Other

Appellant Jonathan Wood was convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of driving a vehicle while being under the influence of an alcoholic beverage in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a) and one count of driving a vehicle with .08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his blood in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced appellant to three years in state prison.

Ernest Christopher Moore appeals from his convictions by jury verdict of first degree residential burglary, attempted first degree residential burglary, assault with intent to commit a sexual offense, criminal threats, attempted robbery, and assault with a deadly weapon. He contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of uncharged crimes and in instructing the jury on first degree burglary. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the assault conviction. He argues the prosecutor violated discovery rules and due process by failing to disclose forensic test results. Appellant argues that multiple punishment for burglary, criminal threats, and attempted robbery is improper and that the case must be remanded to afford the court an opportunity to exercise its discretion to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences. He asserts that these cumulative errors warrant reversal. We conclude that evidence of uncharged crimes was properly admitted under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). The instructions on burglary were adequate. We find sufficient evidence to support appellant's conviction for assault with intent to commit a sex crime. The curative instruction given by the trial court was an adequate sanction for the prosecution's violation of its statutory obligation to provide timely discovery. The sentences for attempted robbery and criminal threats are stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654 (all statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated). Appellant forfeited his challenge to the imposition of consecutive sentences by failing to object, but in any event the court provided an adequate reason for its sentencing choice. The trial court erred by failing to impose the mandatory five-year enhancement for each new serious felony conviction under section 667, subdivision (a) and we order the abstract of judgment amended to reflect those enhancements. Respondent asks us to review the trial court's ruling excluding evidence of uncharged crimes under Evidence Code section 1108. The issue was not preserved for appeal because the prosecutor opted not to pursue admissibility under that statute.

Following a joint trial, separate juries convicted defendants Richard Antonio Hundley and Curtis Level Chapman of the first degree murder of David Barreda (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))[1] and found that the murder was committed while defendants were engaged in the commission of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)). Chapman's jury also found he used a firearm to commit the murder. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). Defendants were sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for Barreda's murder, and Chapman was sentenced to a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement. Among other things, the trial court ordered each defendant to pay a $10,000 parole revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.45) and a $30 court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373). It refused to award either defendant presentence custody credit for the time they spent in actual custody prior to being sentenced. Defendants appeal.[2]

We granted review in this case to decide whether the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution permits law enforcement officers, approximately 90 minutes after lawfully arresting a suspect and transporting him to a detention facility, to conduct a warrantless search of the text message folder of a cell phone they take from his person after the arrest. We hold that, under the United States Supreme Court's binding precedent, such a search is valid as being incident to a lawful custodial arrest. We affirm the Court of Appeal's judgment.

This case involves one of the most egregious types of juror misconduct. During deliberations, a juror performed an experiment at his home under conditions not subject to judicial oversight or cross-examination. He later reported the result, which was unfavorable to defendant, to his fellow jurors, who were struggling over a crucial issue in the case. The jury subsequently convicted defendant Kyle Jordan Vigil of shooting at an occupied dwelling (Pen. Code, § 246),[1] with a true finding that the crime was committed to benefit a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1) (hereafter § 186.22(b)(1)), an enhancement that earned him an indeterminate life sentence (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4)). Vigil was the driver of the car that was used to commit the charged crimes. The shooter, codefendant Joshua Lawrence Latham, was convicted by the same jury of the same offense and enhancement, as well as an additional count of discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner (§ 246.3) for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22(b)(1)). Both defendants appeal. With respect to Vigil, we shall reverse the judgment for prejudicial jury misconduct. With respect to Latham, we find no reversible error and shall affirm.

In this dependency case (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300 et seq.), on the eve of a hearing to terminate parental rights to the minor (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) and determine whether the child's foster parents should be designated prospective adoptive parents (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (n)), the child's mother filed a relinquishment of her parental rights, designating the child's maternal aunt as the person with whom she intended the child to be placed for adoption (Fam. Code § 8700, subd. (f)). Despite having been granted numerous opportunities to visit with the child, the aunt had failed to form a bond with the child, who was quite attached to the foster parents with whom he had spent much of his life. Nonetheless, the aunt, the mother, and the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) sought the immediate placement of the child with the aunt, a position which brought them in conflict with the foster parents and the minor. At the hearing, the dependency court apparently believed that its hands were tied by the mother's designated relinquishment. Upon receipt of the official acknowledgement of mother's relinquishment, the court immediately terminated the hearing, and lifted its previous order which had prevented DCFS from removing the child from the foster parents' home without court approval. In these consolidated appeals, we review three earlier orders of the dependency court, as well as its order lifting its â€

Appellant Jose A. Villegas-Torres appeals from a judgment and sentence entered on his plea of guilty to the felony charge of digital penetration of an unconscious person. His court-appointed attorney has filed a brief raising no issues and asking this court to conduct an independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. As our review discloses no arguable issue, Court shall affirm the judgment and sentence.

Probate Code Sec. 1516.5 which authorizes termination of parental rights when a probate guardianship has continued for at least two years, and trial court finds that adoption by guardian would be in child's best interest is not facially unconstitutional by adopting the best interests of a child as standard for terminating parental rights. Court of appeal erred in barring termination of father's parental rights without a finding of unfitness if father could demonstrate a commitment to parental responsibility where father was qualified to assert his rights as a presumed father but expressly waived those rights when child was placed in guardianship.

Allen Andre Boone appeals from the judgment entered following his convictions by jury on count 2 criminal threats (Pen. Code, 422) with firearm use (Pen. Code, 12022.5, subd. (a)) and count 4 vandalism causing damage under $400, with admissions that he suffered a prior felony conviction (Pen. Code, 667, subd. (d)), a prior serious felony conviction (Pen. Code, 667, subd. (a)), and a prior felony conviction for which he served a separate prison term (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced appellant to prison for 10 years 8 months. Court affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.