CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant M.C. appeals from an order made after a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 et seq.[1]declaring his two minor children, Kimberly C. and Bianca C., to be dependent children of the court. Court affirm.

This case is before us for a second time. Darryl T. Burnside, a known gang member, fired three shots at Jorge Buenos face, killing him, before leaving with Buenos bicycle. A jury convicted Darryl T. Burnside of the first-degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a))[1](count 1) and second-degree robbery ( 211) (count 2) of Jorge Bueno, and found Burnside committed the offenses to benefit a criminal street gang ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and personally discharged a firearm proximately causing great bodily injury and death to Bueno ( 12022.53, subd. (d)).
The trial court sentenced Burnside to indeterminate terms of 25 years to life for first degree murder (count 1) and 25 years to life for the firearm-use enhancement, plus determinate terms of three-years for second degree robbery (count 2), and 10 years for the criminal street gang enhancement. The judgment is affirmed.

On May 16, 2006, the Ventura County Human Services Agency ("HSA") filed dependency petitions on behalf of four-year-old F., three-year-old M., and one-year-old S. HSA alleged that the children's mother, A.N., had abandoned them with a relative and suggested that the relative "give the children to social services." The children's father, Francisco G., was then imprisoned after suffering a conviction in 2005 for driving under the influence of alcohol and causing bodily injury, and child cruelty. Francisco has a lengthy criminal history, including battery, driving under the influence of alcohol, domestic violence, and theft. HSA alleged that the children's parents had failed to protect and provide for them. ( 300, subds. (b) & (g).) Court reverse the order terminating parental rights and remand for the limited determination whether the ICWA applies. If, following proper notice to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the juvenile court determines that the ICWA does not apply, it shall reinstate the order terminating parental rights. Court affirm the order denying the modification petition.

On November 8, 2007, defendant, Aaron Hogan, pled no contest to a felony conspiracy charge and admitted that two special allegations were true. Defendants probable cause certificate issuance request was denied. We have a duty to raise issues concerning our jurisdiction on our own motion. (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126; Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 398.) Hence, we issued an order to show cause concerning possible dismissal of the appeal. Defendant has failed to fully and timely comply with both Penal Code section 1237.5 and California Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b). (In re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 651; People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1096, 1099; People v. Way (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 733, 736.) Without a probable cause certificate, defendant cannot appeal. (People v. Kaanehe (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1, 8; People v. Ribero (1971) 4 Cal.3d 55, 61; People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, 600-601; People v. Ward (1967) 66 Cal.2d 571, 574-576.) The appeal is dismissed.

Sean S. (father) has filed a petition for extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) challenging an order of the juvenile court terminating family reunification services with his daughter, J.S., and setting the underlying dependency proceeding for a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Court deny the petition.

In November 2004, Sacramento Police officers observed defendant Kenneth Hill driving a car with a broken taillight.[1] They stopped the car, and an officer noticed a gun protruding from the area of defendants right thigh. He was ordered to get out of the car and lie down on the ground. He got down, but then ran and was detained by other officers. A search of the car revealed tar heroin and rock cocaine. A booking search of defendant revealed additional heroin. A loaded gun was found on the route defendant took when he ran from the traffic stop. The judgment is modified to award defendant two days of conduct credit and to impose a $40 court security fee. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

Defendant was charged with inflicting corporal injury to a cohabitant (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a)) (count 1), and two counts of making criminal threats (Pen. Code, 422) (counts 2 & 3). Count one further alleged that defendant had been convicted of two other domestic violence crimes (Pen. Code, 273.5) in the last seven years. The information also alleged that defendant had (1) been convicted of a violent or serious felony within the meaning of Penal Code section 1170.12; (2) been convicted of a serious felony within the meaning of Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1); and (3) served three prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5. A jury convicted defendant on count 3, but acquitted him of counts 1 and 2. It also found the three prison term enhancements to be true. The court dismissed the strike and prior serious felony allegations for insufficient evidence. Court affirm.

This is an appeal from a judgment denying a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus seeking to overturn a decision by the New Motor Vehicle Board (the Board). (Veh. Code, 3000.) The Board rejected the protest claim of appellant Forty-Niner Sierra Resources, Inc., a Subaru dealer, and Richard E. Wilmshurst, its owner (collectively, Forty-Niner) that real party in interest and respondent Subaru of America, Inc. (Subaru) was not affording reasonable reimbursement for warranty work. The rejection was on the ground of res judicata, because the claim had been determined adversely to Forty-Niner in an earlier federal court judgment. The trial court agreed with the Board. Forty-Niner contends that the trial court erred in this conclusion. Finding no merit in the contention, Court affirm the judgment.

