Image 2000 Multimedia, Inc. v. Quin
Filed 9/16/13 Image 2000 Multimedia, Inc. v. Quin CA4/1
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
COURT
OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
IMAGE 2000 MULTIMEDIA, INC., et
al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
YVONNE T. QUIN, as Trustee,
etc.,
Defendant and Appellant.
_____________________________________
YVONNE T. QUIN, as Trustee,
etc.,
Plaintiff and Appellant.
v.
IMAGE 2000 MULTIMEDIA, INC., et
al.,
Defendants and Respondents,
D061776
(Super. Ct. No. 37-2007-0062035-
CU-BC-CTL)
(Super. Ct. No.
37-2008-00033205-
CL-UD-EC)
APPEAL from
an order of the Superior Court
of
County, William S. Dato, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices
of Robert Lynn, Robert H. Lynn and Kevin R. Yee for Defendant, Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Maldonado
& Markham and William A. Markham for Plaintiffs, Defendants and
Respondents.
Yvonne T.
Quin, trustee of the Joseph Quin Family Trust (Landlord), appeals an order
denying, in part, her request for attorney fees as prevailing party under a
lease containing an attorney fees provision.
Quin, in her capacity as trustee, served as the landlord under the
lease. Image 2000 Multimedia, Inc. and
El Cajon Grand Cocktail Lounge (together Lessees) were the lessees under the
lease.
its discretion by failing to engage in a proper lodestar analysis in
determining the amount of reasonable fees to award Landlord's previous trial
counsel, Slater & Truxaw LLP (Slater).
Landlord,
however, minimizes the unique procedural history of this litigation in making
her arguments. When this matter first
proceeded to trial, Lessees prevailed and were entitled to their attorney
fees. The matter involved two issues: whether an option under the lease was
exercised and possession of the leased premises. In their motion for attorney fees, Lessees
asked for $126,854.87. In opposing
Lessees' motion, Landlord characterized Lessees' motion as an example of
"the legal profession at its worst" because Lessees' attorneys
requested such an "astounding amount." She expressed outrage at the
"profiteering, abuse, and sheer audacity set forth in the billings
of" Lessees' attorneys and described the subject billings as
"shocking and disgusting." In
the end, Landlord argued that, at most, the superior court should award attorney
fees in the amount of $27,045.15 because "[n]othing more is warranted or
supportable" for a case comprising a one-day bench trial.
The
superior court was persuaded by Landlord's arguments and awarded Lessees
$35,000 in attorney fees. Landlord appealed
the superior court's judgment against her, and we reversed the judgment with
directions for the superior court to enter judgment in favor of Landlord on the
option issue and to conduct further proceedings on the possession issue. (See Image
2000 Multimedia, Inc. v. Quin (July 13, 2010, D055719) [nonpub. opn.].)
After the
case was remanded, Landlord disqualified the previous trial judge and was
assigned to a new court. After further
proceedings, Landlord was determined to be the prevailing party and then moved
for attorney fees and costs under the lease in the amount of $235,276.47. Of the requested amount, $145,739 concerned
fees billed by Slater for pretrial and trial services involving the previous
one-day bench trial. The same bench
trial for which Lessees had previously requested $126,854.87 when they were the
prevailing party (prior to the reversal on appeal) and Landlord argued the
requested fees were "astounding," "shocking and
disgusting." Yet, now that Landlord
was the prevailing party, she failed to explain why Slater's fees for its
pretrial and trial services, which surpassed the Lessees' requested amount by
almost $20,000, were reasonable considering Landlord's previous arguments. The superior court noted this omission in
awarding Landlord fees of $35,000 for pretrial and trial related tasks. The superior court, however, awarded Landlord
additional fees and costs for posttrial and appellate services in the amount of
$89,034.97, resulting in an award of attorney fees and costs of $124,034.97.
Landlord
only appeals the amount of the attorney fees awarded for Slater's
services. Here, the superior court
awarded a total of $47,000 comprised of the $35,000 for pretrial and trial
services and $12,000 for posttrial tasks.
Because we do not conclude the superior court abused its discretion, we
affirm.
