CA Unpub Decisions

Murielle Malebranche brought this action against Sprint Communications, Inc., her telephone service provider. She alleged that Sprint disclosed her personal identifying information to Ernest Damour, a man who had physically and emotionally abused her and stalked her in New York. This information allowed Damour to find her in Los Angeles, where she had moved to escape him, and continue to stalk her. The trial court granted Sprints motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Malebranche could not establish that Sprint breached any duty of confidentiality nor could she establish that such a breach, even if it occurred, was a cause of the harm that she suffered from Damour. Court conclude that Malebranche cannot establish that Sprint breached its duty of confidentiality and therefore Court need not address the causation issue.

Appellant B.W., a ward of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602), appeals the order committing him for a period of one year to the Division of Juvenile Justice (hereinafter, the DJJ; formerly known as the California Youth Authority), following a finding that he violated the terms of his probation by possessing a firearm and by failing to submit to a search and seizure as he had been ordered to do by the court. Appellant contends that (1) his DJJ placement order should be reversed because there was insufficient evidence he possessed a dangerous or deadly weapon, (2) Courtdetermine the adequacy of the documents produced at the Pitchess hearing (see Pitchessv. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531), and (3) his disposition hearing was flawed because the court failed to obtain an Individualized Education Program (IEP). Court find the contentions unavailing and affirm.

Fred Bland appeals from the portion of an order denying his motion to terminate or reduce his spousal support to Vianne Bland. Under the current support order Fred pays a fixed sum plus 20 percent of his income over his 1999 base salary with no cap on the amount of the payment. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in not capping support at $833 per month because the undisputed evidence showed that Vianne only needs $833 a month in addition to her earnings to maintain her marital standard of living. Court modify the order to reflect that cap.

A.C. (Mother) challenges two dependency court orders relating to her son, P.G. She argues that: (1) the court erred by terminating her reunification services; (2) substantial evidence does not support the courts finding that Mother failed to comply with the case plan; and (3) the courts findings sustaining a subsequent petition are not supported by substantial evidence. Court affirm.

A jury convicted defendant of many crimes committed against his wife and adult son, who attempted to protect his mother from defendants attack, and found defendant personally used deadly weapons (a knife against his wife and a car against his son). (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1) [two counts]; 422, 273.5, subd. (a), 646.9, subds. (a) & (b), 459 [1st, two counts], 136.1, subd. (a)(2), 417, 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court sent defendant to prison for a total term of 13 years 4 months. Defendant timely appealed. On appeal defendant claims the trial court improperly ordered him to be restrained, no substantial evidence supports one count, sentence on two counts should have been stayed and the trial court should not have imposed an upper term on one count. Court affirm.

Plaintiff, Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of the Rincon Reservation (Rincon), appeals from a judgment of dismissal following an order sustaining without leave to amend the demurrers of defendants State of California (the State), the California Gambling Control Commission (the Commission), Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, and former Attorney General William Lockyer. The complaint alleges breach of a compact between the State and Rincon and seeks an award of monetary damages. The trial court sustained the demurrers on the ground of sovereign immunity. Rincon contends on appeal that the State waived sovereign immunity. court do not resolve that issue. Instead, Court conclude the demurrers should have been sustained for a more fundamental reason the complaint fails to state a claim for breach of contract. court therefore affirm the judgment of dismissal.

Defendant Richard Daniel Gill waived his right to a jury trial, and the trial court found him guilty of assault with a deadly weapon (a wooden TV tray) by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1))[1]and inflicting corporal injury upon a cohabitant ( 273.5) and not guilty of first degree residential burglary ( 459). The court also found true allegations defendant used a deadly weapon in the commission of the crime of corporal injury upon a cohabitant ( 12022, subd. (b)(1)), inflicted great bodily injury in circumstances involving domestic violence in the commission of both offenses ( 12022.7, subd. (e)), and served three prior prison terms ( 667.5, subd. (b)).
On appeal, defendant contends (1) the trial court erroneously admitted statements made by the victim to a police officer at the crime scene, (2) there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for inflicting corporal injury upon a cohabitant, and (3) should his conviction for inflicting corporal injury upon a cohabitant be reversed, the weapons enhancement must be stricken. Court affirm the judgment.

