In re D.F.
Filed 9/10/13 In re D.F. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE
COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH
APPELLATE DISTRICT
>
In re D.F., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | |
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. D.F., Defendant and Appellant. | F066183 (Super. Ct. No. 09CEJ600846-3) |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
County. Gary D. Hoff,
Judge.
Daniel A. Bacon for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General,
Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell,
Assistant Attorney General, Charles A. French and John G. McLean, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Appellant
D.F. was found by the juvenile court to have committed assault by means of
force likely to produce great bodily injury
(Pen. Code,
title="">[1] § 245, subd. (a)(4); count 1), second
degree robbery (§ 211; count 2), grand
theft person (§ 487, subd. (c); count 3), and two counts of
misdemeanor battery (§ 242; counts 4 & 6).
The court further found that
appellant personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of count 1
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). On appeal, appellant contends there
is insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings with respect to counts
1, 2, 4, and 6. He also contends
insufficient evidence supports the section 12022.7 enhancement in count 1. We disagree with appellant’s contentions and
affirm the judgment.
This appeal arises from appellant’s
involvement in two separate incidents on the night of June
5, 2012,
at the Bob Belcher Park on Alluvial Avenue in Fresno.
The first incident occurred around 7:00
p.m.,
after the victims, Mark Crenshaw and Nicholas Macias, met up with an
acquaintance, Blair Stevens, at the park.
At some point, Crenshaw and Macias went to the field area of the park,
where they were approached by appellant, his codefendant, S.C., and a third,
unknown male.
Appellant and S.C. started insulting Crenshaw; S.C. said his
lip piercings were “gay†and appellant said his shoes were “dirty and messed
up.†Crenshaw tried to tell them he did
not want any problems. When they continued
insulting him, Crenshaw and Macias turned around and started to walk away.
As Crenshaw and Macias were walking down the field towards Alluvial Avenue, appellant, S.C., the third male,
and a fourth, unknown male started following them. Someone then started throwing small rocks at
Crenshaw. The rocks missed and hit the
ground in front of him. Although
Crenshaw had his back turned to them, he believed appellant and S.C. were the
ones throwing rocks at him. Crenshaw
explained they were the only ones who were being aggressive with him, and he
heard S.C. say “do you like pebbles†before the rocks started to be thrown at
him.
After the rocks were thrown, Crenshaw saw S.C. holding a
small, wooden “souvenir†baseball bat.
S.C. struck Crenshaw’s right arm once with the bat. Appellant then started walking towards
Crenshaw and S.C. handed him the bat. As
appellant walked towards Crenshaw with the bat, Macias held up his hand and
stepped in front of appellant.
Appellant walked into Macias’s hand with his shoulder. S.C. told Macias not to touch his friend and
punched him in the face. Macias fell
down and appellant’s group surrounded him.
Macias recalled that, while he was on the ground, both appellant and
S.C. were hitting and kicking him. He
also recalled that appellant hit him with the bat at least once during the
incident. The attack lasted
approximately four seconds. Macias
testified he sustained a cut and swelling to two of his fingers and minor
bruising to his body.
Second Incident (Counts 1, 2 & 3)
The victim Andrew Pope met his
friend, Amanda Ardemagni, at the park around 9:50 p.m.
Ardemagni, who was having some personal issues, was crying and
upset. Ardemagni and Pope talked
together for a while at the park then decided to drive somewhere else to talk.
As Ardemagni and Pope were walking back to the parking lot,
four males including appellant and S.C., ran up behind them. Pope turned around and asked them if they
were good. Appellant said, “yeah, nigga,
we good†and “[w]hat the fuck are you doing.â€
Pope made a few comments about not wanting any trouble. He then turned around and kept walking with
Ardemagni towards their cars.
Appellant’s group followed them and
made remarks such as “come here, baby, we’ll show you a good time.†Ardemagni turned around and glared at them
and then continued walking with Pope towards their cars. When appellant’s group
continued to follow them, Pope turned around and asked again whether they were
good.