FACTUAL
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This appeal
arises from the litigation of two civil cases that were consolidated for all
purposes and tried together in July 2008.
The first of these cases was an action for declaratory relief that
Lessees brought, alleging that they were entitled to a judicial decree that
they had properly exercised an option to renew the term of the lease for an
additional five years (the Option Case).
The second of these cases was an action for unlawful detainer that
Landlord brought against Lessees, alleging that it was entitled to summary
repossession of the leased premises under the unlawful detainer (the UD
Action).
The
consolidated cases concerned two distinct issues: One, whether Lessees could exercise their
option to renew the lease and had done so in a timely and proper manner; and,
two, whether Lessees had timely obtained the insurance required by the lease. The Option Case concerned only the option
issue. The UD Action concerned both
issues. The cases were consolidated, and
the original trial court tried the option issue during the first part of a
one-day bench trial and the insurance issue during the second part of this trial.
The bench
trial lasted a total of six hours, which occurred after the parties exchanged
written discovery, conducted two short depositions (one lasted six hours and
the other only two), and litigated a few pretrial motions. At the bench trial, the trial court found in
favor of the Lessees on the option issue after a three-hour trial in the
morning, ruling from the bench before recessing for lunch. In the afternoon, the trial court heard the
insurance issue. After closing argument,
the trial court instructed the parties to brief two specific issues concerning
the insurance matter. The parties
complied, after which the court delivered a judgment in favor of Lessees with a
statement of decision.
After
finding in favor of Lessees on all claims, the trial court heard Lessees'
motion for attorney fees and costs, which were permitted under the lease. Lessees requested $126,854.87 in attorney
fees, explaining in their submission that Landlord's attorneys had purposefully
made the litigation far more contentious and complicated than necessary. In opposition, Landlord denigrated the
request as "shocking" and "disgusting," and claimed it
"represent[ed] the legal profession at its worst."
The
Landlord's opposition also provided a comprehensive, point-by-point analysis of
the following matters: (1) the
procedures and tasks actually performed in the consolidated cases; (2) the
attorney fees claimed for each procedure and task; and (3) the reasonable time
that Lessees' attorneys should have devoted to each procedure and task actually
performed in the consolidated cases.
Landlord addressed the common tasks and procedures that both sides
performed to conduct the litigation.
Based on this analysis, Landlord concluded that the Lessees could not
reasonably have incurred more than $27,045.15 in fees for all of the attorney
and paralegal work in question in the consolidated litigation, and that the
remaining $99,809.72 of their request must be attributed to padding,
duplicative work, inefficient work, improper overstaffing, and inappropriate
charges for secretarial and clerical work.
In reply,
Lessees provided their own point-by-point analysis of these same matters,
explaining the procedures and tasks that their attorneys had actually performed
in the consolidated cases, the fees that they requested for this work, and why
the total fee request was reasonable on the basis of these matters. Lessees submitted a lodestar request in
support of their motion for attorney fees, after which the parties traded
competing analyses of this lodestar request in light of the billings of the
case and the actual tasks required by the litigation.
At the
hearing of the motion for fees, the original trial court expressly confirmed
that it had reviewed these two competing lodestar analyses and would make its
award of attorney fees on the basis of its conclusions about these analyses
taking into account its understanding of exactly what had happened in the
consolidated cases. During the hearing,
Landlord's counsel questioned the trial court's methodology for awarding
$35,000 in attorney fees. In response,
the trial court confirmed that it reviewed the analyses provided by the
parties. Although Landlord's counsel
stopped short of asking for an hour-by-hour analysis to determine the lodestar
amount, he continued to question how the court arrived at the final award
amount. The trial court responded:
"I have been the trial court, and the court is well
aware of what went on in the case since I started on it from day one. And the way I arrived at it, I looked at both
analyses from both counsel. I will be
quite honest, I started with your [Landlord's counsel] analysis first. I thought it was appropriate. [¶] Again, this is where I think it's the
court's discretion. I thought there
should be some additional attorney's fees added [to the amount argued by
Landlord]. I think that was
approximately $8,000. For the appellate
record, I think that would be good.
