CA Unpub Decisions

Nicole P. (Nicole), an 11-year-old child at the time of the complaint, sued the City of Riverside (City) and the Riverside Unified School District (RUSD) through her guardian ad litem, for injuries she sustained when attempting to jump over a flooded area of a street crosswalk, adjacent to school property, on her way to school. The complaint alleged negligence by the public entities in permitting the existence of a dangerous condition of the street curb, creating a risk of harm to children entering and leaving school grounds during rainy weather due to flooding over the crosswalk. RUSD demurred to the complaint on the grounds that (1) school districts are immune from liability for the conduct or safety of pupils when the pupil is not on school property (Ed. Code, 44808); (2) RUSD is not liable because it neither owned nor controlled the property where the incident occurred (Gov. Code, 835); and (3) absent a specific statutory basis, public entities are immune from liability. (Gov. Code, 815.)
The trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend. Nicole elected not to amend the complaint and appeals from the judgment of dismissal as to RUSD. Court affirm.

In an unpublished opinion in case No. E038475, we reversed defendants convictions on counts 3, 4 and 5, and affirmed his conviction on counts 1, 2 and 6. (Counts 1 and 2 are first degree murder, in violation of Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a); count 6 is unlawful possession of a firearm, in violation of Penal Code section 12021, subdivision (a)(1).) (All further statutory citations refer to the Penal Code.) We remanded the cause for retrial on counts 3, 4 and 5, or in the alternative, if the prosecution elected not to retry those counts, for resentencing on the remaining counts.

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. He contends that the trial court made a number of errors in resentencing him. Primarily, the errors are ministerial in nature, requiring only amendment of the abstract of judgment and correction of the sentencing minutes. As to those contentions, Court agree. Court do not agree with defendants contention that he was entitled to a jury determination of the factor the court relied upon to impose the upper term on count 6.

Appellant Laura A. (mother) is the mother of Frank R. and X.R. (the children). Mothers parental rights were terminated. On appeal, she claims: 1) the juvenile court failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.; ICWA); and 2) the beneficial relationship exception applied. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) Court affirm.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of inflicting a traumatic injury upon his live-in girlfriend, identified at trial as Jane Doe (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a); count 1) and carjacking Janes car (Pen. Code, 215; count 2). Defendant was acquitted of count 3, grand theft person, as to Jane (Pen. Code, 487, subd. (c)). The trial court sentenced defendant to probation for three years.

Defendants Louis Manuel Gonzales and Renee Gonzales were convicted on December 20, 2002, of various charges arising out of the beating and stabbing of Louiss stepnephew. At the sentencing hearing, victim restitution was left to be determined. Counsel for defendants waived defendants presence at any subsequent hearing on the determination of restitution. On August 7, 2007, the superior court ordered defendants to pay restitution in the amount of $19,763.98 to the State Victim Compensation Board as reimbursement for payments made to the victim from the restitution fund. Nothing in the record indicates any notice of hearing was given defendants prior to issuance of the orders. No minute order for any hearing conducted in relation to the orders exists in the record. According to a clerks certificate issued on November 2, 2007, there is no record of any hearing for August 7, 2007, in regards to this case; thus, there is no reporters transcript either.

Defendant was charged in a felony complaint with one count of commercial burglary (Pen. Code, 459), and one count of petty theft with a prior (Pen. Code, 666). It was further alleged that defendant had previously been convicted of a serious or violent felony (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a) (d) [Strikes law]), and that he had previously suffered five prior convictions for which he had served separate prison terms (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)).
On September 19, 2007, defendant entered into a negotiated plea bargain in which he agreed to plead guilty to count one, the commercial burglary count, and admit the Strike, in return for a stipulated sentence of 32 months, and dismissal of the remaining counts and enhancements. The plea agreement included a waiver of the right to appeal from the conviction and judgment. Defendant was immediately sentenced to the agreed term and credited with 18 days of presentence custody credit.

On May 8, 2007, defendant and appellant Stuart Shelby Kinney was charged in a felony complaint with three counts of deliberate, premeditated, attempted murder (Pen. Code, 664, 187, subd. (a) (counts 1-3)), and one count of arson (Pen. Code, 451, subd. (b) (count 4)). On May 29, 2007, under the terms of a negotiated plea agreement, defendant entered a no contest plea to count 4 (arson) and the trial court dismissed the remaining charges and allegations. The plea agreement left the trial court with sentencing discretion. Court affirm.

Appellant Gerardo Romero stands convicted, following a jury trial, of attempted premeditated murder in which he personally discharged a firearm (Pen. Code,[1] 187, subd. (a), 189, 664, 12022.53, subd. (c); count 1) and assault with a firearm in which he personally used a firearm ( 245, subd. (a)(2), 12022.5, subd. (a)(1); count 2), both of which were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). Following a bifurcated court trial, appellant was found to have suffered a prior juvenile adjudication under the three strikes law ( 667, subds. (c)-(j), 1170.12). Appellant was sentenced on count 1 to life in prison with the possibility of parole, with a minimum parole eligibility date of 30 years (15 years, pursuant to 186.22, subd. (b)(5), doubled for the strike), plus 20 years for the firearm enhancement. He now appeals, raising various claims of error. For the reasons that follow, Court affirm.