Appellant replied, “we faded, nigga, we faded.†Appellant then called Pope a “punk ass niggaâ€
and pushed him from behind. Pope told
Ardemagni to run as the rest of appellant’s group ran up to him. Before she ran, she saw Stevens—who had been
in the park earlier with Crenshaw and Macias—punch Pope in the right
temple. Pope stumbled and then
appellant’s group surrounded him.
Ardemagni ran into the middle of Alluvial Avenue and dialed 911. While on the phone with the 911 operator, she
became very emotional. She could see the
four males that comprised appellant’s group were attacking Pope. Pope was on the ground and “kind of rolling
around from the different blows he was getting.†Ardemagni recalled seeing appellant kicking
and punching Pope, primarily in the back and chest. She also saw S.C. kicking Pope “as hard as he
could†in the stomach and sides, and she saw Stevens “kicking and stomping on
his head.â€
While the rest of the group was still attacking Pope,
Ardemagni saw appellant “rummaging†through Pope’s back pockets and the pockets
on his sweater. Ardemagni hung up during
the 911 call, partly because she “vaguely†heard Pope’s assailants “talking
about finding his wallet and his phone.â€
Ardemagni explained, “it clicked in my head, shit, we’re being mugged
and I need to hide my phone in case they come after me because this is the only
thing I have to get us help.â€
When asked which occurred first, hearing the statements
about getting Pope’s wallet and phone or seeing appellant rummaging through
Pope’s pockets, Ardemagni testified, “it was kind of all simultaneous.†She added she thought she heard the statements
after she saw appellant going through Pope’s pockets but “[appellant] was still
in his pockets while it was being said.â€
In the meantime, a car Ardemagni had flagged down during the
911 call turned around and drove back to her.
When the car turned around, appellant’s group stopped attacking Pope and
fled.
On cross-examination, Ardemagni confirmed she heard someone
say “[g]et his phone and wallet†during the assault, and testified that, if the
police report said she heard the statement after the assault, the report would
be wrong.
Pope recalled that, when he was on the ground, his “neck and
head continued to get hit†and it felt like “multiple people†were hitting
him. At some point, he lost
consciousness. But before he lost
consciousness, he heard someone say, “Take his fucking phone and his walletâ€
and felt someone going through his pockets.
When Pope regained consciousness, he found he was no longer on the
pavement but on the grass with Ardemagni holding his head and neck.
Pope recalled that when he was loaded into the ambulance,
paramedics were tapping on him and telling him to stay awake, but he was not
able to stay awake. The next thing he
remembered was being in the emergency room.
At the hospital, Pope underwent a CAT scan, received pain medication,
and had to have stitches above both eyebrows.
After the incident, Pope continued to have head, neck, and
back pain. He was prescribed pain
medication and was in bed for two weeks.
He also suffered from migraine headaches for approximately three
weeks. The attack left visible scars
above his eyebrows. He also suffered
from anxiety in certain situations.
Defense
Fresno Police Officer Jeremy Preis interviewed Crenshaw and
Macias on June 6, 2012, the day after the incident in the park. Macias told Officer Preis he knew appellant
and S.C. were the people involved in the incident, and that S.C. hit him and
Crenshaw with the souvenir bat. After
S.C. hit him, Macias fell down and felt the bat hit him several more
times. Macias put his hands over his
head to block the blows. He also felt
someone hitting and kicking him but could not describe who it was.
When Fresno Police Officer Steven Jaquez interviewed
Ardemagni on the night of the incident, she made no mention of any profane
statements being made by the suspects prior to the attack. She said one of the suspects pushed Pope on
the chest, but she did not identify him.
Ardemagni also said that, as the suspects fled, she heard one of them
say, “I’m faded, nigga.†She made no
mention of items being taken from Pope.
Fresno Police Officer Christopher Lee conducted follow-up
interviews of Ardemagni and Pope on June 21, 2012. Officer Lee specifically asked Pope if he
remembered whether any demands were made for his cell phone and wallet. Pope said he could not remember, but he did
not think so. Pope did not mention
hearing anyone say to get his wallet or go through his pockets, or feeling
anything being taken off him.