Based on that, I think there should be a little additional work added
for this case. I think that would
withstand appellate review."
After
ruling on attorney fees, the original trial court issued a consolidated
judgment, from which the Landlord successfully appealed, persuading this court
to reverse the judgment in the Option Case resulting in the judgment being
entered in favor of Landlord. We then
remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings in the UD Action,
which concerned both the option issue (now resolved in the Landlord's favor)
and the unresolved insurance issue.
On remand,
Landlord disqualified the previous trial court judge, and the case was
reassigned to a new superior court judge.
After further proceedings consistent with our opinion, Landlord became
the prevailing party and brought a motion for attorney fees, seeking
$235,276.47 in fees and costs. Of the
requested amount, $158,240 was for Slater's fees, which performed pretrial and
trial work during the first trial as well as limited posttrial work resulting
in $12,501 of Slater's total fees.
Landlord requested an upper adjustment of the lodestar because of the
difficulty of the litigation, Slater's skill and attention to the matter, and
the success of the litigation.
Nevertheless, Landlord failed to explain in any of her pleadings in
support of her motion why Slater's fees were reasonable in light of her
previous severe opposition to the fees Lessees requested when they were the
prevailing party, prior to reversal of that judgment, for the same matter.
In opposing
Landlord's motion, Lessees challenged specific fees for certain tasks, argued
that Landlord's attorney fees were increased by her attorneys' litigation
tactics, and sought to exclude fees for bundling and overstaffing. In addition, Lessees emphasized that
Landlord's requested fees were well above the $27,045 Landlord claimed was appropriate
on the original judgment when Lessees were considered the prevailing
party. Landlord failed to address this
final argument in her reply.
During oral
argument on Landlord's motion for attorney fees, the superior court
characterized Landlord's previous opposition to Lessees' motion for attorney
fees as consisting of the theme:
"No reasonable attorney could spend this much time on this kind of
case." Landlord's counsel did not
dispute this characterization. Instead,
Landlord's counsel focused on two points.
First, he questioned the lack of any lodestar analysis in the superior
court's tentative ruling. Second, he
argued he was not required to explain why Slater's fees of about $145,000 for
pretrial and trial work were reasonable in light of the previous attack on
Lessees' counsel's fees of $127,000 for the same work on the same case.
Landlord's
counsel focused a large portion of his argument on the absence of a lodestar
analysis in the tentative ruling.
Landlord's counsel reminded the superior court that an earlier attorney
fee award between the parties in a related case was reversed by the appellate
court because of a failure to conduct a proper lodestar analysis.
explained his approach to lodestar:
"Absolutely.
I had forgotten that, but you're absolutely right. So yes, I am familiar with that. But I don't read it I guess in the sort of
inflexible, wooden way that you may be suggesting. I think that it is a framework, but I think
there are other factors that one looks at.
And in this case, like I think I said in the tentative, given the
arguments that were made, focusing on that period of time, dealing with the
initial litigation and the period up to the trial and judgment in that, you
could have come back and responded and said you know what, there were reasons
why it was appropriate for reasonable fees on the other side to be 35,000, but
in our case for it to be 55 or 75 or whatever it is. In other words, we had to do more work than
they did and here are the circumstances.
But there was nothing to my understanding, anyway, by way of explanation
in that regard. So under those
circumstances, I thought it was appropriate to use the 35 for that period of
time. I analyzed each of the other
periods of time and as you note, by and large agreed with you. You made some adjustments and I appreciate
that you did that and I accepted those."
Moving on
from the lodestar analysis, the superior court emphasized its approach in
determining whether the attorney fees for the pretrial and trial work were
reasonable and Landlord's counsel's failure to address this threshold issue in
light of Landlord's previous opposition to the Lessees' motion for attorney
fees:
"Well no, at least I'm not – I don't think you
understood what I was saying. What I was
saying is having pointed out the argument that you made on behalf of your
client on the first attorney's fee motion, you in reply could have come back
and said, you know, 35,000 was a reasonable fee for this firm to charge during
this period of time for the following reasons:
However, it was reasonable for our side to have charged twice as much
during that period or three times or four times as much, as it turns out during
that period of time for the following reasons.