Appellant, Moody Woodrow Tanksley, was charged in an information filed July 7, 2006, with possession of a flammable, explosive, or combustible material with intent to set a fire or burn property (Pen. Code, 453, subd. (a)).[1]The information further alleged that Tanksley had two prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of the three strikes law ( 667, subds. (c)-(j) & 1170.12, subds. (a)-(e)).[2] On November 7, 2006, after a jury trial, Tanksley was found guilty. After a bifurcated trial, the trial court found the prior serious felony allegations to be true. On February 28, 2007, the court struck one prior serious felony allegation and sentenced Tanksley to the midterm of two years, doubled to four years pursuant to the three strikes law. Tanksley was granted applicable custody credits and ordered to pay a restitution fine. On appeal, Tanksley contends the clerks minute order fails to show that one of his strikes was dismissed. Tanksley also argues the minute order and abstract of judgment fail to reflect that his sentence was two years and was then doubled pursuant to the three strikes law.
The judgment is affirmed.

In August 1999, appellant Veronica Aguilar Figueroa pled no contest to second degree burglary (Pen. Code, 459, 460, subd. (b)),[1]a felony, and misdemeanor battery ( 242). In September 1999, the court placed appellant on three years probation. In November 2002, the probation officer filed a report stating that appellant had satisfactorily completed the terms of her probation. In January 2003, the court, pursuant to section 1203.4, ordered appellants pleas withdrawn and dismissed the offenses. On appeal, appellant contends the court abused its discretion in denying appellants motion to vacate the judgment (motion to vacate). Court affirm.

Appellant, Quiona Marie Watts, was charged in a criminal complaint on February 14, 2007, with murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a), count one),[1]gross vehicular manslaughter ( 191.5, subd. (a), count two), driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, 23153, subd. (a), count three), driving with a blood alcohol level above .08 percent (Veh. Code, 23153, subd. (b), count four), and driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, 14601.2, subd. (a), count five). Count five further alleged Watts had a prior conviction of Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivision (b).

On March 29, 2007, Watts entered into a plea agreement in which she would admit count two and the remaining allegations would be dismissed. Watts executed an advisement of rights, waiver, and plea form acknowledging her constitutional rights and waiving them. The plea agreement was to a maximum sentence of 10 years. The trial court advised Watts of her constitutional rights pursuant to Boykin/Tahl,[2]as well as of the consequences of her plea. Watts waived her constitutional rights as well as her right to a preliminary hearing The parties stipulated to a factual basis for the plea. Watts pled no contest to count two and the remaining allegations were dismissed. At the sentencing hearing on April 27, 2007, the trial court stated it had read the probation report and accompanying The trial courts order imposing fines and assessments without an accounting for each one in the abstract of judgment is reversed. The case is remanded for the trial court to identify the statutory bases of all fines and assessments imposed, to record them in its minutes and an amended abstract of judgment, and to forward the amended abstract of judgment to the proper authorities. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

A jury convicted appellant Albert Gabriel of possession of a sharp instrument while confined in a penal institution (Pen. Code, 4502, subd. (a)),[1]and found true allegations that appellant had served a prison term for a prior felony conviction within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b) and had suffered two strikes.[2]The court imposed a sentence of 25 years to life on the substantive offense plus one year on the prior prison term enhancement, and ordered that term to run consecutively to the prison term appellant was serving at the time of the instant offense.
Appellants appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (Peoplev.Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant has not responded to this courts invitation to submit additional briefing. On November 21, 2007, this court received a letter from appellate counsel, accompanied by a petition for writ of habeas corpus (petition) prepared by appellant. In that letter, counsel requested that the petition be deemed briefing in the instant case. On December 3, 2007, this court granted the request. In his petition, appellant argues, as best we can determine, that (1) he did not commit the instant offense, and (2) he was denied his right to effective assistance of trial counsel. Court affirm.

After appellants motion to suppress evidence was denied, appellant entered a negotiated plea of no contest to one count of possession of a throwing knife (Pen. Code, 12020, subd. (a)(1)), and admitted as true an allegation of a prior felony conviction (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (c)-(j), & 1170.12, subds. (a)-(e)). He was sentenced to a state prison term of 2 years and 8 months.
Appellant contends that the superior court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. Specifically, he contends that evidence of his guilt (statements he made to the police and the discovery of the throwing knife he had in his pocket) was obtained as the product of an illegal detention. As we shall explain, Court find his argument to be without merit and will affirm the judgment.

This appeal arises from a felony conviction following a plea of no contest by defendant Carol Lee Slater to maintaining a place for the purpose of selling, giving away or using a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11366). Prior to entry of the plea, defendant made motions to suppress seized evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5[1] and to exclude extrajudicial statements made to the peace officer at or about the time of her arrest. Those motions were largely unsuccessful. She now challenges the conviction entered on her no contest plea, contending that it was based upon an illegal traffic stop and a later unlawful search of her truck.For the reasons below, we conclude that the traffic stop was lawful and the court below properly denied defendants suppression motion. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment of the trial court.