CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Richard Matthew Azzara appeals the judgment of conviction on charges of identity theft, forgery, unlawful access card activity, and drug possession. Azzara contends that (1) insufficient evidence supported his conviction for identity theft; (2) the trial court violated his constitutional rights by denying his request for a continuance on the first day of trial so that he could retain private counsel; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to hold a Marsden hearing. We find no error and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Jacob George Moreno pled guilty to transporting methamphetamine and receiving stolen property and was sentenced, as agreed, to two years in local custody and two years on supervised release. In this appeal, defendant argues: 1) his conflict counsel, appointed more than a month after sentencing to address defendant’s request to withdraw his plea, was ineffective for not filing petitions for habeas corpus or coram nobis to challenge the plea; 2) the court erred in ordering defendant to pay an attorney fee and booking fee; and 3) the condition of his eventual supervised release that he obtain his probation officer’s approval for his place of residence is unconstitutional. As discussed below, we affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant, Jimmy Joe Cox, of second degree murder (Pen. Code, §187, subd. (a)). He was sentenced to prison for 15 years to life and appeals, claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective and his motion to dismiss should have been granted.[1] We reject his contentions and affirm.

James H. and Jennifer H. appeal orders summarily denying James's petition for modification under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 (further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code) and terminating their parental rights to their son, Jordan H., under section 366.26. We affirm.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant Alfonso Alvarado pled guilty to one count of forcibly committing a lewd act on a person under the age of 14 and admitted that at the time of the offense he was over the age of 16. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (d)(1).) In exchange for the plea, the district attorney agreed to dismiss one count of sodomy by force on a person under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 286, subd. (c)(2)(A) & (B)) and four other counts of forcible lewd acts on a person under the age of 14. Alvarado stipulated to a sentencing range of from five to 10 years.
At sentencing, the victim, who is Alvarado's cousin, submitted a statement describing his continuing trauma, and the victim's psychologist submitted a statement in which he described the victim's continuing and irreparable harm. Although Alvarado submitted statements from a number of family members and other individuals in mitigation, the trial court imposed the upper term of 10 years in state prison.
Appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief summarizing the proceedings below. Counsel presents no argument for reversal but asks this court to review the record for error as mandated by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, counsel lists as a possible, but not arguable, issue:
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the upper term.
We granted Alvarado permission to file a brief on his own behalf. He has not responded. Our review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, and Anders v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 738, including the possible issue listed pursuant to Anders v. California, has disclosed no reasonably arguable appellate issues.
We find that Alvarado was adequately represented both at trial and on appeal.

The issues in this appeal are whether the trial court abused its discretion by substantially reducing the lodestar amount of plaintiffs' requested attorney fees under the private attorney general statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5)[1] without specifying which fees it found unreasonable and excessive, and without any support in the record; and erred by denying plaintiffs' request for other costs on the sole ground they did not submit the request on a Judicial Council form. We agree with plaintiffs on the latter issue, as the use of the Judicial Council form is not mandatory. We reverse the order to the extent it denies costs and direct the court on remand to consider the merits of the request. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment. Under California law, the court was not required to explain its ruling and, on this record, we cannot say the court abused its discretion by reducing the lodestar amount.

Following a disposition hearing in June 2012, I. P. (the minor) was placed on formal probation. The minor appeals, alleging that three conditions of his probation are unconstitutionally vague and therefore must be stricken and modified. We disagree and affirm.

This case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Having reviewed the record as required by Wende, we affirm the judgment.

In this one-issue appeal, defendant William Percy Parsons correctly contends the minute order of sentencing and the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the amount of fines and fees the judge orally imposed at sentencing ($280 total as orally pronounced by the judge instead of the $290 total as recorded by the clerk, the discrepancy being a $10 increase in the amount of the restitution fund collection fee in the written documents). The People disagree. They argue that since the judge signed the minute order, he was “exercising his judicial discretion” by increasing the fee by $10.
The People’s argument is contrary to law. “Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.” (People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385.)

Following a jury trial, defendant Ifeanyi Charles Igwegbe was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or higher, proximately causing bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a) --count 1; § 23153, subd. (b)--count 2; further undesignated section references are to the Vehicle Code). The trial court sentenced defendant on count 1 to five years probation, 30 days in jail, and various restitution fees and fines. The court stayed the sentence on count 2 pending successful completion of probation.
On appeal, defendant contends his convictions for counts 1 and 2 must be reversed due to ineffective assistance of counsel and juror misconduct. We affirm the judgment.

This opinion follows our January 7, 2013 order granting defendant’s petition for rehearing and vacating our prior opinion in this matter. (People v. Pontod (Dec. 18, 2012, C065925) [nonpub. opn.]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.268(d).)
A jury convicted defendants Manuel Ray Pontod and Jorge Jaime of each being a felon in possession of a firearm, and of the unlawful possession of ammunition. The jury also convicted Jaime of transporting methamphetamine, possessing methamphetamine for sale, and possessing a controlled substance with a loaded, operable firearm. In addition, the jury found that Jaime was armed in the commission of the offenses for transportation and possession of methamphetamine. The trial court found Pontod had two prior strike convictions and had served a prior prison term. It sentenced Pontod to a term of 25 years to life in state prison, and sentenced Jaime to a term of seven years and eight months in state prison.

Petitioners Edward and Barbara Catiller (collectively plaintiffs)[1] filed this action against numerous defendants based on the contention that Edward was exposed to asbestos while in the navy, which resulted in malignant pleural mesothelioma, a terminal cancer. During his navy career, Edward allegedly was exposed to asbestos contained in Hysol adhesives and sealants manufactured by real party in interest Dexter Hysol Aerospace, LLC (DHA).
On January 2, 2013, plaintiffs’ motion for trial preference was granted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 36.)[2] The trial was scheduled for May 1, 2013.

Petitioners Edward and Barbara Catiller (collectively plaintiffs)[1] filed this action against numerous defendants based on the contention that Edward was exposed to asbestos while in the navy, which resulted in malignant pleural mesothelioma, a terminal cancer. During his navy career, Edward allegedly was exposed to asbestos contained in Square D arc chutes, arc shields and electric switches manufactured by real party in interest Schneider Electric USA, Inc. (SEI).
On January 2, 2013, plaintiffs’ motion for trial preference was granted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 36.)[2] Trial was scheduled to begin on May 1, 2013.
On March 11, 2013, plaintiffs noticed the deposition of SEI’s most knowledgeable person regarding the products that contained asbestos, the years they contained asbestos and the quantitative percentage of asbestos contained in the products. The date of deposition was set as March 26, 2013.

Defendant and appellant Farmontae Taylor (defendant) appealed the trial court’s denial of his petition for recall of sentence made pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.126.[1] On appeal, appointed counsel for defendant filed an opening brief in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 requesting that this court conduct an independent review of the record to determine if there are any issues which if resolved in defendant’s favor would require reversal or modification of the judgment. On July 3, 2013, we gave notice to defendant that his counsel had failed to find any arguable issues and that defendant had 30 days within which to submit by brief or letter any grounds of appeal, contentions, or arguments he wished this court to consider. Defendant did not file a response brief or letter. After independently reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment.