CA Unpub Decisions

Counsel for appellant Hasaan Saleem Weddington has filed a brief raising no specific issues and asking for our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Having conducted such a review, we conclude no arguable issues exist on appeal and affirm. Counsel sent notice to appellant of his right to file a brief in his own behalf. No such brief was filed.
The judgment is affirmed.

Vincent S. appeals from jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the juvenile court. His counsel has filed a brief seeking our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. Court find there are none and affirm.

At the conclusion of the six-month status review hearing, the Marin County Juvenile Court entered orders terminating reunification services and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 366.26 to select permanent plans for Bobbi Jo R. (born June 2002) and Dusty R. (born February 2005). G.R. (Mother) challenges those orders, contending that several underlying findings were not supported by the evidence. As discussed post, Court find no merit in her claims and deny her petition for extraordinary writ on the merits.

Richard Taubman appeals from the probate courts order denying his petition to enforce the no contest clause in the Janice L. Taubman 1990 Revocable Trust against his sister Anne.[1] Richard contends the probate courts findings in prior removal and surcharge actions that Anne had breached her fiduciary duty as special trustee to the trust determinations we affirmed on appeal compel a finding Anne also violated the no contest clause in the trust, which disinherits any beneficiary who attacks or seeks to impair or invalidate any of the trusts provisions. The probate court concluded Annes conduct as special trustee did not constitute a contest. Court agree.

After a court trial, defendant was convicted of one count of sexual penetration with a foreign object (Pen. Code, 289, subd. (a)(1))[1](count 2); two counts of attempted sexual penetration with a foreign object ( 664/289, subd. (a)(1)) (counts 1 & 3); three counts of committing a lewd act upon a child ( 289, subd. (a)) (counts 4, 6, & 7); one count of committing a lewd act upon a child over 10 years younger than himself ( 288, subd. (c)(1)) (count 5); and one count of assault with intent to commit a felony ( 220) (count 8).
Defendant appeals on the ground that his upper term sentences on counts 2 and 4 violate his rights to a jury trial and due process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Phillip Bruno Bush appeals from the trial courts denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis and nonstatutory motion to vacate the judgment. Because the petition/motion fails to state a prima facie case for relief, Court dismiss the appeal.

Kevin Marquis Price appeals from the judgment entered after his conviction by a jury for second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211)[1]with special findings by the court in a bifurcated proceeding he had suffered three prior serious or violent felony convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law ( 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and section 667, subdivision (a)(1). After the trial was completed, Price asserted his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562] (Faretta) to represent himself and thereafter was sentenced to an aggregate state prison term of 35 years to life. He now argues the trial court erred by failing, sua sponte, to terminate his self-represented status and to consider the Romero motion filed by his previous counsel, but withdrawn by Price, to strike one or more of his prior convictions. Court affirm.

Tina Green appeals from the courts dismissal of her complaint for her failure to file a security bond that the trial court required from her because she is a vexatious litigant. Court affirm.

Defendant Leonel Moncada was convicted of the first degree murder of his grandmother, Elvira Diaz, in violation of Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a). In a separate proceeding, the jury found defendant was sane[2]at the time he committed the murder. Defendants primary appellate contentions concern his sanity trial. He argues he was prejudiced because the trial court erroneously and prejudicially permitted the prosecutions mental health expert to opine on the ultimate issue of defendants sanity at the time of the murder. He also argues Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (2007-2008), CALCRIM No. 3450, the pattern instruction defining the burden of proof and the legal standards for assessing sanity pursuant to sections 25 and 25.5, improperly imposed a mandatory presumption of sanity if the jury found at times defendant was legally sane. We reject both claims and affirm. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony, nor was there a reasonable possibility that defendant was prejudiced by the opinion. Although the challenged aspect of CALCRIM No. 3450 is potentially misleading in the abstract, Court hold that a reasonable juror would not be misled based on the instruction as a whole and there is nothing in the record to suggest the challenged aspect of the instruction improperly affected the jurys verdict in this case.

Appellant Carl Leon Adams was convicted of second degree burglary and sentenced to one year four months in prison. The trial court stayed a one-year prior prison term allegation at the sentencing hearing. It struck that allegation altogether while the appeal was pending. Appellant contends: (1) There were errors in some of the rulings on his motions to substitute counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). (2) There was insufficient evidence that he committed a burglary. (3) The handling of the prior conviction was erroneous. Court order a modification of the abstract of judgment to correct clerical error and otherwise affirm.

Fairmont Specialty Group (Fairmont) appeals from the trial courts order denying its motion to extend the 180-day period to vacate a bail bond forfeiture and to exonerate the bond (Pen. Code, 1305.4). Fairmont contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to declare bail forfeited because it failed to order bail forfeited on the date of Antonio Vasquezs first nonappearance in the case and abused its discretion in denying the motion because Fairmont demonstrated good cause to justify an extension of time. Court affirm.

This appeal arises out of the conviction of defendant Dwight Arthur Baker for committing four counts of sexual abuse against his granddaughter, whom we refer to as Jane Doe to protect her privacy. The jury found defendant guilty of committing a lewd act upon a child, on or between June 7, 1999, and June 6, 2001, in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a);[1]continuous sexual abuse ( 288.5, subd. (a)) on or between June 7, 2001, and June 7, 2005; a lewd act upon a child ( 288, subd. (c)(1)) on or between June 7, 2005, and November 30, 2006; and sexual penetration by a foreign object ( 289, subd. (i)) on or between June 7, 2005, and November 30, 2006. Having waived his right to a jury trial on the alleged prior convictions, the trial court found the recidivism allegations truethat defendant had suffered two serious or violent felony convictions under the three strikes law ( 1170.12, subds.(a)-(d); 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and one prior conviction for purposes of the five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1). In his sole appellate contention, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his prior sex crimes in violation of Evidence Code section 352. Court disagree and affirm.

Michael T. LeSage appeals from post judgment orders in a martial dissolution and partition action that were consolidated for trial in 2006. The trial court ordered the community property division of a cabin and office building and the partition sale of a 65 acre parcel (Vineyard Drive) near Paso Robles. Court affirmed the judgment in a prior appeal. (B189730.) Undaunted, appellant claimed that a nunc proc tunc modification of the judgment to correct a clerical error permitted him to refile motions for new trial/mistrial and a motion to vacate the amended judgment. The trial court denied the motions and imposed $15,000 sanctions. (Fam. Code, 271; Code Civ. Proc., 128.7) Court affirm the sanctions order and conclude that the appeal from other orders cited in the notice of appeal is either untimely or barred by the doctrine of law of the case. (See e.g., In re Marriage of Balcof (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1518.)

Defendant, Eugene Lamont Nix, appeals from his convictions for: felony transportation of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a )); felony possession of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5); and misdemeanor driving with a suspended license. (Veh. Code, 14601.1, subd. (a).) The trial court also found that defendant was previously convicted of a serious felony and served a prison term. Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions and the parties raise various contentions regarding the fines. The Attorney General argues the Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement should have either been imposed or stricken rather than stayed. Court affirm in part and reverse in part with directions.