And sometimes I understand, [Landlord's counsel], that attorneys on one
side of the case can make three times as much work for attorneys on the other
side of the case because of their tactics and so on and so forth. So it is possible to justify it under the circumstances;
there was nothing to indicate that."
Landlord's
counsel confessed that he struggled in deciding not to address his previous
argument, but reasoned that there was no need to do so because Landlord's
motion for attorney fees concerned Landlord's counsel's fees not Lessees'
counsel's fees. As such, Landlord's
counsel concluded his previous analysis was not relevant to the issue before
the court, and he could merely emphasize that the motion for attorney fees
concerned a different law firm with dissimilar billings than Lessees'
counsel. The superior court disagreed:
"I don't think that would have been
sufficient. In other words, again, and I
don't want to belabor this. I think that
it is fair to compare the work done by attorneys on one side of the case with
attorneys on the other. It is not
determinative, but it is a factor of comparison that one could use. In most cases there is or should be a
proportionality between the work done on one side [of the] case and on the
other side. So I think it's a fair
comparison to make. I think in response
to that comparison, which I think is what [Lessees' counsel] did, I think you
had an obligation to offer an explanation and you didn't offer an explanation."
Ultimately,
the superior court granted Landlord's motion for attorney fees, but did not
award the amount Landlord requested for Slater's pretrial and trial work,
reasoning:
"The primary support for [Lessees'] claim of
excessive fees comes, strangely, from Landlord's opposition to [Lessees'] earlier
fee motion. In that motion [Lessees]
sought prevailing party attorneys' fees of approximately $127,000 relating to
pretrial and trial activities. Attacking
this request with great fervor, Landlord's counsel characterized it as
representing 'the legal profession at its worst.' [Citation.]
He castigated [Lessees] for 'seek[ing] to recover the astounding amount
of $126,854.87 for a one-day bench trial.'
[Citation.] The billings
submitted in support of the request were, according to Landlord, 'shocking and
disgusting to anyone in the legal profession." [Citation.]
It argued that [Lessees] should be awarded only $27,000 in fees. [Citation.]
"Evaluating the motion, Judge Sturgeon largely
agreed with Landlord, awarding only $35,000 or less than 30 percent of what was
requested. [Citation.] The trial judge's views are particularly
significant since it was he who observed first hand and in context the
performance of the legal services at issue.
It is largely for this reason that the reasonableness of the claimed
attorneys' fees is committed to the trial court's sound discretion. (See Serrano
v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49; Excelsior
Union High School Dist. v. Lautrup (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 434, 448.) It is difficult to see how having successfully
argued that $127,000 was far too much for [Lessees'] counsel, Landlord can now
maintain that $145,000 is just right for its legal fees incurred during the
same period of time. Certainly he makes
no attempt to offer an explanation.
"Accordingly, based on Landlord's arguments as
accepted by Judge Sturgeon, the Court will limit [Landlord] to $35,000 for the
pretrial and trial-related fees incurred . . . ."
The
superior court also awarded Landlord additional attorney fees of $12,000 for
posttrial work by Slater (out of $12,501 requested), $31,474 for fees incurred
by Landlord's appellate counsel, and $38,002 for fees incurred by Landlord's
current trial counsel, resulting in a total attorney fee award of $116,476 and
costs of $7,558.97.
Landlord
timely appealed the superior court's order, but limited her appeal to the
amount awarded for Slater's fees covering pretrial and trial services ($35,000)
and some posttrial work ($12,000).
DISCUSSION
Except as
provided for by statute, compensation for attorney fees is left to the
agreement of the parties. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1021.) Civil Code section 1717
provides that reasonable attorney fees authorized by contract shall be awarded
to the prevailing party as "fixed by the court." Here, it is undisputed that the superior
court awarded fees under Civil Code section 1717 because the fees were
authorized by the lease.