Officer Lee also asked Ardemagni if she heard the suspects
demand Pope’s wallet and phone prior to or during the assault. Ardemagni said she heard them say “get his
phone and wallet†after the assault but was unsure if they took these
items. She did not mention she saw the
suspects going through Pope’s pockets or grabbing items.
Fresno Police Officer Eric Sanders spoke to Pope at the
hospital the night of the incident. Pope
reported that, when he saw the suspects in the park, he asked them if they were
okay but could not remember what exactly was said at that point. Pope explained that it hurt to think. Pope did recall a male wearing a red hoodie
sweatshirt punched him in the side of the face and then being pushed by another
male.
Officer Sanders learned from Pope that he no longer had his
cell phone and wallet, and the officer confirmed with the paramedics that they
did not remove anything from Pope’s pockets.
Pope did not say anything about what happened to his property. He never told Officer Sanders he heard any of
the people say to get his wallet or phone.
Nor did he say anything about feeling people rummaging through his
pockets or taking items from him at the scene.
Dr. Richard Goka, a physician who specialized in physical
medicine and rehabilitation, reviewed medical records and other documents
relating to the injuries Pope sustained on June 5, 2012. In Dr. Goka’s opinion, Pope’s injuries were
mild to moderate.
Rebuttal
On June 5, 2012, Jesse Magana lived in a house across the
street from Bob Belcher Park. Around
10:00 p.m., he heard a girl screaming. When
he looked out his window, he saw a girl in the middle of Alluvial Avenue
flagging down a car and screaming for help.
Magana jumped his back fence and crossed Alluvial Avenue to
reach the park. There, he saw Pope lying
in the parking lot area and Ardemagni trying to help him get up. Magana described Ardemagni’s demeanor as
hysterical and petrified.
Magana observed Pope was muttering incoherently and unable
to stand on his own. Pope had blood
streaming down his head and a big knot on his head the size of a baseball. Magana dragged Pope over to the grass area
and laid him down. Magana never saw Pope
unconscious during the time he was assisting him.
Appellant contends the evidence is
insufficient to support the juvenile court’s findings he committed misdemeanor
battery (counts 4 & 6), assault (count 1), and robbery (count 2). He also contends the evidence is insufficient
to support the court’s finding he personally inflicted great bodily injury in
committing the assault in count 1. For
reasons discussed below, we find appellant’s contentions unpersuasive.
A. Standard of Review
In assessing a claim of
insufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court’s task is to review the
entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether
it contains substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value upon which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The
standard of review is the same in cases in which the prosecution relies mainly
on circumstantial evidence. It is the
trier of fact that must be convinced of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. If the circumstances reasonably
justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that
the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding
does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.
(People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20
Cal.4th 1, 11; see also Jackson v.
Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 317–320; People
v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)
In reviewing a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts do not determine the facts. We examine the record as a whole in the light
most favorable to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the
trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the
judgment. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) If the verdict is supported by substantial
evidence, a reviewing court must accord due deference to the trier of fact and
not substitute its evaluation of a witness’s credibility for that of the fact
finder. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) The testimony of a single witness—unless
physically impossible or inherently improbable—is sufficient for a conviction. (Evid. Code, § 411; People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.)
An appellate court must accept
logical inferences that the trier of fact might have drawn from
v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.)
Before the judgment of the trial court can be set aside for
insufficiency of the evidence, “it must clearly appear that on no hypothesis
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the verdict of the
jury.†(People v. Hicks (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 423, 429; see
443, 453.)
Battery
The juvenile court found that
appellant committed misdemeanor battery on Crenshaw and Macias, the lesser
included offense of the charged assaults in counts 4 and 6. Appellant first contends there is
insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding he committed
misdemeanor battery on Crenshaw because there is no substantial evidence he
struck or touched Crenshaw in any way.
Respondent counters that substantial evidence supports the court’s
misdemeanor battery finding on a theory of aiding and abetting.
We agree with respondent.
Battery is defined as “any willful
and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.†(§ 242.)
“[A] person aids and abets the
commission of a crime when he or she, acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful
purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) the intent or purpose of committing,
encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by act or
advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the
crime.†(People v. Beeman (1994) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561; see
1039.)
“Among the factors which may be
considered in making the determination of aiding and abetting are: presence at the scene of the crime,
companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.†(In re
Lynette G. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1094; see People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409;
1455, 1460 [“Neither mere presence at the scene of a crime, nor the failure to
take steps to prevent a crime, is alone sufficient to establish that a person
is an aider and abettor. Such evidence
may, however, be considered together with other evidence in determining that a
person is an aider and abettorâ€].)
Applying these factors here supports
the conclusion that appellant was an aider and abettor. Appellant was not simply a spectator but an
active participant in the events surrounding S.C.’s attack on Crenshaw. Prior to the attack, appellant and S.C. both
approached Crenshaw and made insulting comments on his appearance. When Crenshaw attempted to walk away,
appellant and S.C. both followed him, and rocks were thrown at him from their
direction. After S.C. struck Crenshaw on
his arm with the souvenir baseball bat, he passed the bat to appellant as
appellant moved towards Crenshaw.
Appellant’s conduct indicates he was intent on striking Crenshaw, and
might very well have personally committed a battery on Crenshaw had Macias not
intervened, at which point appellant and S.C. turned their attention to Macias
and physically attacked him instead.
Viewing these circumstances in the light most favorable to the judgment,
we find the evidence was more than sufficient to support the conclusion that
appellant aided and abetted S.C.’s commission of misdemeanor battery on
Crenshaw.
We also find sufficient evidence
that appellant committed misdemeanor battery on Macias. Macias’s testimony that appellant was hitting
and kicking him when he was on the ground and that appellant hit him at least
once with the bat during the incident constitutes substantial evidence of the
offense. Macias’s prior police statement
claiming he covered his face and was unable to describe the person who was
hitting and kicking him does not necessarily render his testimony physically impossible or
inherently improbable as appellant suggests.
Macias, for whatever reason, might not
have been completely forthcoming with the police. Recognizing the existence of “discrepancies
in the evidence,†the juvenile court nonetheless found “the witnesses generally
credible and persuasive in their testimony as to what transpired.†We are not at liberty to second-guess the
court’s evaluation of Macias’s credibility.
C. Substantial Evidence of Assault
Appellant contends insufficient
evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding he committed assault under count
1, because there is no substantial evidence he applied to Pope force likely to
result in great bodily injury and, therefore, the offense should be reduced to
misdemeanor battery. We disagree.
Assault is “an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present
ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another.†(§ 240.)
The gravamen of the offense “‘is the likelihood
that the force applied or attempted to be applied will result in great bodily
injury.’ [Citation.]†(
779, 787.) In other words, the crime
focuses on what might happen, not
what did happen. (Ibid.) Actual injury to the victim is not
required. (People v. Valdez (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 103, 113.) “[A]ssault only requires an intentional act
and actual knowledge of those facts sufficient to establish that the act by its
nature will probably and directly result in the application of physical force
against another.†(People v. Williams, supra,
26 Cal.4th at p. 790.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that appellant assaulted Pope. As
appellant acknowledges, Ardemagni testified she saw appellant hitting and
kicking Pope in the back and chest when he was on the ground. Contrary to appellant’s suggestion, the
absence of any serious injury to those particular areas of Pope’s body does not
preclude a finding appellant committed an assault. The juvenile court could reasonably conclude
that appellant’s act of hitting and kicking Pope in the upper body, during a
group beating, was an intentional act that was likely to result in great bodily
injury and therefore find he personally committed an assault on Pope.
D. Substantial Evidence of Second Degree
Robbery
Appellant contends insufficient evidence supports the
court’s finding that he committed second degree robbery under count 2. Relying primarily on evidence of
inconsistencies and omissions in Ardemagni’s prior police statement, appellant
argues there is no substantial evidence he formed the requisite intent to steal
during the assault on POPE, rather than after the assault ended. We reject appellant’s argument.
