CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant appeals his conviction following jury trial of grand theft automobile (count 1), grand theft of personal property (count 3), and failure to deliver a certificate of ownership and registration of a vehicle (counts 2 and 4). (Pen. Code, 487, subds. (a) & (d)(1); Veh. Code, 5753.) The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed appellant on supervised probation for 48 months, with several conditions, including spending days in jail. The court also ordered that appellant pay various fines, fees, and $2,019 in victim restitution. The judgment is affirmed.

Penal Code sections 6220-6236 authorize certain prisoners who have been ordered, or who have agreed, to pay restitution to their victims to serve their sentences in restitution centers while working in private sector jobs outside the centers. The State of California collects their wages and is required to distribute the net wages, first to reimburse each prisoner for certain work-related expenses, and then to allocate the remaining amount equally to the cost of operating and maintaining the restitution center, the payment of the restitution order or agreement, and to the prisoners savings account.
The trial court denied Franciss motion for class certification, and she filed a timely appeal. Because the order is based on improper criteria and is not supported by substantial evidence, Court reverse and direct the trial court to grant the motion.

Appellants Leeanne D. (Mother) and Edward B. (Father) appeal from an order summarily denying Fathers petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1]and the order pursuant to section 366.26 terminating their parental rights as to their child H.B. Mother argues that the order terminating parental rights must be reversed because the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) failed to provide proper notice of the proceedings in compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). (25 U.S.C. 1902 et seq.) The Department concedes the error under the ICWA. Father argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to hold a hearing on his section 388 petition and that he demonstrated one of the statutory exceptions to the termination of parental rights, showing he had maintained regular visitation and termination would be detrimental to H.B. ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) Mother and Father join in each others arguments. Court reverse the order terminating parental rights for the limited purpose of directing the Department to provide proper notice under the ICWA. In all other respects, we affirm. Father failed to meet his burden to show that he was entitled to a hearing under section 388 or that the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) exception applied to preclude the termination of parental rights.

A jury convicted Enrique Gonzalez of one murder and six attempted murders. Gonzalez says there was not enough evidence to find him vicariously liable for these crimes. Court affirm the convictions. The sentence is vacated and the cause is remanded for resentencing.

Douglas Carson appeals from the judgment entered following his no contest plea to two counts of robbery, counts 1 and 2 (Pen. Code, 211), one count of possession of cocaine, count 3 (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a)), his admission that he suffered two prior convictions of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d); 667, subds. (b)-(i)), served four prior prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) and suffered two prior serious convictions within the meaning of Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1).[1] The court denied appellants Romero[2]motion as to count 1 and sentenced him to prison for life with a minimum term of 25 years, plus 10 years for the two enhancements under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1). The court granted appellants Romero motion as to counts 2 and 3 and sentenced him to concurrent terms of three years and two years respectively. He contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request to dismiss the prior strike allegations as to count 1 pursuant to Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (a). For reasons stated in the opinion, Court affirm the judgment.

Defendants Setha Ieng Enterprises, Inc. ("SIE") and its president, Mouly Ieng, appeal the judgment entered against them in an unlawful detainer action with respect to the sublease of a gas station and mini mart. Mr. Ieng complains that he was not a party to the sublease and did not guarantee it, so that it was error to enter judgment against him personally. We agree and reverse the judgment against Mr. Ieng. SIE contends that the trial court failed to make certain deductions from the outstanding rent due, and so entered judgment in a higher amount than the facts warranted. Court disagree, and affirm the judgment against SIE.

Joan Christopher appeals from her conviction of possession of cocaine base pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a). Christopher contends the evidence was insufficient to establish that she possessed cocaine base as charged. Court disagree and affirm.

Rafael H. Figueroa was convicted of two counts of attempted murder, two counts of assault with a firearm, and one count of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle, with true findings on allegations that he personally and intentionally used and discharged a firearm and committed the crimes for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (Pen. Code, 664, 187, subd. (a), 245, subd. (a)(2), 246, 12022.53, subds. (b)-(c), 12022.5, subd. (a), 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).)[1] He was sentenced to state prison for a term of 35 years to life. Figueroa appeals, contending (I) the trial court should have granted his request for the appointment of an eyewitness identification expert, and (II) there was insufficient evidence to support the criminal street gang allegations. Court reject his claims of error and affirm the judgment.

