would be given to specified siblings; (3) Ronald would receive the remaining estate assets; (4) the various legal actions would be dismissed; and (5) any disputes regarding the agreement would be submitted to mediation and then to binding arbitration.

The People filed a petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) alleging that Alfredo D. committed the offenses of possession of burglary tools and receiving stolen property. (Pen. Code, §§ 466; 496, subd. (a).) The juvenile court dismissed the possession charge and sustained the petition for receiving stolen property. We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant, Diego Vega Castro, of: attempted robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211, count 1)[1]; second degree commercial burglary (§ 459, count 2); controlled substance possession (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a), count 3); and second degree robbery (§ 211, count 4). The jury found defendant used a knife in the commission of the attempted robbery. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court struck the knife use enhancement and sentenced defendant to three years in state prison. We modify the judgment and affirm as modified.

Defendant, Sheila Gomez, appeals from a January 18, 2013 order partially denying her motion for return of property. We affirm the order.
On June 28, 2012, defendant was charged with six counts: second degree commercial burglary of Best Buy in El Segundo (Pen. Code, § 459); petty theft of Best Buy in El Segundo (Pen. Code, § 484, subd. (a)); receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a); possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine (Health & Safety Code, § 11377, subd. (a); second degree commercial burglary of Best Buy in Hawthorne (Pen. Code, § 459); and petty theft of Best Buy in Hawthorne (Pen. Code, § 484, subd. (a)). The preliminary hearing transcript indicated defendant was involved in a fraudulent effort to return speakers to a store.
On July 13, 2012, defendant pled no contest to second degree commercial burglary. The remaining counts were dismissed. Defendant was placed on a 3-year formal probation on condition she serve 365 days in jail. Defendant received 36 days of presentence credit consisting of 18 day in actual custody and 18 days for conduct credit. In addition, defendant was ordered to pay a $40 court operations assessment and a $30 criminal conviction assessment.

Following a jury trial, appellant was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). She was granted probation pursuant to Proposition 36.
The facts underlying the crime may be briefly stated as appellant merely requests we review the trial court’s in camera hearing conducted pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). Simply put, appellant was observed by a sheriff’s deputy stumbling down the street. The deputy watched as appellant placed a small baggie in her sock. The baggie contained methamphetamine. Appellant testified in her defense that the deputy lied about finding drugs on her person.
In response to appellant’s Pitchess motion, the trial court found the defense was entitled to an in camera hearing to review any civilian complaints in the deputy’s personnel record that alleged the arresting deputy falsified reports or planted evidence. After conducting the review, the trial court found no discoverable information.

The jury convicted defendant and appellant Markus Pierre in count 1of attempted murder (Pen. Code §§ 664, 187 subd. (a)),[1] in count 2 of first degree burglary (§ 459), in count 3 of aggravated mayhem (§ 205), and in count 4 of criminal threats (§ 422).[2] The jury found that defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon in counts 1-3 (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The jury found not true the allegation in count 1 that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. The trial court found true the allegation that defendant served a prior prison term (§667.5, subd. (b)) as to counts 1-4.
The trial court sentenced defendant to seven years to life on count 3, plus one year for each weapon use and prior prison term enhancement for a total of nine years to life in state prison. The court imposed sentences as to counts 1, 2, and 4 but stayed the sentences pursuant to section 654.
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing a juror from the case and that there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction for aggravated mayhem. We affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff and appellant David Oakes appeals from a judgment of dismissal in favor of defendant and respondent Jeffrey Gray Loppnow[1] in this personal injury action. Oakes contends that: 1) Jeffrey waived the statute of limitations defense by citing an incorrect code section in his answer; 2) the trial court erred in determining the merits of Jeffrey’s statute of limitations defense based solely on evidence submitted in connection with the motion to bifurcate trial; 3) there is no substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding the relation-back doctrine is inapplicable, because Oakes knew the identity of the driver at the time he filed his lawsuit; 4) the trial court abused its discretion in finding Mercury Insurance Group and defense counsel owed no duty to Oakes to provide information about other potential defendants; 5) and the trial court erred in finding Oakes’s property damage claim was time-barred as well.
We conclude Jeffrey’s failure to specify the applicable statute of limitations waived the defense. Therefore, we reverse the judgment and remand for trial.