We review
an order granting or denying attorney fees for abuse of discretion. (PLCM
Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1094-1095 (
148 (Graciano).) " 'Because the "experienced trial
judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his
court," we will not disturb the trial court's decision unless convinced
that it is clearly wrong, meaning that it is an abuse of discretion. [Citations.]
However, " '[t]he scope of discretion always resides in the
particular law being applied, i.e., in the "legal principles governing the
subject of [the] action. . .
." Action that transgresses the
confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion
and we call such action an "abuse" of discretion.' " [Citations.]
whether the trial court's award of attorney fees is consistent with the
applicable legal principles, we may reverse the award and remand the case to
the trial court for further consideration and amplification of its reasoning.'
" (Id. at pp. 148-149, quoting In re Vitamin Cases (2003) 110
Cal.App.4th 1041, 1052; see also Nichols
v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1239-1240;
State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 393.)
To
determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees to award to a prevailing party
under Civil Code section 1717, a trial court must begin with the
"lodestar," or the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by
the reasonable hourly rate. (
" 'California courts have consistently held that a computation of
time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a
determination of an appropriate attorneys' fee award.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.) In determining a reasonable compensation,
trial courts must carefully review attorney documentation of hours expended;
"padding" in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not
subject to compensation. (
1131-1132 (Ketchum); see also
165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321 (Christian
Research).)
Our high
court made clear that, after determining the lodestar, a court may then adjust
the basic lodestar fee based on different factors to fix a fee at the fair
market value for the particular action.
(Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132, 1134.) This adjustment as it applies to contractual
attorney fee awards was explained in PLCM: " '[Civil Code] section 1717
provides for the payment of a "reasonable" fee. After the trial court has performed the
calculations [of the lodestar], it shall consider whether the total award so
calculated under all of the circumstances of the case is more than a reasonable
amount and, if so, shall reduce the [Civil Code] section 1717 award so that it
is a reasonable figure.' " (
based on factors "including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty,
skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the
success or failure, and other circumstances in the case." (PLCM,
supra, at p. 1096; see also Graciano,
supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 154,
quoting Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132 [lodestar may be adjusted by
" 'the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, . . . the skill
displayed in presenting them, . . . the extent to which the nature of the
litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] the contingent
nature of the fee award.' "].) In
exercising its discretion, the trial court must not intertwine considerations
relevant to the determination of the lodestar amount with factors relevant to
whether the lodestar should be adjusted.
(Northwest Energetic Services, LLC
v. California Franchise Tax Bd. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 841, 879.)
The
lodestar is the primary means by which a trial court determines an objectively
reasonable amount of fees to award. (See
Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1134; see also Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 324 [The
"lodestar adjustment method of calculating attorney fees . . . is designed
expressly for the purposes of maintaining objectivity."].) However, a moving party seeking to recover
its attorney fees under Civil Code section 1717 bears the burden of
establishing the reasonableness of the fees claimed. (Civic
Western Corp. v. Zila Industries, Inc. (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 1, 16.)
Here,
Landlord's primary argument is that the trial court erroneously failed to
follow the lodestar method of calculating a reasonable attorney fee award.
superior court failed to calculate the reasonable hourly rate and the
reasonable number of hours expended by Landlord's counsel, which are both
essential in determining the lodestar.
But a careful review of the record and consideration of Landlord's
argument reveal her belief that the court had a duty to provide its lodestar
calculations to the parties. Indeed,
during oral argument, Landlord's counsel made it abundantly clear that he
believed the superior court was required to provide its lodestar calculations
in its tentative ruling or otherwise explain its calculations at the
hearing. In other words, Landlord's
position appears to be that the superior court must "show its work"
in calculating the reasonable fees awarded to a prevailing party under Civil
Code section 1717.
Landlord,
however, fails to provide any authority to support her position. Nor did we uncover any through our independent
research. To the contrary, our high
court has held that a trial court need not produce a statement of decision in
support of its attorney fee award. (
And, " ' "[a]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to
support [the judgment] on matters as to which the record is silent, and error
must be affirmatively shown." ' "
(Ibid.)