Abraham Soto (appellant) appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial resulting in his conviction of arson of an inhabited structure or property (Pen. Code, 451, subd. (b)),[1]and the trial courts finding in bifurcated proceedings that appellant had suffered a prior serious felony that qualified him for a five-year enhancement, as well as for sentencing pursuant to the Three Strikes law ( 667, 1170.12). After trial, the trial court heard and denied a Romero motion. (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero).) The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate
11‑year prison term, consisting of a doubled lower term of three years, or six years, enhanced by five years for the prior serious felony conviction. Court appointed counsel to represent him in this appeal.

Donald L. Nelson appeals from a judgment entered following his guilty plea to petty theft with prior convictions (Pen. Code, 666) and his admission that he suffered a prior conviction of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, 1170.12, subds. (a) (d) and 667, subds. (b) (i).) Pursuant to the negotiated plea, count 1, second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211) and count 2, second degree commercial burglary (Pen. Code, 459) were dismissed pursuant to Penal Code section 1385, and he was sentenced to prison for the low term of 16 months, doubled by reason of the Three Strikes law. Appellant was given credit for 184 actual days plus 92 days conduct credit for a total of 276 days and ordered to pay a victim restitution fine of $200 plus a $200 parole revocation fine, which was stayed. The court agreed to make a finding that this was a drug-related case and to recommend that appellant be sent to a prison facility with a drug program. The judgment is affirmed.

Immediately after he killed Lynn Schockner, Nicholas Alexander Harvey was arrested for her murder. A police investigation implicated Frankie Fidel Jaramillo in arranging the murder and Manfred Schockner in paying to have his wife murdered. Following a preliminary hearing of November 16, 2005, the three men were charged by information on December 1, 2005, with willful, deliberate and premeditated murder of Lynn Schockner (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a); 189).[1] It was specially alleged the defendants committed the murder during the commission of a burglary ( 190.2, subd. (a)(1)(17)) and for financial gain ( 190.2, subd. (a)(1)). The defendants were also charged with first degree burglary with another person, other than an accomplice, present in the residence during the commission of the offense ( 459, 460, subd. (a)). As to both counts, the information specially alleged the defendants personally used a deadly weapon (a knife) ( 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury ( 12022.7, subd. (a)) upon Lynn Schockner. The judgment is affirmed.

A jury convicted defendant Frankie Allen Hernandez of one count of continuous sexual abuse on a child under the age of 14 years (Pen. Code, 288.5[1]) and two counts of committing a lewd act on a child either 14 or 15 years of age ( 288, subd. (c)(1)). He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 13 years four months, consisting of the middle term of 12 years for the continuous sexual abuse conviction and two consecutive terms of eight months (one-third of the middle term of two years) for the lewd act convictions. On appeal, defendant challenges his convictions and sentences on various grounds. Court affirm.

Joseph Myers, Clifford P. Record, Terry Sutherland and Kenneth Matson, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated individuals (appellants), appeal from a judgment entered after the trial court sustained a demurrer to their second amended complaint without leave to amend. They assert the trial court erred in ruling that respondents California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), the Board of Administration of CalPERS and the Boards members, the State of California (State) and each of the States agencies and subdivisions are protected from liability for age discrimination under California Code of Regulations, Title 2, section 7286.7, subdivision (f) (Regulation 7286.7), which provides: Notwithstanding a showing of discrimination, such an employment practice is lawful where required by state or federal law . . . . Court conclude there was no error and affirm the judgment.

Attorney David R. Medlin appeals from two orders entered pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6[1] directing him to comply with the provisions of a settlement agreement. The dispute is an outgrowth of an order disqualifying Medlin from representing certain parties in the litigation that this court subsequently determined was wrongly entered. Medlin contends that he is not bound by the terms of the settlement agreement, which require him to return documents obtained in discovery, because he did not sign the agreement or agree in open court to be personally bound by its terms. We conclude that summary enforcement under section 664.6 was improper absent Medlins express consent to the agreement. Accordingly, Court reverse the order requiring Medlin to comply with the terms of the settlement.