“Robbery is the taking of ‘personal property in the
possession of another against the will and from the person or immediate
presence of that person accomplished by means of force or fear and with the
specific intent permanently to deprive such person of such property.’ [Citation.]â€
(People v. Lewis (2008) 43
Cal.4th 415, 464.)
“To support a robbery conviction, the evidence must show
that the requisite intent to steal arose either before or during the commission
of the act of force. [Citation.] ‘[I]f the intent arose only after the use of
force against the victim, the taking will at most constitute a theft.’ [Citation.]â€
(People v. Marshall (1997) 15
Cal.4th 1, 34.)
Substantial evidence supports the inference that appellant formed
the intent to steal during the assault on Pope.
Ardemagni testified that the attack on Pope was still occurring when she
saw appellant rummaging through Pope’s pockets and heard someone say to get his
wallet and phone. The evidence permits
the reasonable inference that appellant’s intent to steal Pope’s personal
property was concurrent with his act of force against him. Appellant’s argument to the contrary is
essentially a request that this court reweigh Ardemagni’s credibility, which we
cannot do.
E. Sufficient Evidence to Support Great
Bodily Injury Enhancement
Lastly, appellant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the great bodily injury enhancement in
count 1, arguing there is no substantial evidence he personally inflicted Pope’s
head injuries upon which the enhancement was based. Respondent counters that the juvenile court
properly found the enhancement to be true under the group-beating theory
posited by the prosecution below. We
agree with respondent. We also reject appellant’s
claim that the injuries Pope sustained did not rise to the level of great
bodily injury.
Section 12022.7, subdivision (a),
requires that the confinement of “[a]ny person who personally inflicts great
bodily injury on any person†be enhanced.
The “personally inflicts†language in section 12022.7 was construed in
and abettors. In Cole, the defendant (during a burglary and robbery) ordered his
accomplice to kill the victim and blocked the victim’s escape while his
accomplice repeatedly struck the victim, but defendant never himself struck the
victim. (Id. at p. 571.) The
defendant challenged the section 12022.7 enhancement, and Cole held the “personally inflicts†statutory language clearly and
unambiguously required that the individual accused of inflicting great bodily
injury must be “the person who directly acted to cause the injury. The choice of the word ‘personally’
necessarily excludes those who may have aided or abetted the actor directly
inflicting the injury.†(
In People v. S.C.
(1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 589 (S.C.), the
court of appeal evaluated whether Cole
precluded a section 12022.7 sentence enhancement when the defendant was one of
numerous assailants who attacked the victim, knocked him to the ground and
repeatedly hit and kicked him, causing the victim numerous significant
injuries, primarily to his head.
Addressing the true finding on the section 12022.7 allegation,
to support the finding. (
concluded the Cole analysis did not
apply in the context of a “group pummeling.â€
(S.C., at p. 594.) “[W]hen a defendant participates in a group
beating and when it is not possible to determine which assailant inflicted
which injuries, the defendant may be punished with a great bodily injury
enhancement if his conduct was of a nature that it could have caused the great
bodily injury suffered.†(
The holding in S.C.
was affirmed by our Supreme Court in People
v. Modiri (2006) 39 Cal.4th 481 (Modiri). The court in Modiri observed that nothing in the terms “personally†or
“inflicts†as used in conjunction with “great bodily injury†requires the
defendant to act alone in causing the victim’s injuries. (Ibid.) Further, “nothing in Cole precludes a person from receiving enhanced sentencing
treatment where he joins others in actually beating and harming the victim, and
where the precise manner in which he contributes to the victim’s injuries
cannot be measured or ascertained.†(
Here, Ardemagni testified she saw Stevens kicking and
stomping on Pope’s head, the area to which his serious injuries were
confined. Based on this evidence,
appellant claims he cannot be punished with the section 12022.7 enhancement
because it is known that Stevens was the assailant who personally inflicted the
great bodily injury on Pope. Therefore,
he argues the S.C. exception does not
apply because the evidence shows only Stevens could have personally inflicted
the injuries.