On July 28, 2000, defendant Rochelle Goldine Marie Hines intervened in an argument between her friend and Paul Johnson. After Johnson pushed or punched defendant, defendant went inside the house, retrieved a knife, and stabbed Johnson in the back. Faced with a charge of attempted murder, defendant entered a plea, pursuant to People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, to assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)) and admitted that she personally inflicted great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 12022.7, subd. (a)). She entered her plea understanding that the maximum term was seven years in state prison.
As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

A jury found defendant Prince Edward Swafford guilty of five counts of robbery (Pen. Code, 211) and found true allegations of two prior felony convictions. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 125 years to life plus 25 years.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by finding that he was not outside the spirit of the three strikes law, and his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the state and federal Constitutions. Court reject the contentions and affirm.

In the first half of the last century the federal government agreed to finance construction of the All-American Canal, which, in separate branches, brings water from the Colorado River to the Imperial Valley and the Coachella Valley. However, the federal government's financing commitment was in important respects contingent upon the ability of the two parties in this case, appellant Imperial Irrigation District (Imperial) and respondent Coachella Valley Water District (Coachella), to either merge or come to an agreement with respect to operation of the canal and distribution of Colorado River water and electrical power that would be produced by the canal. Affirmed.

Defendant Jilberto Rios was convicted of various crimes arising from his long-term sexual abuse of his stepdaughter. On appeal, he contends (1) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on unanimity; (2) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on defendants failure to deny or explain evidence against him; (3) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the upper term; and (4) his sentence violated Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 (Blakely). Court affirm.

Appellant Jose Hernandez, Jr., pled guilty to one count of accessory to murder in violation of Penal Code section 32.[1] He was sentenced to three years of formal probation and one year in the county jail. In addition, along with his two co-defendants, he was ordered to make restitution to the victims family for funeral and burial expenses of $9,2870.90, pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (f). Appellant appeals from the restitution order, alleging the trial court abused its discretion in ordering payment of funeral and burial costs when his criminal conduct occurred after the victims death. For the following reasons, the restitution order affirmed.

Genny Alberts, American Development Corporation (ADC), Ranbir S. Sahni, and 3R Real Estate Corporation (collectively, the Appellants) filed complaints for malicious prosecution against David Rosenbaum, the attorney who initiated a cross-complaint against them on behalf of National Foundation for Housing, Inc. (NFH), and B. Casey Yim and his law firm, the attorneys who took over the representation of NFH from Rosenbaum and continued to prosecute the cross-complaint (collectively, the Attorneys).[2] ADC and 3R obtained summary judgment on the cross-complaint, and Alberts and Sahni were dismissed. The malicious prosecution complaints, which were consolidated in the trial court, allege the cross-complaint was brought without probable cause and with malice because the cross-complainants had no personal knowledge or belief of facts supporting their action, they failed to adequately investigate the factual and legal basis for their action but continued to maintain their action against [the Appellants] despite discovery establishing the lack of any factual basis for their action . . . .
The Attorneys filed special motions to strike the complaints under the anti SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., 425), claiming the Appellants could not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the malicious prosecution complaints. The trial court granted the motions and struck the complaints. The Appellants contend the trial court erroneously found there was probable cause to file the cross complaint. After performing a de novo review of the record, Court find the Appellants have not made the necessary showing that the cross complaint was filed and maintained with malice. Accordingly, Court affirm.

The issue on appeal in this case is whether the trial court erred in determining that, as a matter of law, appellant William Almon has no right to use public utility easements located upon the neighboring property of respondent Blandor Way LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Corporation, for the purpose of connecting appellant's property to the public sewer line installed underneath Blandor Way. The parties brought opposing motions for summary judgment, which the court resolved in favor of respondent. Appellant argues that the public utility easements at issue are appurtenant to his property and he is within the class of persons entitled to use the public utility easements because his property is landlocked, the easements were established for the benefit of his property, and installation of a sewer connection across respondent's property is the only possible way for his property to connect to the main public sewer line. Respondent counters that appellant is a private individual who is not within the class of persons entitled to use the public utility easements since appellant is not a public utility provider and appellant may use the private easements to connect to the public sewer. In this appeal, the parties do not dispute that public utility easements were created; the only question is their nature and scope.