In re Alfredo D.
Filed 9/11/13 In re Alfredo D. CA2/8
California Rules of Court, rule
8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
EIGHT
In re ALFREDO
D., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
B246998
(Los Angeles
County
Super Ct.
No. YJ37108)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ALFREDO D.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior
Court of
County. Wayne C.
Denton, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Stephen
Borgo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant.
Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Stacy
S. Schwartz, Deputy Attorneys General, Attorneys for Respondent.
______________________________
The People
filed a petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) alleging that Alfredo D.
committed the offenses of possession of
burglary tools and receiving stolen
property. (Pen. Code, §§ 466;
496, subd. (a).) The juvenile court
dismissed the possession charge and sustained the petition for receiving stolen
property. We affirm.
FACTS
At
approximately 2:00 a.m., police
officers responded to reports of individuals checking car door handles and
entering a Ford Explorer. Upon arriving
at the scene, the officers found four individuals inside the car. Alfredo was in the front passenger seat, another
person was sitting in the seat behind him, and two others were lying down in
the trunk area. The officers detained
all four individuals, searched the car, and found a flashlight, a wire-cutter,
a pair of pliers, GPS systems, skateboards, and computers inside the car. Additionally, the police found a removable
center console located in the front passenger side seat, which contained a
camera, sunglasses, business card, and the registration information of John
Svetlik.
Svetlik
lived down the street from where the police found the silver Explorer. The police informed Svetlik about the items
they found in Alfredo’s possession.
Svetlik said the items belonged to him and that they were in his car
when he checked it at 3:00 p.m. that
afternoon. He then checked his car,
discovered that the door had been opened, and the items found in the center
console were missing from the vehicle.
A petition
alleging the offenses noted above was filed.
At the adjudication, the People presented evidence establishing the
facts previously summarized. Alfredo
testified that the Explorer belonged to his friend, Crystal, who used to be his
neighbor in Long Beach.
was not called as a witness. Alfredo
said he could not get in touch with her prior to the court date. He claimed that he ran into Crystal
while he was walking around his neighborhood at approximately 8:00 p.m. that evening. She proposed that they “cruise around.†After dropping off Crystal’s
friend in Wilmington, they had
planned to go to Redondo Beach. However, at around midnight, Crystal
drove to where the police eventually found the car. She told Alfredo that she was going to see a
friend and that she would return shortly.
She never returned. Alfredo
testified that he fell asleep in the car after 15 minutes, and awoke to the
police car’s headlights. Alfredo claimed
that he never left the vehicle and was not involved in taking any
property. He did not address how
the stolen items came to be next to him inside the vehicle.
DISCUSSION
Alfredo
argues the evidence was not sufficient to support the juvenile court’s judgment
that he knew the property in his possession was stolen. We disagree.
“On appeal,
we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to
determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence . . . from which a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.†(People
v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 66.)
This standard of review applies to juvenile cases as well as those in
which the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence. (In re
Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809; People
v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.)
In order to be convicted of
receiving stolen property, it must be shown that (1) the property found in the
possession of the accused was acquired by means of theft or extortion; (2) the
accused received, concealed or withheld such property from its owners; and (3)
the accused knew that the property was stolen.
(People v. Siegfried (1967) 249
Cal.App.2d 489, 493.) “Knowledge that
property was stolen can seldom be proved by direct evidence and resort must
often be made to circumstantial evidence.â€
(People v. Vann (1974) 12
Cal.3d 220, 224.) As to the
circumstantial evidence, “‘[p]ossession of recently stolen property is so
incriminating that to warrant conviction there need only be, in addition to
possession, slight corroboration in the form of statements or conduct of the
defendant tending to show his guilt.
[Citations.]’†(
This corroboration can take the form of an unsatisfactory explanation of
the possession or by suspicious circumstances.
(People v. McFarland (1962) 58
Cal.2d 748, 754.)
Alfredo does not contest that he was in
possession of the stolen property just hours after the items were stolen. As a result, we need only look to whether
there was sufficient evidence to corroborate that Alfredo knew that the
property was stolen. We find there
is sufficient evidence.
People v.
Peters (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 75 (Peters) is instructive. In
that case, police searched the defendant’s car after he was arrested for
robbing a restaurant. (
check-book, guarantee card, license and medical identification card belonging
to individuals who had each been robbed on previous occasions. (Ibid.) While the defendant admitted to being in
possession of the items, he claimed someone else placed the items in his car
and that the circumstances were insufficient to prove that he had knowledge
that the items were stolen. (
prove knowledge because the items were found in the defendant’s immediate
vicinity behind the sun visor of his car.
The court held that these were suspicious circumstances sufficient
to show that the defendant knew the property in his possession was stolen. (Id.
at p. 83.)
This case is analogous. Similar to Peters, Alfredo was found with the victim’s registration paperwork,
business card, camera, and sunglasses in a removable console in his immediate
vicinity. Alfredo was found with these
items just hours after the items were stolen, in a car parked on the same
street as the car that had been broken into, by police officers who were
responding to reports of individuals checking car door handles. Two people were hiding in the back of his
car. We find the circumstances
surrounding Alfredo’s possession of the stolen property sufficient to support
the conclusion that he knew the items were stolen.
Alfredo relies on People v. Jolley (1939) 35 Cal.App.2d 159, 163, to support his
argument. In that case, the court held
that the defendant’s uncontradicted testimony negated any knowledge that the
property was stolen because the circumstances surrounding defendant’s possession
were also insufficient to show such knowledge.
(Ibid.) Here, the circumstances surrounding Alfredo’s
possession of the stolen items were sufficiently suspicious to prove his
knowledge. As such, this case is
not analogous.
“[W]hat constitutes a ‘satisfactory’
explanation of possession of the ‘fruits’ of a burglary or a larceny, is a
question that primarily and impliedly must be answered by the [fact finder] in
its verdict.†(People v. Juehling (1935) 10 Cal.App.2d 527, 531-532.) We must accept logical inferences that the
trier of fact drew from the circumstantial evidence. (People
v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th 342 at p. 396.)
The trial court found Alfredo’s testimony insufficient to explain the
possession of the stolen property.
We agree. When combined with
the suspicious circumstances surrounding his possession of the stolen property,
there is sufficient evidence to show that Alfredo knew the property was stolen.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BIGELOW,
P. J.
We concur:
RUBIN,
J.
FLIER, J.
was not one of the four persons in the car when the police arrived. The police found a driver’s license for
Crystal Ibyerlein in the car and the vehicle’s registration was also in her
name.
