CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant, Dexter Carter, appeals from an amended judgment on a special verdict awarding attorney fees to plaintiff, Bill Henderson. The award of attorney fees followed a favorable plaintiff’s verdict in a case litigated pursuant to title 42 United States Code section 1983 (“section 1983”).[1] Plaintiff was awarded attorney fees of $109,977. Plaintiff eventually sought $549,885 in attorney fees. Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by not further reducing or denying plaintiff’s award of attorney fees. We affirm the amended judgment.

Defendants and appellants Alex Ortega and Richard Abelar appeal their convictions for second degree murder, and appellant Andrew Sabo appeals his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, arising from an incident in which the trio fought with and killed a rival gang member. Ortega and Abelar were sentenced to 15 years to life in prison, and Sabo was sentenced to 11 years.

In his petition for an extraordinary writ, Herbert A. (Father) challenges a February 2, 2012 jurisdiction finding and a March 5, 2012 order setting a permanency planning hearing for July 2, 2012 as to his children Lorenzo A. and E.A. We deny the petition because substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that Father’s sexual abuse of his stepdaughter J.F.[1] presented a substantial risk to his minor son Lorenzo and minor daughter E.A.

The Government Claims Act requires that claims for damages against local public entities be presented to the responsible public entity before a lawsuit is filed; failure to present a claim for personal injury within “six months after the accrual of the cause of action” bars a lawsuit against the public entity. (Gov. Code, §§ 911.2, subd. (a), 905, 945.4.) The question in this case is whether plaintiff Angel Martinez alleged facts sufficient to invoke the delayed discovery rule for accrual of his cause of action for medical negligence, so that his tort claim against defendant Antelope Valley Hospital District, a public entity, may be deemed timely filed for pleading purposes. The trial court ruled that he did not, concluding that plaintiff “failed to meet [his] burden to allege the circumstances surrounding the discovery that Plaintiff’s injuries may have been attributed to Defendant and that said discovery was not a failure to investigate or act diligently.”

Daniel J. (born in 1997) and Christopher G. (born in 2005) are the children of Jessica M. (Mother). On February 1, 2012, at a hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26,[1] the court found, inter alia, that Christopher could not be safely returned to Mother’s custody and was adoptable, terminating her parental rights as to Christopher. Daniel appeals the orders made with respect to Christopher. We affirm.

Appellant Jerome Leventhal Accountancy Corporation and respondent David B. Newman, CPA, Inc., are owned and operated by Jerome Leventhal and David B. Newman, respectively.[1] Leventhal appeals from a money judgment in Newman’s favor. He contends the court erred in (1) enforcing a settlement agreement the parties signed as a result of mediation, (2) denying Leventhal’s cross-complaint, and (3) computing Newman’s damages. We affirm the judgment, but reverse the damage award in part.

A jury convicted appellant, Danny Pinon, of one count of short-barreled shotgun or rifle activity in violation of Penal Code section 12020, subdivision (a)(1), one count of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of Penal Code section 12021, subdivision (a)(1), and one count of possession of a controlled substance in violation of Health & Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a)(3). Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for self-representation and when it allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence of a second gun—namely, a .22-caliber rifle. As we shall explain, appellant failed to demonstrate sufficient cause to substitute his counsel on the eve of trial, and therefore the court did not err in rejecting his request. In addition, although evidence of a second gun should not have been admitted at trial, appellant has not shown he suffered prejudice as a result of the error. Consequently, we affirm the judgment.

Lorena L. (Mother) is the mother of George and P. In August 2011, after George and P. were placed in the custody of their father, Jorge L. (Father), the juvenile court ordered conjoint counseling and monitored visitation for Mother and terminated its jurisdiction. Mother appeals. We affirm.

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of Gloria F. (mother) and John M. (father) with respect to their son, Tristan. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)[1] Mother appeals, arguing that: (1) the order terminating parental rights must be reversed because the beneficial relationship exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) is applicable; (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her request for a bonding study; (3) the juvenile court failed to consider Tristan’s wishes; and (4) the juvenile court’s written findings and orders contained a mistaken finding that visitation with Mother is detrimental. We affirm.

On the afternoon of April 26, 2011, the minor D.S., and his companions, H.M. and an adult male,[1] approached Jacob V. and Preston Dupree Banks, who were sitting on a hiking trail in Riverside County. The minor and his two companions, physically restrained Jacob and Banks and repeatedly struck each of them in the face, before taking Banks’s wallet and cell phone and Jacob’s Sony Playstation Portable. D.S. was later arrested by Riverside County Sheriff’s Deputies.

The parents of S.U. and K.T. appeal from orders declaring the children dependents of the court and removing them from their parents’ custody. They contend that there is insufficient evidence to show that abuse or neglect on their part caused “non-accidental” injury to K.T., or placed his brother S.U. in danger of similar harm, or that the children should be removed from their home. They also contend that the court failed to formulate an adequate reunification plan.
We affirm the jurisdictional order as to both children. We affirm the dispositional order removing K.T. from the parents’ custody; for the reasons explained below we reverse the dispositional order as to S.U.

Andre J. Cohen (Cohen) appeals the summary judgment entered in favor of Melvin Morris (Morris). Cohen brought this lawsuit seeking damages resulting from the breach of two purported oral agreements: a Partnership Agreement and a Draw Agreement. After these agreements were allegedly breached, the parties entered into a General Agreement, which provided that upon payment of $300,000 from Morris to Cohen, “all parties [would] be satisfied” and owe each other nothing. Morris obtained summary judgment on the basis that the clear and unambiguous terms of the General Agreement settled any and all claims between the parties. We affirm.

A jury convicted Rafael Martinez-Berumen (appellant) of carrying a concealed dirk or dagger in violation of Penal Code section 12020, subdivision (a)(4).[1] In a separate trial, the court found that he had suffered a prior “strike” conviction within the meaning of section 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d) and 667, subdivisions (b) through (i). He was sentenced to four years in prison. On appeal, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering counsel to reopen closing statements after commencement of jury deliberations in response to the jury’s inquiries. He also contends that this court must independently review the trial court’s in camera hearing on his Pitchess motion for pretrial discovery. Finally, he contends that the trial court incorrectly calculated presentence custody credits. We order the abstract of judgment to be modified to reflect the correct presentence custody credits but otherwise affirm.

Robert Zamora appeals a judgment following conviction of first degree murder, with findings that he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim, and committed the murder during a robbery. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, 12022, subd. (b)(1), 12022.7, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A).)[1] We strike the three-year sentence for personal infliction of great bodily injury, and modify the sentence to reflect a one-year determinate term for personal use of a deadly weapon, but otherwise affirm.