CA Unpub Decisions

In March 2005, defendant Richard Delbert Davis drove while intoxicated and ran into a tree. His wife and a friend removed him from his car, took him home, and placed him in bed. When he awoke he yelled at his wife and blamed her for the accident. He head-butted her and slapped the side of her head. She sustained a three-inch bump on the side of her head and a red mark below her nose. The judgment is modified to award defendant 128 days of custody credit. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment, including all applicable fines and fees, and to forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and requests this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised by counsel of the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days have elapsed, and Court have received no communication from defendant. Having reviewed the record as we are required to do, Court affirm the judgment but direct the trial court to correct an error on the amended abstract of judgment.

Appellant, Crystal W., the mother of minors C.M. and Alexus M., appeals from orders of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights and selecting a permanent plan of adoption for the minors. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, 395; further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) On appeal, appellant contends there was a failure to comply with the notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq. (ICWA)). Court shall reject the contention and affirm.

In this action for wrongful termination and discrimination brought by Antoine T. Bou-Malham (Malham) against his employer Farmers Insurance Exchange, and his supervisors Ross Jose and Bob Mull (collectively, Farmers), Malham appeals from the court's grant of Farmers' demurrer to his second amended complaint without leave to amend on the basis that (1) he had failed to timely exhaust his administrative remedies by filing an administrative complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) within one year of his termination; and (2) he failed to file his complaint within one year after he was deemed to have received his right-to-sue notice from the DFEH. The court dismissed his complaint and entered judgment in favor of defendants. Malham appeals, asserting the court erred in granting Farmers' demurrer and dismissing his complaint because (1) his second amended complaint sufficiently alleges a timely exhaustion of administrative remedies; (2) the complaint did not clearly and affirmatively set forth dates showing it was barred by the statute of limitations; (3) a two-year statute of limitations did not apply to his lawsuit; (4) the court should have allowed him leave to amend to set forth dates of the actions taken by Malham and the DFEH; and (4) the court should have allowed him to amend his complaint to allege equitable tolling. Court affirm.

Samuel Samson Guzman appeals a judgment following his jury conviction of second degree murder. On appeal, Guzman contends the trial court erred by: (1) excluding evidence of the victim's gang membership; (2) excluding evidence of the reputation of the victim's family for violence; (3) admitting evidence he (Guzman) was trained by the military to kill; (4) admitting evidence on the operation of a .38-caliber revolver; and (5) refusing his request for an instruction with CALJIC No. 5.17 on voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense. He also contends the judgment should be reversed because of cumulative prejudicial errors.

In May 2006, the minor, U.V. (minor), was declared a ward of the Juvenile Court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code[1]section 602 following his admission that he committed an assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)). The court committed the minor to Camp Barrett for 270 days and imposed other terms of probation. One of the conditions imposed was that the minor was required to take an assaultive behavior class while at Camp Barrett. At the annual review of the minor's probation the trial court, at the request of the probation officer, ordered the minor to attend a 28-week treatment course.
The minor did not appeal from the 2006 dispositional order and does not challenge the true finding or the original disposition on this appeal. The minor does appeal from the April 30, 2007 order which added the 28-week course to the requirements of his probation. The minor contends the court lacked the authority to modify the terms of his probation in the absence of a showing of changed circumstances and, even if there were changed circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the new requirement. We find the court properly added a necessary treatment requirement that had been inadvertently omitted in the original disposition order and affirm the trial court's decision.

Juan M., the father of Isabella M., appeals the judgment terminating his parental rights pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code, section 366.26. Juan contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that Isabella was likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. Additionally, Juan contends the court erred by finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption did not apply.

A jury found Loraine Lewis guilty of grand theft by an employee (Pen. Code, 487, subd. (b)(3)). The court placed her on five years probation. Lewis appeals. Court affirm.

Lonel Gray entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count of elder theft (Pen. Code, 368, subd. (d)) and admitted he had a prior serious/violent felony or strike conviction (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i)). In exchange for the guilty plea and admission, six other chargesone count of grand theft, one count of burglary, and four counts of forgerywere dismissed. The trial court denied Gray's request to strike his prior serious/violent felony conviction and sentenced him to four years in prison. The judgment is affirmed.

The juvenile court made custody and visitation orders, modified a restraining order, and terminated dependency jurisdiction in the case of Kailey M. Kailey's presumed father, Randall C., appeals, challenging the visitation and restraining orders. We conclude it is unclear whether Randall's visitation with Kailey is supervised or unsupervised, the restraining order contains inconsistencies, and there are discrepancies between the visitation order and the restraining order. Court remand the case to the family court to resolve these issues and otherwise affirm the juvenile court orders.

Mayra M. petitions for writ review of juvenile court orders terminating her reunification services regarding her daughter, Aimee M., and referring the matter to a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. She contends the court erred by terminating her reunification services and setting the section 366.26 hearing. Court deny the petition.

Defendant appeals from judgments in two cases. One case (case No. 14372) involves his convictions by a jury for two drug-sales offenses. Another case (case No. 7153) involves a probation revocation. The court sentenced defendant to six years in prison on the drug-sales case and one year on the probation revocation. In his appeal of the first case, defendant raises issues about a Marsden hearing and the sentencing. In the second appeal, defendant challenges the three fines imposed by the court.Court affirm the judgment.

Lakshman Wickremesinghe and Chrisanthie Wickremesinghe (plaintiffs) sued Walter Jayasinghe and Aesha Jayasinghe (defendants) for damages suffered from defendants failure to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 724.050.[1] In a prior lawsuit resolved in 1989, defendants were granted a judgment against plaintiffs, and plaintiffs and defendants were found jointly and severally liable to third parties also involved in the lawsuit. Plaintiffs were to indemnify defendants for any amounts paid by them to the third parties. In June 2000, defendants filed abstracts of judgment against plaintiffs properties in three counties for the judgment owed to them (that they later admitted had already been paid) and for the indemnification amounts, although they had never been asked to make any payments to the third parties. Plaintiffs demanded (pursuant to section 724.050) that defendants sign an acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment to remove the abstracts of judgment filed against their properties. Defendants refused, claiming that, although they had never been asked by any third party to pay on the judgment for which they were jointly liable with plaintiffs, they did not want to lose their right of indemnification by signing an acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment.

Defendant Wayne Elwin Chick appeals from his conviction of two counts of forcible lewd acts on a child (Pen. Code[1], 288, subd. (b)(1) counts 1 and 2), one count of child endangerment ( 273a, subd. (a) count 3), and one count of rape of a child under the age of 14 ( 269, subd. (a) count 4). Defendant contends: (1) the admission of his prearrest invocation of his right to remain silent as evidence of guilt violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (2) the prosecutor improperly suggested that defendants failure to testify in his own defense was an indication of guilt; (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of dissimilar conduct under Evidence Code section 1108; (4) the trial court erred in admitting the same propensity evidence from five witnesses under the guise of corroborating the complaining witnesss statement; (5) the evidence of rape was insufficient to establish defendants guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (6) his convictions of violating section 288, subdivision (b)(1) should be reduced to convictions of violating section 288, subdivision (a) because there was no evidence of the element of force; and (7) the cumulative error doctrine requires reversal. Court Affirm.