CA Unpub Decisions

Michael King appeals from an order denying his release from commitment. In 1992, appellant was found not guilty of a charge of murder by reason of insanity and committed to the state hospital. On August 31, 2006, appellant filed an in pro per application for restoration of sanity pursuant to Penal Code, section 1026.2.[1] On February 1, 2007, the trial court conducted a bench trial and denied the application. On February 6, 2007, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Court appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that defendants appellate attorneys have fully complied with their responsibilities and that no arguable issues favorable to him exist. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 279 280; People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 441, 443.) The order is affirmed.

Over three years ago, defendant appealed from a judgment following pleas of guilty and imposition of a ten-year state prison term: the upper term of eight years on count one, and a two-year consecutive term on count two. His counsel raised no issues and asked this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any issues that would, if resolved favorably to appellant, result in reversal or modification of the judgment. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436; see also Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259.) Upon review of the record Court found no arguable issues, although Court ordered an amendment of the abstract of judgment to require AIDS testing.

Tony T. (appellant) appeals from jurisdictional and dispositional orders sustaining vandalism and arson allegations. He contends the juvenile court erred by failing to declare his vandalism offense a felony or misdemeanor. Court conclude the matter must be remanded for the juvenile court to exercise its discretion to declare the offense a misdemeanor or felony as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 702. Court affirm the juvenile courts orders in all other respects.

The trial court convicted defendant Jose Aparicio of five sexual offenses and sentenced him to 18 years in prison. He contends the court committed sentencing error by imposing a full consecutive sentence for an offense not enumerated in Penal Code section 667.6, subdivisions (c) and (e). The Attorney General essentially agrees. Accordingly, Court remand for resentencing.

Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of evading a peace officer and causing serious bodily injury (Veh. Code, 2800.3), unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)), receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, 496d), driving on a suspended license (Veh. Code, 14601.1) and possession of burglary tools (Pen. Code, 466). Imposition of sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on probation for a term of five years. The court also ordered defendant to pay various fines and costs, three of which she now claims must be stricken: attorney fees in the amount of $500 (Pen. Code, 987.8), probation costs of $50 per month (Pen. Code, 1203.1b), and a criminal justice administration fee of $170 (Gov. Code, 29550.2). Court conclude that defendants challenge to the attorney fees order is premature, and she has forfeited any objection to the order to pay probation costs, but Court strike the imposition of a $170 criminal justice administration fee as inconsistent with the oral pronouncement of judgment.

The trial court found that appellants breached fiduciary duties to respondents in connection with a merger transaction and liquidation of a partnership. Compensatory damages were awarded to respondents, along with prejudgment interest, and equitable relief was granted in the form of a constructive trust and equitable lien on the partnership units. In this appeal, appellants complain of the trial courts evidentiary rulings, challenge the evidence to support the judgment, assert they were improperly denied a new trial before a jury to assert the defense of collateral estoppel, and contest various aspects of the relief granted to respondents by the trial court. We conclude that the imposition of a constructive trust and equitable lien must be reversed, and the award of prejudgment interest must be modified. We further conclude that no other prejudicial errors occurred and the evidence supports both the finding of breach of fiduciary duties and the compensatory damages awarded to respondents. Court therefore affirm the judgment in all other respects.

Appellant Sanctuary Investments, Inc. (Sanctuary) appeals from an order denying its motion to aside a void judgment. Court affirm.

Luis L. (father) appeals from jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the juvenile court adjudging his daughter, Anastacia Samantha L., a dependent child under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 300, subdivision (c). The juvenile court found that Samantha suffered serious emotional damage and that her father was unable to provide adequate care for her mental health needs. Among other things, the court found that Samantha was absent from school for extended periods as a result of her fear that she and her father were being stalked by a stranger. On appeal, father contends the juvenile courts jurisdictional findings are not supported by substantial evidence and that the juvenile delinquency court, not the dependency court, has exclusive jurisdiction to deal with Samanthas school attendance problems. While fathers appeal was pending, the juvenile court set a hearing under section 366.26 to implement a permanent plan for Samantha. Father filed a petition seeking writ review of the courts order setting a section 366.26 hearing, contending the court failed to give proper weight to Samanthas desire to return to her father. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) Court issued an order to show cause and consolidated the appeal with the writ petition. Court affirm the juvenile courts jurisdictional and dispositional orders, and Court deny the petition seeking writ relief.

