CA Unpub Decisions

Christina A. appeals a judgment terminating her parental rights to her son, Steven H., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends the judgment must be reversed because proper notice was not provided under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. 1901). Court hold because the record shows proper ICWA notice was not provided, the judgment must be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings to ensure compliance with the notice requirements of the ICWA.Reversed and remanded with directions.

Aaron T. appeals the findings and orders entered at the termination of parental rights hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, he asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting his custody of a child or his status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We therefore deny his requests to review the record for error and to address his Anders issue. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.)
Aaron T.'s counsel has filed a "motion to file appellant's supplemental statement," attached to which is a statement by Aaron T. The motion is denied. The Clerk of this Court is directed to return the statement to Aaron T.'s counsel.
The appeal is dismissed.

C. S. appeals the findings and orders entered at the termination of parental rights hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, she asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting [her] custody of a child or [her] status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We therefore deny her requests to review the record for error and to address her Anders issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.) C. S.'s counsel also requests leave for her to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. The request is denied. The appeal is dismissed.

Nancy S. appeals the findings and orders entered at the termination of parental rights hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, she asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
Nancy S.'s counsel also requests leave for her to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. The request is denied. The appeal is dismissed.

Appellants William J. (father) and Natalie J. (mother) (the parents) appeal the juvenile courts order finding that their daughter, Alexis J., came under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a). They argue that there was insufficient evidence that Alexis suffered serious physical harm as a result of corporal punishment. The parents also argue that the juvenile court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it placed the family on probation for a period of nine months, rather than the statutory period of six months. Court affirm.

Defendant and appellant Darrin G. (father) is the father of Katlin E. (the child), a dependent child of the juvenile court. The juvenile court terminated fathers parental rights. Fathers sole contention on appeal is that the termination order must be reversed because the juvenile court failed to perform its duty to inquire whether the child had any Indian heritage under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) Father has failed to demonstrate any reversible error, and Court therefore affirm the termination order.

Respondent James Brooks and Shawn Weizel, the sole shareholders of Hi Tech Traffic, Inc., agreed that Weizel would purchase Brookss interest in the corporation. A written purchase agreement and promissory note were signed by the parties on January 17, 2002, and the note was guaranteed by appellant John Pierson. According to the terms of the promissory note, the purchase price was established on 08/15/01 at a price of $244,000.00, but this principal amount was reduced by two payments made thereafter (one of $10,000 and one of $32,000), leaving a remaining balance of $202,000.00 as of 12/31/01. Although there were other sums paid to Brooks prior to December 31, 2001, the promissory note did not refer to those other payments. When Weizel defaulted, Brooks sued Pierson for the balance due. Following a court trial, judgment was entered in favor of Brooks in the sum of $168,500. Pierson appeals, contending that the court erred when it interpreted the parties agreement so as to exclude the pre-December 31, 2001 payments that were not referenced in the note. Pierson argues such payments should have been applied toward the principal obligation. Court conclude the trial court properly construed the agreement, and Court therefore affirm the judgment.

Joseph Albert Garca appeals from a judgment of conviction of multiple crimes against his girlfriend and her three year old twin sons. The court sentenced him to an aggregate determinate term of twenty years and four months consecutive to an aggregate indeterminate term of two consecutive life with possibility of parole terms consecutive to a 15 to life term. Court affirm the judgment.

It was alleged in a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602) filed October 31, 2006, that appellant Susana M., a minor, committed misdemeanor assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)) and felony vandalism ( 594, subd. (a)), and that she committed the former offense for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with, a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further or assist in criminal conduct by gang members, within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (d) (section 186.22(d)). Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant admitted the assault and vandalism allegations, and the court dismissed the section 186.22(d) allegation. Subsequently, at the disposition hearing, the juvenile court adjudged appellant a ward of court; found that appellants welfare required that her physical custody be removed from her parents (Welf. & Inst. Code, 726, subd. (a)(3); ordered her committed to the Kings County Boot Camp Female Treatment Center (FTC) for a period not to exceed one year but not less than 90 days, and declared appellants maximum period of physical confinement (MPPC) (Welf. & Inst. Code, 726, subd. (c)) to be three years four months, by aggregating confinement periods for the two offenses. On appeal, appellant contends (1) the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering appellant committed to the FTC, and (2) the inclusion in the MPPC of confinement time for both of the instant offenses violated section 654. Court reduce the MPPC by four months, the period attributable to the instant misdemeanor assault, and otherwise affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Carlos Zuniga of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211, 212.5, subd. (c)),[1]and found true enhancement allegations that (1) in committing the instant offense, appellant acted for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further or assist in criminal conduct by gang members ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), and (2) a principal in the commission of the instant offense personally used a firearm ( 12022.53, subd. (e)(1)) The jury acquitted appellant of a second count of second degree robbery. The court imposed a prison term of 23 years, consisting of the three year midterm for the substantive offense, 10 years for the gang enhancement and 10 years, the court erroneously stated, for an enhancement for personal use of a firearm under section 12022.53, subdivision (b). The abstract of judgment reflects the sentence as pronounced by the court.

Appellant Allen Larry Cohoe pleaded no contest to assault with a deadly weapon and admitted a prior strike conviction. He was sentenced to the lower term of two years, doubled to four years for the prior strike conviction, plus one year for a prior prison term enhancement. He has filed an opening brief which adequately summarizes the facts and adequately cites to the record, which raises no issues, and asks this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Court affirm.

Defendant Marvin Anthony Gutierrez was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and street terrorism. Defendant raises a single issue on appeal whether under the conviction of count 4 as described below, there was sufficient evidence he was willfully promoting, furthering, or assisting felonious criminal conduct by the gang of which he was a member by possessing a loaded firearm in his car. We affirm. The prosecutions gang expert properly testified, based on his training and experience, that a gang benefits from a gang members possession of a loaded firearm under the facts of this case; this evidence established defendant willfully promoted, furthered, or assisted the gangs felonious criminal conduct. Therefore, sufficient evidence supported defendants conviction for street terrorism. The judgment is affirmed.

The Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) appeals from an order terminating dependency services, and finalizing the adoptions of eight year old Brianna M., and two year old Mary Jane M. SSA asserts the court prematurely finalized the adoptions in direct violation of Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivisions (e) and (j). The minors adoptive parents, Sergio and Estela M., do not contest the appeal, and urge this court to provide the relief SSA seeks. Court agree the courts order must be vacated as premature.

Defendant Kelvin Donnel Williams was sentenced to seven years eight months in state prison, after the trial court found that he had violated his probation. The court also imposed a $2,800 restitution fine, and a suspended parole revocation fine in the same amount. On appeal, defendant contends that the courts imposition of the upper term on one count violated his right to a jury trial. He further contends that the amount of the ordered restitution and parole revocation fines must be reduced and that the abstract of judgment needs to be amended to correct clerical errors. We find that defendants Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was not violated by imposition of the upper term. We further find that the restitution and parole revocation fines must be reduced, and that clerical error in the abstract of judgment must be corrected. court affirm the judgment as amended.