Twenty-two-year-old defendant Jeffrey Weber Duke pled no contest to driving with a blood-alcohol level of .08 percent or greater and causing injury (Veh. Code, 23153, subd. (b)) and admitted the allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on Jennifer C. in the commission of that felony (Pen. Code, 12022.7, subd. (a)). The court denied probation and sentenced defendant to four years and four months in prison: the lower term of one year and four months for the Vehicle Code violation, and an additional three years for the great bodily injury enhancement. The court dismissed the remaining charges and special allegations at sentencing. The sole issue on appeal is whether the court abused its discretion in denying defendant probation. Concluding that there was no abuse of discretion, Court affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Mario Sandoval Gonzalez of driving under the influence (DUI) (Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (a)) and driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 percent or above (Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (a)), both having occurred within 10 years of a previous felony DUI conviction (Veh. Code, 23550.5), and driving on a suspended or revoked license (Veh. Code, 14601.2, subd. (a)). After the jury sustained allegations of two prior prison terms (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)) and driving with a blood alcohol level of .15 percent or above (Veh. Code, 23578), the court sentenced defendant to a five-year term.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial after he was seen in restraints by jurors, his upper term sentences are in error, and the abstract refers to a fine never imposed by the court. Court modify the judgment to include two $20 security fees pursuant to Penal Code section 1465.8, order a correction to the abstract, and otherwise affirm the judgment.

On March 5, 2007, defendant Thornton Lester Cooley pleaded no contest to possession of cocaine. Imposition of sentence was suspended, defendant was placed on probation for three years, and ordered to enroll in drug treatment pursuant to Proposition 36. On March 20 and May 9, 2007, defendant admitted violating terms of his probation by failing to report for the drug treatment program. He was reinstated to Proposition 36 treatment both times. On May 18, 2007, the probation officer again filed a petition alleging that defendant had failed to report for Proposition 36 treatment as ordered. Following a contested hearing conducted July 16, the court sustained the petition and imposed a two-year state prison term. The court also imposed restitution fines of $200 in accordance with Penal Code sections 1202.4 and 1202.45, as well as $135 for laboratory fee analysis.
The judgment is affirmed.

Rob Halliburton appeals from a summary judgment in favor of his former employer, Remington College Denver Campus, Inc. (Remington), on Halliburton's complaint against Remington and his former supervisors for wrongful termination in violation of public policy (Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 172), defamation, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court initially granted summary adjudication of all but the defamation causes of action on grounds (1) Halliburton did not establish in his pleadings or in discovery responses that he was terminated for engaging in activity protected by an established and well-known constitutional provision, statute or governmental regulation; (2) Halliburton could not invoke certain Education Code provisions as a public policy basis; and (3) Halliburton's emotional distress cause of action was preempted by workers' compensation exclusivity (Labor Code, 3200, et seq.). The trial court later corrected its ruling to encompass Halliburton's defamation cause of action; it then granted summary judgment, ruling Halliburton had not alleged Remington authorized or ratified the conduct of his supervisors and denied him leave to amend his complaint to allege such ratification on grounds his request was untimely.
For reasons set forth below, Court conclude summary judgment was improper on Halliburton's causes of action for wrongful discharge and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. We direct the trial court on remand to grant Halliburton leave to amend his defamation cause of action as indicated below. Finally, Court vacate the order denying Halliburton's motions to compel discovery and remand the matter with directions that the trial court consider the proper remedy for Halliburton's insufficient efforts to informally resolve the discovery disputes.

Plaintiff Terrance Peterson appeals from summary judgments in favor of his former employer, Remington College-Denver Campus, Inc. (Remington), and former supervisors Jose Cisneros and Lennor Johnson, on his complaint alleging wrongful termination in violation of public policy (Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 (Tameny)) and other causes of action. During the litigation, Peterson purported to accept Remington's Code of Civil Procedure[1]section 998 offer to compromise, but Remington rejected Peterson's acceptance and the trial court denied Peterson's motion to enter judgment on the offer. The trial court thereafter granted summary judgments in part on grounds Peterson had not shown his termination resulted from activity protected by an established or well known constitutional provision, statute, or government regulation, and Peterson's discovery admissions established the truth of defendants' assertedly defamatory statements. Court affirm the judgment.

On September 30, 2005, the People charged Johnathan M. Walker with vehicle theft, receiving stolen property and possession of a controlled substance. (We take judicial notice of Imperial County Superior Court file No. JCF16618.) Walker entered a negotiated plea to vehicle theft on October 6, 2005, and the remaining charges were dismissed. The court set sentencing for November 3, 2005. Walker was not sentenced on that date because the probation department did not provide a report. The State of Nevada extradited Walker on November 14, 2005. PROCEEDINGS in mandate after request for disposition under the agreement on detainers. Petition granted.