Other

J.S. (mother) appeals from six-month review orders by the juvenile court as to her minor daughters K.S. and N.K. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.21, subd. (e), 395.) The court continued K.S.’s placement in foster care and ordered further reunification services to mother, including conjoint counseling for mother and K.S. As to N.K., who was placed with her father B.K. at disposition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1), the court granted sole legal and physical custody to B.K. and terminated jurisdiction. On this appeal, mother contends only that the juvenile court abused its discretion and violated due process by refusing to admit audiotapes made by mother and offered by her as impeachment evidence. According to mother, the court’s error was prejudicial because this evidence, if admitted, could have “painted a very different” (more favorable) picture of the relationship between her and the minors; therefore, she requests remand of both minors’ cases for rehearing. Respondent Yolo County Department of Employment and Social Services (the Department) replies that the audiotapes were properly excluded because (1) the communications recorded were confidential and the other parties did not consent to being recorded (Pen. Code, § 632); (2) the audiotapes might have been incomplete or selectively edited; (3) they were minimally probative and would have consumed undue time (Evid. Code, § 352); and (4) mother never provided the parties with copies or transcripts of the audiotapes (Evid. Code, § 250; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.1040(b)).[1] We conclude the Department’s last point is sufficient to uphold the juvenile court’s rulings. Therefore, we shall affirm on that basis without reaching the parties’ other arguments.

Appellant Huan Ta was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and battery with serious injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d)). He admitted several enhancements for prior convictions and commitments to state prison. He was sentenced to the upper term of four years on the aggravated assault, a term that was doubled because of his two prior strike convictions. The same sentence computation was applied to his battery with serious injury term, that sentence ordered to run concurrently. Additionally, the court imposed one-year enhancements for appellant’s two prior state prison commitments and an additional 16 months for one of the two unrelated driving under the influence charges (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a), punishments increased under the Three Strikes Law) he pled guilty to, and stayed the same sentence on the second. Appellant’s total term came to 11 years and 4 months. The court awarded 519 days of actual custody credits and 77 days of conduct credits for a total award of 596 days against his sentence. Ta complains of two instances of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument and a miscomputation of his presentence custody credits. He is right about the credits, and we order 258 days added to the 519 originally computed. But the first putative misconduct assignment fails on its merits and the second was cured by an admonition by the trial court, so we affirm his conviction.

On November 17, 2011, at the conclusion of a combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the juvenile court concluded that minor Gianna D. came within subdivision (b) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 (hereafter, subdivision (b)), and declared her a dependent child. Gianna’s parents, Antonio D. and Kristine K., appeal from the dispositional order. Although expressed in differing language in their separate briefs, both parents argue that the conditions which might have warranted the initial assertion of jurisdiction had, by the time of the hearing, been so alleviated, mitigated, and superseded by subsequent events that they were wholly inadequate basis for a dependency. Although the parents’ contention has some colorable merit, it is not sufficient to overturn the dependency.

Kenmore Villas, LLC (Kenmore), and its guarantors Amco Company, Inc., Suk Myong Kim, and Kyong Hwa Pak (collectively Guarantors) appeal from a judgment and orders entered in favor of California Business Bank (Bank). Kenmore and Guarantors contend that the trial court erred in sustaining Bank’s demurrer to Kenmore and Guarantors’ second amended cross-complaint without leave to amend for, among other things, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; granting Bank’s motion for summary judgment on Kenmore and Guarantors’ third amended cross-complaint for breach of contract; and granting Bank’s motion for summary adjudication as to Bank’s complaint for breach of guaranty and a common count.

The juvenile court declared Cameron D. a ward of the court after he admitted committing a misdemeanor assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, §§ 17, subd. (b)(4), 245, subd. (a)(1)). Consistent with the plea agreement leading to the admission, the juvenile court dismissed two other felony charges, in which Erick Becker was the victim. At a subsequent restitution hearing, the juvenile court ordered Cameron to pay Becker restitution of $4,106, consisting of $2,393.04 for lost wages, $412.96 for Becker's share of an ambulance bill, and $1,300 for the portion of the ambulance bill paid by his insurance company.[1]

Defendant, Reginald Conwright, is serving nine years in prison after a jury found him guilty of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459),[1] receiving stolen property (§ 496) and misdemeanor resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)) and the court found true several prior conviction allegations, including that he had been convicted of an attempted burglary that qualified as both a serious felony and a strike. Defendant argues in this appeal that he is entitled to additional presentence custody credits under the version of section 4019 that became effective October 1, 2011. As discussed below, defendant’s contention on this point has no merit. However, we do order the abstract of judgment corrected to reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncement in two other respects.

Destiny Pedersen allegedly fell on toys strewn on the floor of a Target store. After hearing the evidence, a jury rendered a verdict for Target. On appeal, Pedersen contends that her case was prejudiced by the hearsay statement of an unidentified eyewitness, who said that her misbehaving child caused plaintiff’s fall. We conclude (1) plaintiff invited the error by presenting the eyewitness statement during her case-in-chief, and later failed to object to the admission of the statement, and (2) even if the issue was preserved for appeal and assuming that the eyewitness statement was inadmissible hearsay, there was no miscarriage of justice sufficient to justify a reversal of the judgment.

A jury convicted Rey Benavidez of sexual intercourse with a child 10 years or younger, T.C., digital penetration with a child 10 years or younger, T.C., attempted lewd act upon a child under 14 years of age, A.L., and misdemeanor indecent exposure after unlawful entry. Benavidez appealed and in our prior nonpublished opinion (People v. Benavidez (June 28, 2011, G043412)), we reversed his conviction for committing an attempted lewd act upon a child under 14 years of age and concluded the trial court failed to make the requisite findings for imposition of the sex offender fine. We remanded the matter. On remand, the trial court concluded Benavidez did not have the ability to pay the sex offender fine and struck the sentence on count 4. The court, however, refused to award him additional actual credits from the time of his first sentencing hearing to the date the court struck the sentence on count 4. As we explain below, we conclude Benavidez was entitled to additional actual credits.

Rogelio Elopre appeals from the judgment entered after he was convicted of two counts of lewd conduct on a child under 14, one by force and one without force. We reject his contentions that the trial court: on its own motion should have instructed the jury with certain lesser included offenses, and should have given an instruction clarifying that breasts are not sexual organs; erred by not suppressing his statement to police investigators; and erred by not allowing both cross-examination and argument concerning whether the victim’s hymen was still intact. Because the trial court erred in calculating his presentence custody credits, we modify the judgment to reflect the correct amount and affirm the modified judgment.

Plaintiff and appellant Kathleen Sommer brought a legal malpractice action against defendant Georgine F. Brave and her firm, Brave, Weber & Mack, APC (together, Brave). This appeal arises from a defense summary judgment granted on the ground that the action was barred by the limitations period established by Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6, subdivision (a)(1) (one-year statute of limitations, tolled until actual injury sustained; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c; undesignated statutory references will be to this code).