Here, we
have the benefit of a good record on which to evaluate Landlord's claim. Landlord concedes that the parties filed
"detailed submissions" that "would have provided a basis for the
[superior] court to have made a reasoned decision for attorney fees." Landlord only challenges the attorney fee
award for Slater's services. In their
moving papers, Landlord asked for $158,240 in attorney fees for these
services. Thus, Landlord asked the
superior court to set the lodestar amount at $158,240 and then adjust that
amount up for certain factors. (See
In opposing
Landlord's motion, Lessees challenged some of the billings, but also argued
that the Landlord's request for fees for Slater's pretrial and trial work was
severely inflated considering Landlord's previous argument that Lessees'
counsel should have only billed $27,045 for litigating the matter.
Here, the
superior court stated that it considered evidence presented by the parties
regarding the hours billed throughout the litigation, including pretrial,
trial, posttrial, and appeal. It is the
trial court's role to examine the evidence and we presume the trial court
performed its duty. (Christian Research, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1324.) The superior court separated the fees billed
by Slater into two categories. The first
consisted of pretrial and trial work amounting to a claimed $145,739 in
fees. The second consisted of posttrial
work amounting to a claimed $12,501 in fees.
For the first category, the superior court deferred to the trial court's
determination, which was based on the Landlord's own arguments regarding what
should have been billed for a "one day bench trial." The superior court thus adjusted the lodestar
of $145,739 to $35,000, but provided Landlord an opportunity to justify the
large disparity between what she previously stated was appropriate for the
one-day bench trial and what her counsel billed for that same trial. Landlord refused to provide any justification
whatsoever.
Landlord's
unwillingness to explain why Slater's billings were more than the amount she
characterized as "astounding" (among other more colorful
descriptions) is puzzling. In opposing
Landlord's motion for attorney fees, Lessees raised the issue of the fees'
reasonableness in light of the Landlord's opposition to the Lessees' previous
motion for attorney fees, but Landlord did not address that argument
whatsoever. The superior court gave
Landlord ample opportunity to discuss the reasonableness of Slater's fees at
oral argument, but Landlord eschewed delving into that topic. Instead, Landlord focused on the court's
failure to provide its lodestar calculations.
Perhaps, Landlord could not provide an adequate explanation against the
backdrop of her stinging tirade challenging Lessees' counsel's fees for a
one-day bench trial, which were less than what Landlord requested here.
Landlord's
failure to provide any justification for Slater's fees beyond merely submitting
copies of the billings limited the superior court's ability to evaluate the
reasonableness of the requested fees.
Similarly, this omission also limits our ability to evaluate the
superior court's use of discretion in determining the reasonable amount of
attorney fees.
title="">[4] In the end, we are left without a reason why
Slater's counsel's fees surpassed the "shocking and disgusting" total
Lessees previously requested. Simply
put, Landlord failed to establish Slater's pretrial and trial fees were
reasonable although it was her burden to do so.
(See Civic Western Corp. v. Zila
Industries, Inc., supra, 66
Cal.App.3d at p. 16.)
Where the
trial court severely cuts the number of compensable hours in a fee award, we
infer the court determined the request was inflated. (Christian
Research, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1323.) Here, the superior court
obviously determined Slater's fees were overstated. Based on the record, we are satisfied the
superior court was well within its discretion to reduce the lodestar. (See PLCM,
supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1096.)
In
addition, the superior court only significantly reduced the lodestar as to
Slater's pretrial and trial work. For
Slater's posttrial work, the superior court awarded $12,000 out of a requested
$12,501.
superior court did not abuse its discretion." (PLCM,
supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1096.)
DISPOSITION
The order
is affirmed. Lessees are awarded their costs,
including attorney fees as are appropriate under the lease for this appeal, as
determined by the trial court.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
McINTYRE,
J.
IRION,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] The lease was guaranteed on behalf of the Lessees by Alex
Kalogianis and Jason Kreider. Neither
individual is a party to this appeal although both were parties in the
litigation below.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] See Quin v. El Cajon
Grand Cocktail Lounge (Nov. 6, 2008, D052193) [nonpub. opn.]