We disagree with appellant’s
contention that only Stevens could have caused injuries to Pope’s head and
face. The juvenile court could
reasonably believe it was impossible to determine who caused the injuries. After Pope fell, appellant’s group surrounded
him, and Ardemagni ran out into the street, where she dialed 911 and flagged
down a passing car. The evidence thus
suggests Ardemagni was not always in a position to see precisely who did what
during the incident. Moreover, in
describing the blows he received to the area of his head, Pope testified it
felt like “multiple people†were hitting him.
This evidence renders it difficult to determine exactly “whose foot
could be traced to a particular kick [and] whose fist could be patterned to a
certain blow.†(S.C., supra, 213
Cal.App.3d at p. 594.)
The juvenile court here reasonably concluded there was
“sufficient evidence to show … each minor … applied substantial force to the
victim†and “the force with which each individual applied either caused or
contributed to the great bodily injury that was inflicted, specifically, each
minor in the assault … put [Pope] in a position where the assault was completed
by the group.†The circumstances in this
case present the type of scenario covered by the S.C. exception. Appellant
“join[ed] others in actually beating and harming the victim,†and “the precise
manner in which he contribute[d] to the victim’s injuries cannot be measured or
ascertained.†(Modiri, supra, 31 Cal.3d
at p. 495.) Accordingly, the court
did not err in applying the S.C.
exception to find the great bodily injury enhancement to be true.
Finally, we reject appellant’s assertion that the injuries
Pope sustained to his face and head did not rise to the level of great bodily
injury. Citing Justice Corrigan’s
concurring opinion in People v. Cross
(2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 73–74 (Cross),
appellant asserts Pope’s injuries did “not meet the definitions originally
contemplated by the legislature when passing [section] 12022.7.†In this regard, appellant complains there is
no substantial evidence Pope “suffered any loss of consciousness, much less a
prolonged loss of consciousness or severe concussion, nor bone fractures or
protracted loss of impairment of any function of any bodily member or organ,
nor did Mr. Pope require extensive suturing or suffer serious
disfigurement.â€
However, a great bodily injury need not be one that caused
the victim to suffer permanent, prolonged or protracted disfigurement,
impairment, or loss of bodily function.
(People v. Escobar (1992) 3
Cal.4th 740, 750 [great bodily injury found where rape victim suffered
extensive bruises and abrasions on legs, knees and elbows, injury to neck, and
soreness in vaginal area impairing ability to walk]; Cross, supra, 45 Cal.4th
at p. 64 [injury “need not be so grave†as to cause victim permanent,
prolonged, or protracted bodily damage]; see also People v. Sanchez (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 718, 733 [multiple
abrasions, lacerations, swelling and bruising to eye and cheek];
sustained where victim suffered swollen jaw, bruises to head and neck, and sore
ribs].)
Here, the juvenile court found “there was great bodily
injury, primarily the loss of consciousness, … established beyond a reasonable
doubt by the evidence.†The court’s
finding is supported by substantial evidence.
Pope testified he lost consciousness at the time of the assault and
subsequently was unable to follow the paramedics’ instructions to stay awake in
the ambulance. Witnesses’ reports of
Pope’s incoherence at the scene and at the hospital were not inconsistent with
his reported loss of consciousness.
Following the incident, Pope was medicated for continuing head, neck,
and back pain, was confined to bed for two weeks, and suffered migraines for
three weeks. At the time of appellant’s
adjudication hearing, Pope suffered lingering anxiety and, in the scars above
his eyebrows, bore visible reminders of the senseless, unprovoked assault by
appellant and his companions on June 5, 2012.
In light of all the evidence before it, the court could reasonably
conclude Pope suffered great bodily injury within the meaning of section
12022.7, subdivision (a).
The judgment is affirmed.
_____________________
HILL, P. J.
WE
CONCUR:
_____________________
CORNELL,
J.
_____________________
FRANSON,
J.
references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
second assault charge (count 5) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code,
section 701.1.