Michael Ray Coffman appeals from a judgment of conviction entered upon a guilty plea. Counsel has advised us that examination of the record reveals no arguable issues, and requests that we conduct an independent review of the record as required by Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 and People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Appellant has filed a supplemental statement asserting: (1) he was coerced into entering a guilty plea; and (2) he should be deported in lieu of serving time in prison because he is an Israeli citizen. Court find no arguable issues and affirm the judgment.

Appellant Charles Alfred Glasper pled guilty to one count of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code,[1] 245, subd. (a)(1)) and one count of making criminal threats ( 422). Appellant also admitted an allegation he personally inflicted great bodily injury during the commission of the assault ( 12022.7, subd. (e)), and he admitted a number of allegations concerning prior convictions and prison terms served ( 667, subds. (a)(1) & (b)-(i), 667.5, subd. (b), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), & 1203, subd. (e)(4).) The trial court sentenced him to 19 years in state prison. Appellants court-appointed counsel has briefed no issues and asks this court to review the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Court have done so and find no issues that merit briefing.

Defendant Janet Stanford appeals from an order granting a preliminary injunction directing her to stay away from plaintiffs facilities unless she needs medical care. Stanford presents various arguments challenging the courts order. Court conclude none of the contentions has merit. Accordingly, Court affirm.

On April 6, 2006, appellant John Anthony Snodgrass entered a plea in Butte County Superior Court to a charge of possession for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11351). The next month, before sentence was pronounced in the Butte County case, appellant was arrested and charged with several offenses in Lake County after he led Clearlake police officers on a high-speed car chase while he was intoxicated. On June 23, 2006, appellant pleaded guilty to felony counts of evading a peace officer and vehicle theft (Veh. Code, 2800.2, 10851, subd. (a)) and a misdemeanor count of driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (a)). The prosecution dismissed the remaining charges in the interest of justice, and appellant waived time for sentencing.

An amended information charged defendant with one count of possession of a controlled substance, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a); one count of possessing a hypodermic needle and syringe, in violation of Business and Professions Code section 4140; and a prior strike allegation pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.12. Defendant pled guilty to possessing a controlled substance and admitted her prior strike pursuant to section 1170.12. The trial court placed defendant on probation.
After violating probation three times, the trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of four years. The court committed defendant to the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC), but she was statutorily ineligible for commitment to CRC because of her prior strike and she was referred back to the trial court for further proceedings. The court vacated its previous sentence of four years and resentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 32 months in state prison. She was awarded presentence credits in the amount of 239 days. On appeal, defendant contends that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to request the trial court to strike her prior strike. Additionally, she maintains that the sentencing court miscalculated the number of presentence credits to which she was entitled. The People agree that the court miscalculated the presentence credits, but contest defendants claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Court are unpersuaded by defendants claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, but remand to the trial court and direct it to calculate defendants presentence credits in a manner consistent with this opinion.

The juvenile court found minor Gabriel B. to be a dependent child and committed him to the care of respondent Alameda County Social Services Agency. On appeal from the jurisdictional and dispositional order, Gabriels fatherappellant Fidel H.contends that the juvenile court failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). (See 25 U.S.C.[1] 1901-1923.) As several months passed since these juvenile court rulings before the case became ready for determination on appeal, when the case was fully briefed, Court asked the parties whether any juvenile court events had occurred that might bear on this issue. In response to our request for letter briefs, the parties have asked us to take judicial notice of records reflecting some of these later occurring events. court have done so. Now, the agency contends that subsequent events have rendered this appeal moot. Court agree and thus, Court dismiss the appeal as moot.