CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant Karla Maria Velazquezrosales of attempted murder with premeditation and deliberation. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a).) The jury also found defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury to the victim. (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (d).) The trial court sentenced defendant to seven years to life for attempted murder and a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the gun enhancement (for a total of 32 years to life in state prison).
We reject defendant’s claim that the court erred by refusing to reopen the case to allow defendant to impeach the prosecution’s rebuttal witness. We likewise reject defendant’s assertion that the court erred by imposing a $10,000 restitution fine. (Pen. Code, § 1202.4.) But, as conceded by the Attorney General, the court erred in its calculation of custody credits. We therefore modify the judgment to reflect the correct number of custody credits and affirm the judgment as modified.

Petitioner, Eric H. (father), filed an extraordinary writ petition (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452)[1] regarding his minor child, Devin H. (Devin). Father seeks relief from the juvenile court’s order issued at the 12-month review hearing setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[2] hearing to consider termination of parental rights.
On review, we conclude father’s petition is inadequate because it fails to comply with the procedural requirements of rule 8.452. He fails to allege, let alone make an arguable claim, that the juvenile court committed any error. Therefore, we will dismiss his petition.

Petitioner Tiffany P. (mother) seeks extraordinary writ relief (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (l)[1]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court’s October 3, 2013, order made at the 18-month review hearing, in which the court terminated reunification services and set a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 to consider termination of parental rights and implementation of a permanent plan for mother’s six-year-old son James P.[2] We deny the petition on the merits.

This appeal involves a family with an extensive history in the dependency system. Mother, Tiffany P., appeals the juvenile court’s May 2013 order following the 12-month review hearing, finding that return of her five-year-old son James P. to her care and custody would create a substantial risk of harm to the child.[1] Finding no error, we affirm.

K.C. (mother) appeals from an order terminating parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, [1] § 366.26) to her sons H.M. and E.F. (collectively, the boys). Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding no beneficial parent-child or sibling relationship existed to prevent termination of her parental rights. We affirm.

The court continued appellant, Rolando M., as a ward of the court after appellant admitted allegations charging him with violating his probation. Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

The court continued appellant, Rolando M., as a ward of the court after appellant admitted allegations charging him with violating his probation. Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

A jury convicted appellant, Caleb Daniel Mantzouranis, Sr., of driving under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)), and in a separate proceeding appellant admitted a special allegation that he had suffered a prior conviction of that offense (Veh. Code, §§ 23550, 23550.5). The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed appellant on five years’ probation, one of the conditions of which was that he serve nine months in county jail.
As discussed more fully below, prior to the defense’s presentation of the testimony of an expert witness, the court made a ruling prohibiting the expert from testifying as to any opinion that the expert based on certain matters set forth in a document prepared by a physician who, according to defense counsel, had treated appellant. On appeal, appellant argues that this ruling violated Evidence Code section 801 (section 801) and appellant’s rights under the United States and California Constitutions “to Due Process, a fair trial and to present a defense” because the ruling “improperly restricted appellant’s direct examination of his expert witness regarding a critical issue.” We affirm.

A jury convicted appellant, Caleb Daniel Mantzouranis, Sr., of driving under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)), and in a separate proceeding appellant admitted a special allegation that he had suffered a prior conviction of that offense (Veh. Code, §§ 23550, 23550.5). The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed appellant on five years’ probation, one of the conditions of which was that he serve nine months in county jail.
As discussed more fully below, prior to the defense’s presentation of the testimony of an expert witness, the court made a ruling prohibiting the expert from testifying as to any opinion that the expert based on certain matters set forth in a document prepared by a physician who, according to defense counsel, had treated appellant. On appeal, appellant argues that this ruling violated Evidence Code section 801 (section 801) and appellant’s rights under the United States and California Constitutions “to Due Process, a fair trial and to present a defense” because the ruling “improperly restricted appellant’s direct examination of his expert witness regarding a critical issue.” We affirm.

Appellant/defendant Dominique Baker, an inmate in the security housing unit (SHU) at Corcoran State Prison, was convicted after a jury trial of battery by a prison inmate upon a nonconfined person (Pen. Code,[1] § 4501.5), with special allegations found true that he had two prior strike convictions (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); § 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and two prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). He was sentenced to the third strike term of 25 years to life plus two years for the prior prison term enhancements.
On appeal, defendant contends he was improperly impeached with prior convictions identical to the charged offense; the court improperly reunified the jury trial on both the substantive offense and the special allegations; the prosecutor committed numerous instances of alleged misconduct; and his third strike term must be reversed. We affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Adrian Wayne Griffith of committing lewd and lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 years and misdemeanor annoying or molesting a child. He raises several challenges to his convictions, including (1) the trial court abused its discretion in excluding impeaching evidence and in admitting other evidence, (2) instructional error, (3) failure to inquire into possible juror misconduct, (4) error in conducting a hearing pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) when he sought to discharge retained counsel, and (5) abuse of discretion in denying his motion for new trial.
We conclude the trial court erred in several respects and reluctantly reverse the convictions.

Defendants Amber Virginia Anderson (Anderson) and Isaac Vandrell Brown (Brown) stand convicted of multiple offenses arising from a crime spree they allegedly perpetrated in the summer of 2011.[1] They were accused and convicted of robbing multiple victims over a span of several days.
The only substantive dispute[2] between the parties on appeal relates to whether the sentencing court violated Penal Code[3] section 654 in imposing prison terms on two firearm enhancements. We conclude the court did not violate section 654.
In accordance with two concessions offered by the Attorney General, we order modifications to the abstract of judgment and to Anderson’s sentence on count 6. We otherwise affirm.

A jury convicted appellants Trenton Oshea Davis, Kebrocee Aaron Maxwell, Jimmy Dave Serna, and Brett Gallagher, Sr., of kidnapping, second degree robbery, and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. The jury also found that all four personally inflicted great bodily injury and committed the offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang. All appealed their convictions and the appeals have been consolidated. We reject all of appellants’ contentions and affirm the convictions.

Defendant James Darnell Ross threatened his former wife and her son and broke the windows at their residence. A jury convicted defendant of two counts of making criminal threats (counts 1 and 3), one count of felonious vandalism (count 2), and a bail enhancement for count 3. (§§ 422, 594, and 12022.1) The court dismissed count 4 for attempting to dissuade a witness. (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1).) In a bench trial, the court found true that defendant had suffered a prior “strike” and a prior felony conviction resulting in imprisonment. (§§ 667, subds. (d)-(i), and 667.5, subd. (b).) The court sentenced defendant to a total prison term of 11 years eight months. (E051536, p. 2.)
In People v. Ross (E051536), an unpublished decision, this court reversed with directions “for the limited purpose of allowing defendant a reasonable time to investigate juror misconduct by Juror No. 79 and permitting defendant to file a motion for new trial, if warranted.” (E051536, p. 16.) On remand, a hearing was held on defendant’s motion for new trial. The motion was denied. Defendant appeals from the final judgment entered on October 25, 2012. (§ 1237, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(a).)